Opinion
NO. 2015 CA 0605
01-07-2016
CHASE BANK USA, N.A. AND DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR JP MORGAN MORTGAGE ACQUISITION TRUST 2007-CH3, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-CH3 v. WEBELAND, INC., MALISE PRIETO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT FOR ST. TAMMANY PARISH, AND RODNEY STRAIN, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF AND EX-OFFICIO TAX COLLECTOR FOR ST. TAMMANY PARISH
JAMES M. GARNER JOHN T. BALHOFF, II ELWOOD F. CAHILL, JR. NEW ORLEANS, LA ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR JP MORGAN MORTGAGE ACQUISITION TRUST 2007-CH3, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-CH3, AND CHASE BANK USA, N.A. CHRISTOPHER J. DAVIDSON JOHN A. E. DAVIDSON METAIRIE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WEBELAND, INC. MALISE PRIETO CLERK OF COURT IN AND FOR ST. TAMMANY PARISH COVINGTON, LA PRO SE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE RODNEY STRAIN, JR. SHERIFF AND EX-OFFICIO TAX COLLECTOR FOR ST. TAMMANY PARISH COVINGTON, LA PRO SE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2010-12725
Honorable Martin E. Coady, Judge JAMES M. GARNER
JOHN T. BALHOFF, II
ELWOOD F. CAHILL, JR.
NEW ORLEANS, LA ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR JP
MORGAN MORTGAGE ACQUISITION
TRUST 2007-CH3, ASSET BACKED
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2007-CH3, AND CHASE BANK
USA, N.A. CHRISTOPHER J. DAVIDSON
JOHN A. E. DAVIDSON
METAIRIE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
WEBELAND, INC. MALISE PRIETO
CLERK OF COURT IN AND FOR
ST. TAMMANY PARISH
COVINGTON, LA PRO SE
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE RODNEY STRAIN, JR.
SHERIFF AND EX-OFFICIO TAX COLLECTOR
FOR ST. TAMMANY PARISH
COVINGTON, LA PRO SE
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BEFORE: PETTIGREW, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND CRAIN, JJ. PETTIGREW, J.
This is an appeal of two district court judgments which resulted in the nullification of a tax sale, and the corresponding tax sale deed, of immovable property that had been purchased at the tax sale by Jackson Title Corporation, the appellant's, Webeland, Inc.'s, ancestor in title. The judgments appealed also annulled a prior judgment in favor of Webeland that had confirmed tax title in their name and had ordered cancelled a mortgage that had been executed by the previous owners of the property, Clifford Lane Keen, Jr. and his wife Vickie Sue Keen (the Keens), in favor of the mortgagees/appellees herein, Deutsche Bank/Chase Bank. The judgments appealed ordered the tax sale deed cancelled from the conveyance records and the cancelled mortgage reinstated to its original recordation date (January 30, 2007). After a thorough review of the record, the issues presented, and the applicable law, we affirm both judgments.
The petition in the suit giving rise to this appeal alleges that Chase Bank USA, N.A. (Chase Bank) assigned the promissory note at issue herein to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), and therefore, Deutsche Bank was also a named plaintiff. Apparently, that assignment was lost and never recorded. The record reveals that a second assignment was executed on August 23, 2010, and filed in the mortgage records on August 26, 2010. At times throughout this report, the two plaintiffs may be referred to collectively as "the Banks". --------
SUMMARY OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This litigation has a lengthy, convoluted history. To the extent necessary to understanding and resolving the issues presented at this juncture, a summary of that history is provided below.
The Tax Sale
On September 19, 2003, the Keens purchased the immovable property at issue, a lot at 25040 Shubert Lane in Covington, in a cash sale. Shortly thereafter, the sale was recorded in the St. Tammany Parish conveyance records, identifying the Keens, individually, as co-owners. The act of sale listed the Keens' address as P.O. Box 1037, Covington, Louisiana 70434.
On December 20, 2004, the St. Tammany Parish sheriff/tax collector (Sheriff) mailed a property tax notice and bill to the Keens, at the post office box address listed in the act of sale. The notice was addressed to: "KEEN, CLIFFORD L JR ETUX." The tax notice and bill were returned to the Sheriff undelivered and stamped "NO SUCH NUMBER."
Once the taxes became delinquent, on April 14, 2005, the Sheriff mailed a delinquent tax notice to "KEEN, CLIFFORD L Jr., ETUX.," by certified mail, to the same post office box address. This notice was also returned to the Sheriff undelivered and stamped "NO SUCH NUMBER."
