Opinion
05-22-00568-CR
06-23-2023
JULIUS ERVING CHAPMAN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
DO NOT PUBLISH TEX. R. APP. P. 47
On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court Kaufman County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 21-00408-86-F
Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Kennedy
MEMORANDUM OPINION
NANCY KENNEDY JUSTICE
Julius Erving Chapman appeals the judgment of conviction for aggravated assault family violence with a deadly weapon. In two issues, appellant urges the trial court erred by admitting certain statements he made to law enforcement and evidence of extraneous offenses. We affirm. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Background
Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, to wit a firearm. The indictment further alleged that appellant had previously been convicted of the felony offense of obstruction/retaliation.
The case proceeded to trial before a jury where the following was established. Appellant and his wife, the complainant, met over social media, began a romantic relationship in 2016, and married in 2020.
On Saturday, January 16, 2021, at approximately 11 p.m. the complainant came home from work with pizza and wings that appellant had requested she bring home for dinner. At home was appellant, his friend Malakai, the complainant's friend Gabby, and Gabby's two children. They all ate dinner, after which, Malakai left and appellant and the complainant went to their bedroom to watch a movie. During the movie, the complainant fell asleep.
Gabby and her children had been living with appellant and the complainant for a few months before the incident.
Appellant became upset with the complainant for falling asleep, woke her up, spat on her, and began yelling at her and calling her names. According to the complainant, appellant told her that Gabby had told him details about the complainant's age and children that the complainant had not previously shared with him. Appellant later admitted he had been drinking that night. As part of her testimony, the complainant explained that appellant "knew about my family but he didn't know everything about my family and I knew him and that when he drank, he found a reason to fight with me." Appellant then began hitting the complainant. Gabby, who had been sleeping in the other bedroom, woke up and went to their bedroom. The complainant asked Gabby what she had told appellant, and Gabby responded that appellant already knew everything. Appellant continued to hit the complainant. He then took a pistol out from a drawer, held the complainant against the wall by her hair, and threatened to kill her while holding the pistol against the side of her head. Appellant pulled the trigger, but the pistol did not fire. The complainant told appellant she would leave, and he walked her to the front door while pointing the pistol at her. While he walked her to the door, appellant hit the complainant in the face, pushed her into the wall, injuring her shoulder, and threatened to kill her.
The complainant had found the pistol days before and unloaded the bullets but did not know if appellant had found those bullets since then.
The complainant drove to the police station and reported to the police that appellant had assaulted her. Officer Victor Guzman interviewed her and took pictures of her injuries. Subsequently, the complainant went by ambulance to the hospital for treatment of her injuries where she reported she had been assaulted at approximately 1 a.m. She did not mention the pistol to the police or anyone at the hospital. The complainant returned home at approximately 6 a.m. on January 17 and laid down in the living room because appellant was at home and in their bedroom.
On January 22, appellant went to an interview with Detective Theresa Sommers, who was investigating the incident. Detective Sommers tried to contact the complainant, but she was unsuccessful. Appellant told the detective the complainant drove him to the interview and would return to pick him up. He stated she did not come into the police station because she was tired. During the interview, appellant admitted to assaulting the complainant and stated that she had assaulted him the week before the incident. Appellant was allowed to leave the police station after the interview.
The jury found appellant guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment. The trial court assessed his punishment at twenty-five years' confinement.
Discussion
I. Miranda or Article 38.22 Rights
In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court improperly, and over his objection, admitted into evidence statements he made during his interview with the investigating detective. Appellant urges that the voluntary interview was converted from a voluntary encounter into a custodial interrogation, such that all statements made after that conversion should not have been admitted or testified to, without the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Appellant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress, but defense counsel objected when Detective Sommers began to testify to what she and appellant said during the January 22 interview. At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel urged that the following statements made by the detective "at least insinuated that the interrogation [became] custodial in nature and at no point are any Miranda rights or other legal warnings under [article] 38 read to my client."
