Summary
granting plaintiff's motion in limine "to exclude the testimony and report of purported expert Kerry Najolia" after defendants advised the court that they would not oppose the motion
Summary of this case from Day v. Baton Rouge City PoliceOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-2200 SECTION "C" (2).
October 16, 2000.
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The plaintiffs' motion in limine to exclude the testimony and report of purported expert Kerry Najolia is GRANTED as unopposed. Counsel for the defendants has advised that they do not oppose this motion.
2. The plaintiffs' motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to the Hardwood incident is PARTIALLY GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENIED. First, the Court finds that the cases cited by the defense are distinguishable. They deal with continuous flowing incidents where the officer had not yet secured control of a scene. In this case, the Hardwood incident occurred elsewhere, that scene was in fact secured and the two teenage boys arrested and handcuffed in the police car by the time Dep. Chaisson drove to the Chauvin home. What happened once Dep. Chaisson arrived at the Chauvin home was a separate event. Nonetheless, some evidence of the Hardwood incident is admissible and relevant to this case. The defendant may introduce the excerpt of the Juvenile Arrest Reports under "Probable Cause Affidavit" with regard to the arrest of Matthew and Jason Chauvin. These were written by Dep. Chaisson and they provide a barebones explanation for the arrests. Any independent or additional evidence of the Hardwood incident is inadmissible unless the plaintiffs' challenge the legitimacy of those arrests in their case-in-chief.
3. The defendants' motion in limine is PARTIALLY GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENTED. With respect to evidence of Dep. Chaisson's employment with St. Charles Parish, the Court assumes the plaintiff is relying on the information in Exhibit 16. These records are sparse and inconclusive of any actual wrongdoing on the part of Dep. Chaisson. Additionally, the complaints against Dep. Chaisson during his tenure in St. Charles Parish apparently all occurred no later than 1986, ten years prior to his employment with Jefferson Parish. Finally, the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office gave Dep. Chaisson universally "excellent" performance evaluations when the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office asked for a pre-hiring evaluation in 1996 and there has been no showing by the plaintiff that the JPSO was unreasonable in relying on such an evaluation. For the above reasons, the Court finds that any probative value of these records is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.
With respect to Dep. Chaisson's employment with Jefferson Parish, the Court concludes that the incidents described in Exhibit B (the Saavedra Complaint) and Exhibit G (the George/Lynn Complaint) are conditionally admissible with regard to Dep. Chaisson's conduct on July 26, 1998. The Saavedra and George/Lynn complaints and the investigations exonerating Dep. Chaisson took place prior to the incident involving the Chauvins. Plaintiffs' expert, Lou Reiter, has opined that the internal investigation of these complaints was inadequate and self-serving (Exhibit 14, #23 and #24). Should the jury conclude this to be correct, the jury could likewise find that Dep. Chaisson perceived he could act inappropriately without fear of consequences. The probative value of this evidence for this purpose is not substantially outweighed by the danger of any unfair prejudice or confusion. However, the evidence of the earlier incidents is not admissible to prove actual earlier misconduct by Dep. Chaisson. The lack of an adequate internal investigation does not "prove" that Dep. Chaisson did or did not act improperly in those earlier incidents. Consequently, plaintiffs' claim that the evidence is admissible to show that Dep. Chaisson "is a bully, who explodes when he does not get his way" is rejected. In order to admit the evidence for its limited purpose, and to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendants, the evidence of the incidents shall be redacted to simply state the generic nature of the police conduct allegedly violated (i.e. Exhibit B, "Courtesy"; Exhibit G, "Personal Conduct") and the exoneration of Dep. Chaisson. Mr. Reiter may testify as to the alleged inadequacy of the investigation without detailing the facts of the allegation.
On the other hand, the incidents and investigation described in Exhibit A (Parker Complaint; Exhibit 14, #27); Exhibit B (Saavedra Complaint; Exhibit 14, #24); Exhibit D (Leo Complaint; Exhibit 14, #28); Exhibit E (Downs Complaint; Exhibit 14, #26) and Exhibit G (George/Lynn Complaint; Exhibit 14, #23) are admissible in full as to the Monell claim against Sheriff Harry Lee for two separate reasons. First, the details of the documented allegations are relevant to whether Sheriff Lee knew or should have known of the prior complaints lodged against Dep. Chaisson. Secondly, the details of the internal investigation of those incidents is likewise relevant is light of the plaintiffs' expert evaluation that the investigations were inadequate and self-serving. The relevancy of this evidence is significant for these purposes and is not outweighed by any unfair prejudice.
Finally, the fact that additional complaints were lodged against Dep. Chaisson (Exhibit C, Jenkins Complaint and Exhibit F, Ross Complaint) is admissible on the Monell claim with regard to what Sheriff Lee knew or reasonably should have known regarding complaints against Dep. Chaisson. However, the Court notes that Mr. Reiter gave no opinion as to the adequacy of any investigation into the Jenkins Complaint and found the investigation into the Ross Complaint to be in fact adequate.
Given the nature of the constitutional claims being made, the Court recognizes that the Monell claim will only be at issue if the jury first concludes that Dep. Chaisson abused his authority on July 26, 1998, with regard to the Chauvins. "Nevertheless, proper analysis requires us to separate two different issues when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality: (1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Here, the alleged constitutional injury and harm derive from the actions of Dep. Chaisson, and the city's responsibility is based on its own "policy" under Monell. In light of the possibility of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues that may well flow from the Monell evidence being presented prior to that threshold decision being made, the Court will consider bifurcating the presentation of the case to the jury. The evidence of July 26, 1998, would be presented first and if the jury finds Dep. Chaisson to have violated the plaintiffs' rights, then the Monell evidence would be presented.
This would include evidence of the incidents of Exhibit B G under the conditions set forth above.
Lastly, with regard to the evidence of Dep. Chaisson's marital problems, the defendants' motion to exclude is GRANTED. These problems do not involved Dep. Chaisson's employment and therefore any probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.
4. The defendants' objection to:
Exhibit 9 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 10 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 11 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 12 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 13 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 14 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 15 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 16 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 17 is PARTIALLY SUSTAINED and PARTIALLY OVERRULED;
Exhibit 18 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 19A, 19B, 19C and 19D are OVERRULED as to theMonell claim (See #3 above). However, they are SUSTAINED as hearsay as to Dep. Chaisson's culpability. The actual testimony of the witnesses is necessary to establish that issue;
Exhibit 20A and 20B are SUSTAINED.
5. The plaintiffs' objection to:
Exhibit 21 is OVERRULED;
Exhibit 22 is OVERRULED;
Exhibit 23 is OVERRULED;
Exhibit 24 is OVERRULED;
Exhibit 25 is SUSTAINED;
Exhibit 26 is SUSTAINED.