The Sheriff then published notice of the delinquent tax debtors and advertised the property for tax sale, in The St. Tammany Farmer newspaper, on May 5, 2005 and on June 2, 2005. The published notice listed "KEEN, CLIFFORD L JR ETUX" as the tax debtors, provided the same post office box address listed on the act of sale and used previously, and listed the taxes and costs owed as "$451.00."
On June 8, 2005, the property was sold at the tax sale to Jackson Title Corporation for $529.00, the amount of the past due taxes and costs. On April 26, 2006, Jackson Title Corp. sold the property by quitclaim deed to Webeland for $100.00 and "other valuable considerations."
The Mortgage
The Keens subsequently obtained a loan from Chase Bank to build a house on the property. On December 21, 2006, the Keens executed a promissory note in the amount of $183,700.00, payable to Chase Bank; and on that same day, granted the bank a mortgage over the property to secure repayment of the note. The mortgage was recorded on January 30, 2007, in the St. Tammany Parish mortgage records.
Confirmation of Tax Title/Cancelling of Mortgage Suit
On September 12, 2008, Webeland filed an action to confirm and quiet title with respect to five parcels of property, including the property at issue, naming as defendants the Keens and Chase Bank. Webeland also sought to have Chase Bank's mortgage erased from the public records.
Despite having received service of citation and the petition, pursuant to Louisiana's Long Arm Statute, Chase Bank did not answer the lawsuit or otherwise participate in any way. On April 16, 2009, Webeland's motion for a preliminary default was granted, and on April 23, 2009, a judgment was entered in favor of Webeland and against the Keens and Chase Bank, confirming and quieting Webeland's title to the property at issue and ordering the erasure of Chase Bank's mortgage.
Action to Annul Tax Sale and Confirmation Judgment/Reinstate Mortgage
One year later, on April 23, 2010, Chase Bank and Deutsche Bank filed this action seeking to annul the June 8, 2005 tax sale (and the April 23, 2009 judgment in favor of Webeland, confirming and quieting title), and to have the mortgage reinstated in the mortgage records. The Banks alleged the tax sale was null for lack of constitutionally required pre-sale notice to the Keens. Specifically, the Banks challenged the Sheriff's use of the term "et ux," in the notices issued to refer to Vickie Keen as well as the Sheriff's failure to advertise the property twice. The Banks urged that the lack of proper pre-sale notice to the Keens rendered the tax sale and the resulting tax deed null and void. On that basis, the Banks sought to have the court nullify the tax sale and restore title to the property to the Keens.
Regarding the April 23, 2009 judgment, the Banks urged it was a nullity on four grounds. First, they claimed that under Louisiana law, a null tax sale due to the lack of proper pre-sale notice cannot be confirmed or quieted through an action to quiet title, therefore, the judgment quieting Webeland's title is also null. The Banks further alleged that the judgment had been obtained through fraud and ill practices, because Webeland knew that the Keens were not given proper pre-sale notice of the tax sale and Webeland purposefully obtained the judgment against the Keens and the Banks with full knowledge that the underlying tax sale was a nullity. Third, the Banks asserted that Webeland and its attorney obtained the judgment through fraud and ill practices because Webeland did not, at the time of the judgment, own the property at issue, as it had been sold by the Sheriff to J.A. Resources at a tax sale on July 13, 2007, for unpaid property taxes for 2006, owed by Webeland. Finally, the Banks asserted that the default judgment was null under La. C.C.P. art. 1703 because it was different in kind from that demanded in the petition, noting that Webeland's petition to confirm its title incorrectly described the property as being in Section 32, but the judgment described it as being in Section 22.
In their petition, the Banks additionally sought reinstatement of the mortgage on the basis of the nullity of the tax sale and of the April 23, 2009 judgment. Finally, they also asserted a claim for damages as a result of the improper cancellation of the mortgage. The claimed impropriety of the mortgage cancellation was on the basis that the April 23, 2009 judgment was not a final appealable judgment, because Webeland's petition named seven identifiable defendants, yet the judgment addressed only the claims against four of those defendants. The Banks contend that since the partial judgment was not certified as final, the appeal delays never began to run, and therefore, the cancellation of the mortgage authorized by that judgment was premature.
Webeland filed numerous exceptions (no cause of action, no right of action, res judicata, and prescription) and a motion for summary judgment that were all denied by the district court in a judgment dated October 11, 2010. In written reasons for judgment, the district court stated its denial of the motion for summary judgment and overruling of the exception raising the objection of no cause of action was based on its finding the tax sale was an absolute nullity, because identifying Vickie Sue Keen, a record co-owner of the property, as simply "et ux" did not give her sufficient proper pre-sale notice of the tax sale. The district court further found that the April 23, 2009 confirmation judgment in favor of Webeland was improperly based on an absolute nullity, and therefore, was an absolute nullity.