Don't try to make something up now, ok, because you don't have to think about the truth. The truth is the truth. Ok. You're not going to be able to get out of here and get your story together and come up with what you're going to try to tell me now. Ok. So we'll get to the bottom of it. Ok. So, again, what's done is done. You can't change that. Ok. By you continuing to dig a hole and tell me things that are not true, it's going to get you in more trouble. Ok. Because before, charges may have been reduced, the more you lie to me the more it tells me you know that this was not ok and you're trying to cover something up. Ok. So where a lot of times the DA will come back to the officer or the investigator or whoever it is and say hey, this is what we're looking at, how do you feel about it? And I'm like... Julius? Nah, Julius lied straight to my face when I'm giving him an opportunity to tell me.
Counsel objected to the admission of any testimony regarding statements made after that point in the interview. Similarly, he objected to the publication of the interview after that point. The trial court judge questioned the detective regarding the context of her statement and then reviewed the recording of the interview. Although the judge thought the statement that appellant would not "be able to get out of here" was not appropriate for the nature of the interview, he ultimately concluded that, in context, the statement made was to warn appellant that the interview was his one opportunity to tell his story and that his credibility with the detective would be damaged if he attempted to tell her a different version of events at a later time. The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection and granted a running objection. The detective proceeded to testify regarding the entirety of the interview. The trial court later admitted the recording of the interview over defense counsel's same objection.
Article 38.22 prohibits admission of statements made by an accused as a result of a custodial interrogation unless the accused has been given statutory warnings and has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived any rights set out in the warning. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. ART. 38.22 § 3(A). Miranda has a warnings and waiver requirement that is consistent with the Article 38.22 requirements. See Sandoval v. State, 665 S.W.3d 496, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45). As defined in Miranda, "custodial interrogation" means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Constitutional and statutory confession claims are evaluated under the bifurcated standard set out in Guzman v. State, with questions of historical fact and questions that turn on credibility and demeanor being reviewed with deference to the trial court's ruling and application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor being reviewed de novo. Sandoval v. State, 665 S.W.3d 496, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
If a statement has been found to be admitted in violation of Miranda or due process, we apply the constitutional-error harm analysis, which requires the error to be found harmful unless the appellate court "determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment." See id. (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a)). In determining whether constitutional error in the admission of evidence is harmless, we consider the entire record in light of several factors, including the importance of the evidence to the State's case; whether the evidence was cumulative of other evidence; the presence or absence of other evidence corroborating or contradicting the evidence on material points; the overall strength of the State's case; and any other factor, as revealed by the record, that may shed light on the probable impact of the error on the mind of the average juror. See Foyt v. State, 602 S.W.3d 23, 45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref'd) (citing Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
If a statement has been found to be admitted only in violation of a statute, then the harm analysis for non-constitutional errors applies, requiring the error to be found harmless if it did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. See Sandoval, 665 S.W.3d at 515. A substantial right is affected only if the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the jury's verdict. See id. at 515-16 (citing Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). Stated another way, a substantial right is not affected if the appellate court has "fair assurance from an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect." See id. at 516 (quoting Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373).
Even assuming, without deciding, the trial court erred, we conclude any error was harmless under either standard.
On appeal, appellant argues that in the interview he did not make any statements about having pointed a gun at the complainant until after the detective's challenged statement and points out that the complainant did not mention any gun to Officer Guzman nor anyone at the hospital where she sought treatment. However, the complainant testified that appellant threatened her with a pistol during the assault, pointed it at her, and that she heard him pull the trigger. She testified she had taken the bullets out of the pistol before that day, but she did not know if he had reloaded the pistol at any time since then and before he threatened her with it. Thus, the record, absent appellant's interview and statements concerning the same, contains sufficient evidence to establish the use of a deadly weapon in the assault. See, e.g., Funes v. State, 630 S.W.3d 175, 184 (Tex. App.-El Paso, no pet.) (sufficient evidence to support conviction for driving while intoxicated absent defendant's statements to officer that she had been to a bar earlier and had "some drinks" while there). Moreover, there was no evidence at trial to contradict the complainant's testimony that appellant used a deadly weapon in the assault. See Foyt, 602 S.W.3d at 45. Finally, we conclude, after reviewing the entire record, that any error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect. See Sandoval, 665 S.W.3d at 516.
We overrule appellant's first issue.
II. Admissibility of Statements Regarding Other Violent Incidences during the Relationship
In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the complainant to testify to extraneous offenses.
