Opinion
No. CV-07 5005067
June 24, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #129
The defendant rental car company moves for summary judgment on this General Statutes § 14-154a vicarious liability action. The gravamen of this motion is that the plaintiff's action under § 14-154a is preempted by the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a). The plaintiff objects to the motion on the ground that the Graves Amendment is unconstitutional and therefore cannot bar her present suit. Even if the court finds the Graves Amendment to be constitutional, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's motion should be denied as she has alleged independent acts of negligence by the defendant which create genuine issues of material fact as to the defendant's liability. The court concludes that the Graves Amendment is constitutional and that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I POSTURE OF THE CASE
On November 16, 2009, the plaintiff, Katherine A. Chapman, filed a four-count amended complaint against the defendants, Franklin S. Herren, Jr., Allstate Insurance Company and Camrac, Inc., d/b/a Enterprise Rent-A-Car, for injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Counts one and two are addressed at Herren and allege that Herren was negligent and reckless in the operation of the motor vehicle that struck the plaintiff and caused her harm. In count four, the plaintiff brings an underinsured motorist claim against her insurance provider, Allstate. Count three, which is the count implicated by Camrac's motion for summary judgment, seeks to hold Camrac, as owner and lessor of the vehicle operated by Herren, liable for the plaintiff's injuries.
In count three, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On August 3, 2006 the defendant Camrac was engaged in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles. On that date, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Herren entered into a contractual agreement with Camrac to rent or lease a 2007 Dodge Caliber. Later that evening, at approximately 9:54 p.m., the plaintiff was operating her vehicle on Taftville Occum Road in Norwich, Connecticut when the 2007 Dodge Caliber owned by Camrac, but operated by Herren, crossed the center line of the highway and collided with the plaintiff's car, thereby causing the plaintiff severe injury.
The plaintiff further alleges that Camrac had a duty to the public, including the plaintiff, to take reasonable and sufficient steps to prevent entrusting rented or leased cars to persons Camrac knew or should have known create an increased risk of harming others by unsafely operating the rented vehicle. A review of the driving history and criminal record of Herren at the time of the rental would have caused a reasonable person to know that there was an increased risk that rental of the vehicle to Herren would result in harm to another person by his unsafe operation of the rented vehicle. The injuries sustained by the plaintiff are the legal responsibility of Camrac as Camrac, its agents, servants and employees were negligent and careless in that: (1) they failed to require rental applicants, including Herren, to disclose any past motor vehicle related convictions; (2) they failed to require rental applicants, including Herren, to disclose whether their motor vehicle license had ever been suspended or revoked for DWI/DUI related offenses or refusals to submit to alcohol or drug testing; (3) they failed to adequately screen rental applicants as to their driving history; (4) they failed to establish a policy prohibiting rental of their vehicles to applicants who have an unsafe driving history; and (5) they allowed Herren to rent a vehicle when they knew or should have known he had an unsafe driving history that placed the public, including the plaintiff, at an increased risk of harm. Pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a, Camrac is liable for any damage to the person or property of the plaintiff by the operation of its 2007 Dodge Caliber while rented or leased to Herren.
On March 3, 2010, Camrac filed an answer and special defenses to the amended complaint. Camrac has alleged two special defenses to the present action: (1) that it cannot be liable as the owner of the vehicle pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30106 and (2) that the active negligence claims set forth in count three are barred by the applicable statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-584.
On September 3, 2008, Camrac filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support. On February 25, 2010, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Camrac's motion. In support of her memorandum in opposition, the plaintiff has attached the following as evidence: Herren's responses to the plaintiff's request for admissions, the November 12, 2009 request for admissions that was served upon Camrac, a copy of the certified mail receipt signed by a representative of Camrac's defense counsel showing service of the request for admissions, the affidavit of Shelley L. Graves, the plaintiff's attorney, and copies of the official website pages for the rental car companies of Alamo Rent A Car, Avis, Budget Rent A Car, Dollar Rent A Car, Thrifty Car Rental and Enterprise Rent A Car. On March 18, 2010, Camrac responded to the plaintiff's objection by filing a supplemental memorandum of law in support of its motion. The motion for summary judgment was argued at short calendar on March 22, 2010.
Camrac filed its motion for summary judgment on September 3, 2008. Thereafter, on November 16, 2009, the plaintiff filed a request to amend her complaint. Camrac did not file an objection to the request, and, accordingly, the amended complaint is deemed to be filed by consent. Practice Book § 10-60(a)(3). Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-61, Camrac's motion for summary judgment will be applied to the plaintiff's amended complaint.
II DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherman v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 553-54, 985 A.2d 1042 (2010). Further, "[i]n seeking summary judgment it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact . . . [The movant must show] the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006). "When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Socha v. Bordeau, 277 Conn. 579, 586, 893 A.2d 422 (2006).
In the present case, Camrac has moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's statutory vicarious liability claim under General Statutes § 14-154a has been preempted by federal law, 49 U.S.C. § 30106. The plaintiff, however, contends that the Graves Amendment is unconstitutional. Alternatively, even if the court finds the Graves Amendment to be constitutional, the plaintiff contends that it does not preempt her § 14-154a claim as she has alleged independent acts of negligence on behalf of the defendant.
A Constitutionality
General Statutes § 14-154a(a) provides that "[a]ny person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner." In 2005, Congress enacted the Graves Amendment "as part of a comprehensive transportation bill entitled the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equality Act: A Legacy for Users (act), Pub.L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) . . . The Amendment was included in the act as a tort reform measure intended to bar recovery against car rental and leasing companies on the basis of vicarious liability." Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 9 (2010). The Amendment provides that "[a]n owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person . . . shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle . . . for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease if (1) the owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner." 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).
The plaintiff has challenged the constitutionality of this federal law, arguing that the Graves Amendment is an overreaching by Congress of its commerce power and it constitutes an illegal intrusion on the State's police power. However, in Rodriguez v. Testa, supra, 296 Conn. 23, the Supreme Court "join[ed] the overwhelming majority of federal courts that have considered the question [of the Amendment's constitutionality] and [it] concluded that the Amendment is constitutional."
"The constitution of the United States, article one, § 8 provides in relevant part: `The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the Several States . . .' The United States Supreme Court has identified `three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power . . . First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce . . . Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities . . . Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce . . .' (Citations omitted.) United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 155 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed. 2d 626 (1995)." Id., 22.
"[T]he Graves Amendment fits within the second category of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power because car rental companies are instrumentalities of, and things in, interstate commerce and should not be subjected to state by state regulatory regimes that can dramatically burden their operations even if only on an intrastate basis . . . [Further] the Amendment fits within the third category because vicarious liability laws may, in the aggregate, adversely affect the motor vehicle leasing market . . . This is because leasing companies may cease doing business in states with vicarious liability laws or may increase the cost of leasing cars to consumers in those and other states." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 23. "[I]t has long been understood that the commerce power includes not only the ability to regulate interstate markets, but the ability to facilitate interstate commerce by removing intrastate burdens and obstructions to it . . . On this theory, the Graves Amendment protects the rental car market by deregulating it, eliminating state imposed laws and lawsuits Congress reasonably believed to be a burden on an economic activity with substantial effects on commerce . . . Congress may foster and protect the entire market for rental cars because, in the aggregate, that market substantially affects interstate commerce. [As] long as the underlying economic activity the federal statute aims to protect is within the commerce power, we will not second guess [Congress'] decision that preemption is an appropriate means to achieve proper ends. Rather, Congress may choose any means reasonably adapted to the attachment of the suited end, even though they [involve] control of intrastate activities." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 24. Accordingly, "the Graves amendment . . . is a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the commerce clause of the United States constitution." Id., 26.
B Independent Acts of Negligence
Camrac contends in its motion for summary judgment that "[t]he [p]laintiff has not made an independent allegation of negligence against [it] . . . Further . . . even if an allegation of negligence had been made, there would be no good-faith basis for such allegation. Camrac, Inc.'s only involvement was renting a vehicle to Franklin Herren, Jr., as part of its ordinary course of business." The plaintiff, however, argues that she has alleged independent acts of negligence on behalf of the defendant. She contends that the Graves Amendment does not bar her claim because § 30106(a)(2) contains a savings clause which allows her to assert that Camrac was negligent in leasing the vehicle to Herren. The plaintiff claims that Camrac owed her a duty to prevent entrusting the rental vehicle to a person that it knew or should have known had an unsafe driving history that involved convictions and suspensions for multiple alcohol related offenses, reckless driving and driving with a suspended license. In support of her argument, the plaintiff has introduced copies of the rental requirements of Alamo Rent A Car, Avis, Budget Rent A Car, Dollar Rent A Car, Thrifty Car Rental and Enterprise Rent A Car taken from their official website pages. The plaintiff contends that "[i]n stark contrast [to Camrac, doing business as Enterprise] . . . a review of the rental requirements of a number of other major rental car companies (Alamo, Avis, Budget, Dollar, [and] Thrifty) evidences that: (1) it is customary for rental car companies to require a safe driving record in order to rent a car; and (2) it is customary for rental car companies to seek verification of a safe driving record via the application and/or DMV checks."