Review of Confirmation Judgment/Reinstatement of District Court Judgment
Webeland filed a supervisory writ application seeking review of the October 11, 2010 judgment, which this court granted. This court reversed the district court in part, sustained Webeland's exception of res judicata, and dismissed with prejudice the portions of the Banks' petition for nullity of the tax sale, reinstatement of the mortgage, and nullity of the April 23, 2009 default judgment. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Webeland, Inc., 2010-2180 (La. App. 12/21/11) (unpublished opinion). However, the supreme court granted the Banks' writ application and held that the district court did not err in denying Webeland's exceptions of prescription and res judicata. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed this court's judgment, reinstated the district court's October 11, 2010 judgment, and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Webeland, Inc., 2012-0240 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So.3d 823.
Actions in District Court Post Supervisory Review
During the pendency of the foregoing appeals, Webeland, in the district court, answered the Banks' petition to annul the tax sale and, also, asserted a reconventional demand against the Banks alleging they had engaged in unfair trade practices by (1) intentionally placing a mortgage on property that was presumptively owned by Webeland as a tax sale purchaser; (2) permitting a default judgment to be entered against it in the earlier confirmation action; and (3) taking an assumption of the note and mortgage without recording it in the public records, thereby creating confusion as to the true note holder.
In response thereto, the Banks filed an exception raising the objection of prescription, arguing that Webeland failed to timely assert its unfair trade practices claims, and an exception raising the objection of no cause of action, arguing that Webeland failed to plead damages required by the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Banks also filed an exception raising the objection of no right of action on the basis that the district court had already held the tax sale to be an absolute nullity; thus, Webeland never had valid title or interest in the property needed to raise questionable claims about said property. The exceptions were taken under advisement by the district court, pending the higher courts' decisions on the writ applications.
Following the supreme court's reinstatement of the district court's judgment denying Webeland's motion for summary judgment and overruling its exceptions, Webeland filed a First Supplemental and/or Amended Reconventional Demand and Demand for Declaratory Judgment. Webeland alleged that the Banks had acquiesced in the perfection of Webeland's tax title interest by the following actions: (1) they did not maintain an escrow account for the payment of taxes and insurance with respect to the property despite provisions in the mortgage requiring them to do so; (2) accepting a mortgage from the Keens when they knew that the public record reflected that the Keens were no longer owners of the property; (3) despite having been served with the petition to confirm title, they took no action for a period of almost eighteen months before challenging Webeland's tax title; and (4) they knew the judgment cancelling the mortgage was executed, but did nothing to enjoin or restrain the cancellation of said mortgage interest before filing the suit to annul. Further, Webeland alleged that it relied to its detriment on the aforementioned actions/inactions by the Banks. Finally, Webeland re-urged the validity of the tax sale, as well as the sufficiency of the pre-sale notice given to the Keens and the advertised notice of the tax sale.
Webeland sought a declaratory judgment "concerning the nature of the alleged absolute nullity of its tax title," specifically requesting a declaration that the absolute nullity was of the type that is susceptible of acquiescence. They also sought a declaratory judgment that the Keens had waived, acquiesced, ratified, or abandoned their due process rights by giving an incorrect address, taking no action to defend their interest in the confirmation suit, executing a quitclaim deed transferring their interest in the property to Webeland, and by permitting their due process rights to lapse by virtue of a five-year prescription. In this pleading, Webeland additionally raised the issue of whether the 2009 amendments to the provisions of La. R.S. 47:2121 et seq. were remedial insofar as said legislation was enacted with the purpose of satisfying due process requirements and return to commerce of tax sale properties. Webeland furthermore raised the issue of the nature of the enactment of La. R.S. 47:2286 (stating that tax sale nullities are relative nullities) and of La. R.S. 47:2122(4) (establishing that service of citation and petition of a tax sale confirmation suit constitutes notice of a tax sale), seeking a declaratory judgment that the provisions are interpretive and, as such, retroactively effective as to tax sales registered prior to the effective date of that legislation, January 1, 2009.
Deutsche Bank responded to Webeland's supplemental reconventional demand with an exception raising the objection of no cause of action. It also filed its own motion for summary judgment, urging that the district court's written reasons for its October 11, 2010 judgment directly support that the denial of Webeland's exceptions and motion for summary judgment in effect nullified that tax sale, and that judgment was upheld by the supreme court.