At trial, the complainant testified regarding the January 2021 assault and other prior instances of similar violence that occurred during her relationship with appellant. Prior to her testimony, and out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor stated that, pursuant to Article 38.371 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, "[W]e are looking to admit testimony in evidence as to the nature and relationship between [appellant and the complainant]." According to the prosecutor, the State wanted to establish "a pattern of assaults against [the complainant] and that this has been the very nature of his treatment of the victim for pretty much the entire time that they were together." He argued such testimony would also relate to "the reporting of the offense and whether or not [appellant] had anything to do with [the complainant] not meeting with Detective Sommers, things of that nature." Defense counsel responded that admission of such evidence would violate rules 403 and 404 as improper "character evidence." The trial court overruled defense counsel's objections to the discussion of any offenses other than those previously disclosed in the State's notice of intent to introduce evidence of extraneous offenses. The trial court granted defense counsel a running objection.
Appellant specifically complains about three instances of the complainant's testimony. The first was a November 2017 incident during which appellant hit the complainant's face with his open hand and continued to hit her after she fell. The complainant called the police that day to report appellant's assault.
The second instance was her later testimony that after she and appellant were married in 2020, they continued to have "more problems, more fights."
The third instance was testimony about a fight appellant had mentioned in his interview with Detective Sommers. In that interview, appellant told the detective the complainant had assaulted him on January 12 by hitting him on the side of his head with the pistol he later threatened the complainant with. According to the complainant's testimony at trial, the week before the January 17 assault, she became angry with appellant because she heard him speaking to another woman on his phone. She accused appellant of not respecting her and caused his phone to fall down. Appellant followed the complainant to their bedroom where he grabbed her by the neck and began choking her. The complainant took a pistol from a cabinet in the bedroom and hit appellant on the side of the head with it. After she hit appellant, the complainant left their home to spend a few days at a friend's house. The complainant testified that after she hit appellant, "he said that if I said anything, that he would tell the police and I would be arrested." He also told her that his friend who was present during the January 12 assault would be "his witness" and not hers.
We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts for an abuse of discretion. See Andrews v. State, No. 05-21-00388-CR, 2023 WL 3089812, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 26, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op. nunc pro tunc, not designated for publication) (citing Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). Under that standard, we affirm admissibility rulings when they are within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id. (citing James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 541 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2021, no pet.).
The State may not introduce evidence of a defendant's prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts for the sole purpose of showing his character and that he acted in conformity with that character on a particular occasion. See Espinoza v. State, No. 05-17-00547-CR, 2018 WL 6716619, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 404(B) AND Smith v. State, 5 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). Permissible purposes listed in Rule 404(b) include motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. See id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 404(B) AND Smith, 5 S.W.3d at 678). But "this list is not exhaustive." See id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 201 S.W.3d 695, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Article 38.371 "provides another non-character-conformity purpose for admitting extraneous-offense evidence" in addition to those listed in Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2). See id. (quoting James, 623 S.W.3d at 545, and citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 38.371). MORE SPECIFICALLY, ARTICLE 38.371 PROVIDES, FOR CERTAIN FAMILY VIOLENCE OFFENSES, INCLUDING THE ONE FOR WHICH APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED:
(b) In the prosecution of an offense described by Subsection (a), subject to the Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable law, each party may offer testimony or other evidence of all relevant facts and circumstances
that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the actor committed the offense described by Subsection (a), including testimony or evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between the actor and the alleged victim.
(c) This article does not permit the presentation of character evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable law.CRIM. PROC. ART. 38.371.
We have stated that article 38.371 "allows testimony concerning the nature of the relationship between the actor and the victim." See Espinoza, 2018 WL 6716619, at *5 (quoting Mapolisa v. State, No. 05-16-00711-CR, 2017 WL 2952994, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 11, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). In family violence cases, "[t]he nature of the relationship between the actor and the alleged victim may be relevant to, among other things, confirm the alleged victim's initial--and later recanted--statements to police, or to explain the alleged victim's unwillingness to cooperate with law enforcement or prosecution." Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.)). "Neither use contravenes Rule 404(b)'s prohibition against use of character-conformity or propensity evidence." Id. (quoting Gonzalez, 541 S.W.3d at 312).
