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Chase v. Sullivan's of Middletown, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Feb 4, 1985
108 A.D.2d 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)

Opinion

February 4, 1985

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Orange County (Colabella, J.).


Order dated April 11, 1984 modified, by deleting the provision requiring that discovery be completed within 90 days after the substitution of counsel. As so modified, order affirmed, insofar as appealed from.

Respondents are awarded one bill of costs.

We find that there was ample evidence in the record to support Special Term's conclusion that appellants' law firm had, in the past, represented Middletown Plaza Associates' (Middletown) predecessor in interest on issues which are substantially similar, if not identical, to issues raised by the parties in the pending consolidated actions. "[W]here any substantial relationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter will be prohibited" ( T.C. Theatre Corp. v Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268). Middletown is entitled to be free from any apprehensions that its interests will be prejudiced because of such former representation ( see, Rotante v Lawrence Hosp., 46 A.D.2d 199).

The record further disclosed that appellants' law firm had been defending Middletown in a number of insurance subrogation claims while simultaneously acting as counsel to appellants in the instant action. This court has held that the "simultaneous representation of [parties], even though on unrelated matters, is at best unseemly" ( Rubinstein v Foster Bros. Mfg. Co., 52 A.D.2d 597). In our opinion, disqualification is necessary in order to insure fairness in the conduct of the pending litigation ( see, Renault, Inc. v Auto Imports, 19 A.D.2d 814).

The instant actions involve disputes as to the rights and obligations of the parties under a commercial lease. The issues are complicated and even Middletown now agrees that Special Term's expedited discovery schedule is insufficient for both sides to complete the extensive discovery necessary. Hence, we vacate that expedited schedule and leave the parties to their rights and remedies under CPLR article 31. Titone, J.P., Mangano, Gibbons and O'Connor, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Chase v. Sullivan's of Middletown, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Feb 4, 1985
108 A.D.2d 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
Case details for

Chase v. Sullivan's of Middletown, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:DAVID T. CHASE et al., Respondents, v. SULLIVAN'S OF MIDDLETOWN, INC., et…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Feb 4, 1985

Citations

108 A.D.2d 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)