Judgments on Appeal
On July 31, 2014 judgment, the district court signed a judgment granting Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment and all the requested relief, and dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted by Webeland against Deutsche Bank. Webeland then filed a motion for new trial and an affidavit of expenses, setting forth taxes, interest, and costs incurred by it after the nullity of the tax sale. Deutsche Bank filed a motion to contest those expenses. In the other judgment before us on appeal, dated December 3, 2014, the district court denied Webeland's motion for new trial, granted Deutsche Bank's motion to contest taxes, interest, and costs (finding no amounts were due to Webeland), declared the 2005 tax sale, the 2005 tax sale deed, and the confirmation judgment absolutely null, ordered the 2005 tax sale deed cancelled from the conveyance records, and uncancelled and reinstated the Banks' mortgage in the mortgage records.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Webeland asserts the following assignments of error:
1. The Trial Court erred by failing to recognize that Clifford L Keen, Jr. and Vickie Sue Keen's whereabouts were not reasonably ascertainable to the Sheriff for the Parish of St. Tammany.
2. The Trial Court erred in granting an exception of no cause of action to Webeland's Unfair Trade Practice Claim.
3. The Trial Court failed to consider whether the effects of the 2009 amendments to Title 47 should have been deemed remedial, interpretive, and therefore applicable to the case at bar.
At the outset, the Banks, in their brief, in addition to arguing that the district court's judgments were correct and that Webeland's assignments of error lack merit, they object to Webeland's appeal urging that the supreme court's earlier reinstatement of the district court's October 11, 2010 judgment (that denied Webeland's exceptions and motion for summary judgment, based upon its finding the tax sale was an absolute nullity) constitutes law of the case. The Banks further maintain that application of the law of the case doctrine bars revisiting the issue of whether the Keens received the constitutionally required pre-sale notice that was decided in that judgment. Thus, the Banks claim Webeland's argument on assignment of error number one, that the Keens' whereabouts were not reasonably ascertainable, is improper because it raises an issue that has been already litigated, decided, and affirmed by the supreme court's order reinstating the district court's ruling.
The Banks further argue that the district court, being bound by its own earlier ruling (that the tax sale and confirmation judgment were absolute nullities because the Sheriff failed to give the constitutionally required notice to the Keens, and their whereabouts were reasonably ascertainable), correctly granted Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS
LAW OF THE CASE
The law of the case doctrine is a discretionary guide which relates to (a) the binding force of a trial judge's ruling during the later stages of trial, (b) the conclusive effects of appellate rulings at trial on remand, and (c) the rule that an appellate court ordinarily will not reconsider its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Verdin, 95-2579 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 63, 65, writ denied, 96-2629 (La. 12/13/96), 692 So.2d 1067, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1212, 117 S.Ct. 1696, 137 L.Ed.2d 822 (1997). It applies to all prior rulings or decisions of an appellate court or the supreme court in the same case, not merely those arising from the full appeal process. Jones v. McDonald's Corp., 97-2287 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 723 So.2d 492, 494, citing Brumfield v. Dyson, 418 So.2d 21, 23 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 422 So.2d 162 (La. 1982). The doctrine applies only against those who were parties to the case when the earlier decision was rendered, and who thus have had their day in court. State, ex rel. Division of Administration, Office of Risk Management v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Louisiana, 2013-0375 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/8/14), 146 So.3d 556, 563.
The reasons for the doctrine are to avoid re-litigation of the same issue, to promote consistency of result in the same litigation, and to promote efficiency and fairness to the parties by affording a single opportunity for the argument and decision of the matter at issue. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 681 So.2d at 65; Petition of Sewerage and Water Bd. Of New Orleans, 278 So.2d 81, 83 (La. 1973). When an appellate court (or the supreme court) considers arguments made in supervisory writ applications or responses to such applications, the court's disposition on the issue considered usually becomes law of the case, foreclosing re-litigation of that issue either at the trial court on remand or in the appellate court on a later appeal. Spruell v. Dudley, 2006-0015 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 339, 342, writ denied, 2007-0196 (La. 3/23/07), 951 So.2d 1106 (emphasis added), citing Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Verdin, 681 So.2d at 65.
Applying the foregoing law of the case principles, we conclude that the supreme court's decision in Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Webeland, Inc., 2012-0240 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So.3d 823, reinstating the district court's October 11, 2010 judgment, constitutes law of the case in this litigation, precluding re-litigation of the issue of whether the Keens had sufficient pre-sale notice of the tax sale, and whether the lack thereof rendered the tax sale an absolute nullity. Although, procedurally, the October 11, 2010 judgment overruled Webeland's exceptions raising the objections of prescription, no cause of action, no right of action, and res judicata, and denied its motion for summary judgment; substantively, that judgment resolved the issue of "whether the 2005 tax sale was an absolute nullity because Vickie Keen allegedly did not receive proper pre-sale notice which would be in violation of her constitutional rights and render the sale null," as expressly stated by the district court in its written reasons for judgment. The district court's judgment, overruling Webeland's exceptions and denying its motion for summary judgment, was based on its findings; and as we found before, it explicitly stated, in its written reasons for judgment that the notice was insufficient and rendered the tax sale an absolute nullity.