We conclude it was well within the zone of reasonable disagreement for the trial court to have found in this case that the disputed evidence was admissible for a non-character-conformity purpose. The court allowed the complainant in this case to testify during the State's case-in-chief regarding appellant's prior continuous physical and mental abuse of her. This evidence showed the physical and mental control appellant exerted over the victim and explained her fear of him, which led to her reticence to speak to Detective Sommers and her repeated decisions to remain in a relationship with him. See id. (citing James, 623 S.W.3d at 545-46; Brickley v. State, No. 03-19-00784-CR, 2021 WL 1418978, at *8 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 15, 2021, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence of past incident of abuse admissible under article 38.371 because it contextualized the nature of the relationship between defendant and victim and helped explain some of victim's conduct during the incident and her hesitancy in reporting the offense); and TEX. R. EVID. 404(B).
We now address the Rule 403 complaint. See Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (requiring appellate review of trial court's Rule 403 analysis).
Finding a piece of evidence to be relevant is the first step in a trial court judge's determination of whether the evidence should be admitted before the jury. See Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 401). But, even if evidence is relevant, it may be properly excluded under Rule 403, which permits a trial judge to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." See TEX. R. EVID. 403. TO BE CLEAR, RULE 403 DOES NOT EXCLUDE ALL PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE AND INSTEAD FOCUSES ONLY ON THE DANGER OF "UNFAIR" PREJUDICE. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
In determining whether it was error to admit the evidence under Rule 403, we balance the claimed probative force of the proffered evidence along with the proponent's asserted need for that evidence against (1) any tendency of the evidence to suggest that the case would be decided on an improper basis; (2) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues; (3) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence; and (4) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. See Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 93. Of course, these factors may well blend together in practice. See Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
We have already discussed the State's asserted need for the evidence of other violent incidents during appellant's relationship with the complainant, that this evidence contextualized the nature of their relationship and helped explain some of the complainant's reticence in speaking with Detective Sommers, as well as her repeated decisions to remain in a relationship with appellant. Moreover, as the State argues in its brief, other than the evidence of the complainant's injuries and appellant's admissions during the interview, this case "was a credibility contest" between appellant and the complainant. The court of criminal appeals has warned that excluding evidence under Rule 403 in "he said, she said cases" should be done "sparingly." See Woodland v. State, No. 05-19-00174-CR, 2020 WL 1862126, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 14, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (discussing Rule 403 generally before specifically reviewing admission of prior false accusation evidence)). We conclude the trial court could have found the probative force and the State's need for the evidence was great and weighed in favor of its admission.
Weighing the foregoing against the remaining factors of the requisite balancing test, we conclude the trial court did not err. The offenses alleged in the challenged testimony, assault family violence or assault family violence impeding, are less serious than that with which appellant was charged, aggravated assault family violence with a deadly weapon, such that the evidence had less tendency to suggest that the case would be decided on an improper basis. Cf. Jackson v. State, No. 05-22-00370-CR, 2023 WL 1097801, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (prior conviction involving child victim under age of five years more serious in nature than charged offense against child victim of approximately ten or eleven years). Additionally, the complained-of testimony consists of six pages of testimony, which is a small fraction of the more than forty pages of testimony from the complainant and an even smaller fraction of the two volumes of testimony. Thus did not consume an inordinate amount of time; nor did it merely repeat evidence already admitted. See, e.g., Laube v. State, No. 05-13-00242-CR, 2014 WL 2993823, at *8 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding objected-to evidence that consisted of approximately twenty-six pages out of approximately three-and-a-half volumes of testimony did not consume an inordinate amount of time). Moreover, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the testimony of previous assaults, which were offenses similar in nature to the charged offense, did not have a tendency to confuse or distract the jury from the main issue of the case. See Andrews, 2023 WL 3089812, at *3 (noting similarities between extraneous offense and charged assaults as part of conclusion this factor weighed in favor of inclusion of evidence).
As part of his second issue, appellant argues the trial court failed to perform any Rule 403 analysis. The court of criminal appeals has explicitly held that "a judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is invoked" and further explicitly "refuse[d] to hold that silence of the record implies otherwise." See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc). As we are bound by the holdings of the higher court, we overrule appellant's argument. See Jackson v. State, No. 05-22-00370-CR, 2023 WL 1097801, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We overrule appellant's second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.