Opinion
13-P-1832
12-17-2014
CHARLES COMEAU & another v. COVANTA COMPANY OF SEMASS, L.P., & another.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiffs, Charles Comeau and his wife, filed this lawsuit after Comeau reported receiving an electrical shock in 2007 while using a trash compactor under the control of Covanta. They appeal from a Superior Court judgment in favor of Covanta and the order denying their motion for postjudgment relief. We affirm.
Background. Comeau was taken to a hospital in March, 2007, where he apparently gave conflicting reports to medical personnel about receiving an electrical shock while depositing trash in a compactor at a public facility in Plymouth. He and his wife filed a complaint on March 23, 2010, for negligence and loss of consortium against Covanta, which was responsible for maintenance of the trash compactor.
A medical report marked exhibit forty-six, apparently an intake report, indicates that Comeau told medical personnel after the incident that "he was electrocuted again today." In contrast, a medical discharge report marked exhibit forty-seven states that Comeau "denies that he had an electric shock."
At trial, Covanta denied that it was negligent and pointed to a previous electrocution that injured Comeau in 1998. On August 15, 2012, a jury returned a special verdict slip in which they answered "Yes" to the first question, "Was the defendant Covanta negligent?," but answered "No" to the next question, "Was the defendant Covanta's negligence a substantial factor in producing an injury to plaintiff Charles Comeau?" The jury also answered "No" to the question, "Do you find that the plaintiff, Arlene Comeau, has suffered a loss of her husband's consortium as a result of Covanta's negligence?" As such, the jury did not respond to two questions on damages. Judgment entered for Covanta. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial, which was denied by the trial judge.
Jury verdict. The plaintiffs argue that the trial judge erred in denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial because of inconsistencies in the special jury verdict.
A trial judge should set aside a jury verdict in a civil case only if the judge concludes that "the verdict is so markedly against the weight of the evidence as to suggest that the jurors allowed themselves to be misled, were swept away by bias or prejudice, or for a combination of reasons." W. Oliver Tripp Co. v. American Hoechst Corp., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 748 (1993). The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Ibid. Arguments that challenge the weight of the evidence require an appellant to include all portions of the trial transcript necessary for review of the issue. Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 83-84 (1995). The necessity of including parts of the transcript that "are essential for review of the issues raised on appeal . . . is a fundamental and long-standing rule of appellate civil practice." Id. at 84, quoting from Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 371, 372-373 (1991).
Here, the plaintiffs argue that they should have received a new trial because no rational jury could have answered "Yes" to the first question (whether Covanta was negligent) while simultaneously answering "No" to the second question (whether Covanta's negligence was a substantial factor in producing an injury to Comeau). To the extent this argument requires us to examine whether the jury could rationally reach the conclusions they reached, the plaintiffs have failed to place before us the trial transcripts necessary for appellate review. See Cameron v. Carelli, supra at 83-84. Their appendix includes only limited portions of the trial transcripts, which precludes our review of their argument because not all the evidence considered by the jury has been presented to us. See ibid.
Even if we were to review the merits from the materials presented, the plaintiffs would fare no better. The jury were given conflicting evidence, considered it, and ruled in favor of Covanta. There was no error.
The evidence supporting the verdict included expert testimony and medical reports regarding Comeau's past treatment.
The plaintiffs argue that Covanta's closing argument resulted in a judicial admission or concession. Looking at the case as provided and Covanta's closing, we do not agree. Taken in context, the remarks that the plaintiffs highlight are consistent with the defense's theory that Comeau's injuries were caused by his 1998 electrocution, not negligence from Covanta. Some statements in the closing appear to agree that Comeau was injured in 2007, but the common theme for the defense was that the injuries were preexisting from 1998.
Denial of postjudgment motion. The plaintiffs argue that the trial judge abused his discretion because he denied their motion to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial without issuing a written explanation, other than to state that "[t]he jury's verdict was not against the weight of evidence for the reasons set forth in the opposition," namely, Covanta's memorandum opposing the motion.
The plaintiffs fail to cite any authority requiring a judge ruling on a motion to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial to give a written explanation accompanying the ruling. The plaintiffs' citation to Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 236-237 (1980), is misplaced because Cormier addresses the restrictions imposed on a judge's wholesale adoption of proposed findings of fact after a jury-waived trial. Here, the judge's choice not to elaborate on his reasoning when denying the motion, beyond referencing the opposing memorandum, was not an abuse of discretion.
For these reasons, and for substantially those in Covanta's brief, we affirm the judgment and the order denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial.
So ordered.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Graham & Katzmann, JJ.), Clerk Entered: December 17, 2014.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.