The supreme court reinstated that judgment, implicitly affirming the district court's finding that the tax sale was absolutely null, and putting an end to the litigation of the issue of the adequacy of the notice and the nullity of the tax sale. Such being law of the case in this matter, the district court erroneously re-considered the issue; and assignment of error number one, not properly before us, lacks merit.
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE CLAIM
Webeland also assigns error to the district court's granting the exception raising the objection of no cause of action and dismissing the claim it asserted in its reconventional demand to the Banks' annulment suit. Webeland argues that the Banks engaged in unfair trade practices and violated the consumer protection law by placing a mortgage on the property over which Webeland claimed ownership (as a result of the tax sale).
At the outset, we note that it appears counterintuitive to find that Webeland states a valid cause of action against the Banks for having engaged in unfair trade practices by filing a suit in which in they ultimately prevailed; particularly, now, that we have affirmed that judgment. Moreover, our review of the allegations in Webeland's reconventional demand reveals that they challenge acts by the Banks that the Banks were legally entitled to do.
Additionally, this assignment of error lacks merit because the reconventional demand does not plead the damages recoverable under the unfair trade practices act. The cause of action is granted to a "person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use of employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice declared unlawful by La. R.S. 51:1405." La. R.S. 51:1409(A), Webeland's demand does not, and cannot, state such a cause of action.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in sustaining the Banks' exception of no cause of action to Webeland's reconventional demand.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE TAX SALE STATUTES
In its final assignment of error, Webeland asserts the district court erred in not applying, retroactively, the 2009 amendments to the tax sale statutes (addressing the means by which notice of delinquent property taxes must be provided), enacted by 2008 La. Acts No. 819, § 1, effective January 1, 2009. It is undisputed that the tax sale at issue herein, which took place in 2005, occurred years prior to the effective date of the amended statutes. Thus, the only way those amendments apply in this litigation is if they are given retroactive application.
We need not employ the legal analysis of whether retroactive application of those amendments is warranted, because our review of the jurisprudence reveals that Louisiana courts, when considering the nullity of pre-January 1, 2009 tax sales, have applied the pre-revision law, implicitly holding that retroactive application of the amendments thereto is not proper. See C & C Energy, L.L.C. v. Cody Investments, L.L.C., 2009-2160 (La. 7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1134, 1139 (a case involving a tax sale occurring in 2000, prior to the amendments to the statute, but decided in 2010, after the effective date of the amendments). The supreme court expressly noted that former La. R.S. 47:2180 was the effective statute at the time of the sale, and therefore, it, rather than the amended statute, applied in determining whether the notice of delinquent property taxes was proper). See also, Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc., 2011-2566 (La. 7/2/12), 94 So.3d 750, 756 (where the supreme court again applied former La. R.S. 47:2180, which was in effect at the time of the tax sale at issue therein, in determining whether the notice of delinquencies of taxes was in compliance with law).
CONCLUSION
Finding no merit in any of Webeland's assignments of error, the judgments of the district court are hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Webeland, Inc.
AFFIRMED.
CRAIN, J., dissenting.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the supreme court's decision in Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Webeland, Inc., 12-02040 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So. 3d 823 (Chase I), was an implicit affirmation of the district court's finding that the tax sale is absolutely null, and now constitutes law of the case precluding consideration of the notice issue. There is no indication in Chase I that the supreme court considered the merits of the notice issue or the district court's denial of Webeland's motion for summary judgment. Rather, the decision was limited to the exceptions of res judicata and prescription, both of which focused on the effect of the judgment confirming the tax title in the context of the allegation of an absolutely null sale. The law of the case doctrine is discretionary and applies only to parties and issues that were actually presented and decided by a reviewing court. See Display S., Inc. v. Express Computer Supply, Inc., 06-1137 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So. 2d 451, 454. Based on the language of Chase I and the record in this matter, I do not find the doctrine applicable here.
After de novo review, I find that genuine issues of material fact remain as to the adequacy of the pre-tax sale notice provided to the Keens. Accordingly, I would reverse the July 31, 2014 summary judgment granted in favor of Deutsche Bank and remand this matter for further proceedings. I would further vacate the November 3, 2014 judgment declaring the tax sale and tax sale deed to be absolute nullities.