Here, because the counts asserted against the State and County Defendants are dismissed due to insufficient factual allegations, and because the Complaint hardly differentiates “DOES 1-100” from the other Defendants using specific factual allegations, the claims asserted against “DOES 1-100” are dismissed sua sponte, to the extent there are any. See Clinton v. Pollard, 2023 WL 3510410, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 17, 2023) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead an Eighth Amendment claim against Doe defendants where the plaintiff “fail[ed] to link any specific constitutional violation to any specific, individual state actor, and . . . fail[ed] to even minimally explain how each individual Doe party he seeks to sue personally caused a violation of his constitutional rights”); Char v. Simeona, 2018 WL 5815519, at *7 (D. Haw. Nov. 6, 2018) (dismissing claims against Doe defendants where “[i]t is impossible to discern between any Doe Defendant to determine who, individually, did exactly what to [plaintiff], and when the alleged action occurred”). Leave to amend is granted in the same manner as with the claims against the County Defendants: Plaintiff may amend his § 1983 claims against the Doe defendants and, if he wishes, reallege the violations of state law against the Doe defendants.

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have equated the elements of malicious prosecution and abuse of process under Section 1983. See Char v. Simeona, No. CV 18-00303 DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 5815519, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 6, 2018) (“An abuse of process claim is essentially a malicious prosecution [claim].”).

Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).Char v. Simeona, CIV. NO. 18-00303 DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 5815519, at *4 (D. Hawai'i Nov. 6, 2018).

This district court has noted that “[m]ost federal courts to consider the issue have concluded that there is no constitutional violation for abuse of process under Section 1983 without conscience-shocking, egregious wrongdoing.” Char v. Simeona, CIV. NO. 18-00303 DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 5815519, at *4 (D. Hawai'i Nov. 6, 2018).

Char v. Simeona, CIV. NO. 18-00303 DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 5815519, at *4 (D. Hawai'i Nov. 6, 2018).

However, the evidence adduced must demonstrate more than the mere fact that two people did or said the same thing; the evidence must actually point to an agreement.") (citation omitted); see also Char v. Simeona, No. CV 18-00303 DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 5815519, at *6 (D. Haw. Nov. 6, 2018) (sua sponte dismissing claims that prison officials tampered with evidence and wrote false reports to "cover up what really happened" as unsupported by "facts indicating any discussion or agreement" between the defendants to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A). Second, and as to Warden Paramo and Facility Captain Bracamonte, the Court finds Jones's unsupported claim that they "have been made well aware" that Officers Salas, Danial, Jones, Chacon, and Aviles and "vast other[s]" like them, "use the gym to assault, torture, and beat prisoners [like him] in solitude," see FAC, ECF No. 11 at 6, insufficient to sustain any individualized § 1983 claim for relief against them.

Char has filed several other actions in the federal court, with and without counsel, and he clearly understands how to assert a federal claim. See e.g., Char v. KHON, et al., Civ. No. 18-00304 LEK-KJM (D. Haw. 2018); Char v. Simeona, et al., Civ. No. 18-00303 DKW-KJM (D. Haw. 2018); Char v. Smith, et al., Civ. No. 18-00202 HG-RLP (D. Haw. 2018) (stayed pending state criminal proceedings concluded); Char v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, et al., Civ. No. 16-00058 JMS-KJM (D. Haw. 2016); Char v. City & Cty., et al., Civ. No. 96-00007 HG-FIY (D. Haw. 1996). Char, as the master of his complaint, explicitly limits his claims to state law torts, depriving this court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.