On November 28, 2009 the plaintiff's attorney accessed the website for Budget Rent A Car. On February 23, 2010, the plaintiff's attorney accessed the websites for Alamo Rent A Car, Avis, Dollar Rent A Car, Thrifty Car Rental and Enterprise Rent A Car. The websites provided, in relevant part, the following regarding the companies' rental requirements.
Budget Rent A Car: "Once a customer opens a rental agreement, but before the transaction is completed, some Budget corporate-operated locations might contact the issuing Department of Motor vehicles (DMV) to perform a driver's license verification for primary and additional drivers. Budget reserves the right to deny rental if the driving history reveals any of the following: (1) invalid, suspended or revoked license; (2) one or more convictions for reckless driving within 48 months; (3) one DUI, DWI or DWAI conviction within 48 months; (4) failure to report/leave scene of accident within 36 months; (5) expired license; (6) three or more convictions for moving violations within 24 months (excluding seatbelt violations); (7) two or more accidents within 36 months; [or] (7) other activities that suggest an unsatisfactory driving record . . . Budget will check renters' and additional drivers' licenses to ensure that they are valid. If the driving history reveals any of the [above mentioned issues] Budget is unable to rent."
Alamo Rent A Car: "All drivers must meet the renting location's minimum age requirements, have a valid driver's license, clean driving record and present a major credit card in his/her own name at the time of rental."
AVIS: "At the time of rental, the renter or authorized driver may be subject to an electronic DMV check from the state that issued the driver's license, or may be asked to sign a declaration attesting to specific criteria: (1) [t]he renter/authorized driver has a valid license that is not currently suspended, expired, revoked, cancelled or surrendered; (2) [t]he renter/authorized driver has not, within the past 36 months, had 1 or more convictions for reckless driving; (3) [t]he renter/authorized driver has not, within the last 48 months, had 1 or more convictions for driving under the influence (DUI), driving while intoxicated (DWI), or driving while alcohol impaired (DWAI); (4) [t]he renter/authorized driver has not, within the last 36 months, failed to report or leave the scene of an accident; (5) [t]he renter/authorized driver has never been in possession of a stolen vehicle or used a vehicle in a crime; (6) [t]he renter/authorized driver has not, within the last 24 months, had 3 or more convictions for moving violations (including seat belt violations); [and] (7) the renter/authorized driver has not, within the last 36 months, had 3 or more accidents."
Dollar Rent A Car: "In the U.S., before we will rent a vehicle and when the customer arrives at our location, the customer and any additional authorized drivers may be subject to a driving record and license check with the DMV. In the rare instance the driving record and license check fails to met our criteria, we reserve the right to deny the rental based on the DMV report. A list of our criteria follows: (1) [t]he drivers have a valid license that is not currently suspended, revoked, expired or surrendered . . . (2) [t]he drivers have not, during the last 24 months, accrued 8 or more points . . . (3) [t]he drivers have not, during the last 36 months, pled guilty or paid a fine for, or otherwise been convicted, of three or more moving violations [or] two or more accidents; and (4) [t]he drivers have not, during the last 48 months, pled guilty or paid a fine for, or otherwise been convicted, of one or more reckless driving, one or more accidents with a fatality or bodily injury, operating a vehicle, or permitting the operation of a vehicle, without a license or without insurance, possession of a stolen vehicle or using a vehicle in a crime, or failure to report an accident or leaving the scene of an accident."
Thrifty Car Rental: "In the U.S., before we will rent a vehicle and when the customer arrives at our location, the customer and any additional authorized drivers may be subject to a driving record and license check with the DMV. In the rare instance the driving record and license check fails to met our criteria, we reserve the right to deny the rental based on the DMV report. A list of our criteria follows: (1) [t]he drivers have a valid license that is not currently suspended, revoked, expired or surrendered . . . (2) [t]he drivers have not, during the last 24 months, accrued 8 or more points . . . (3) [t]he drivers have not, during the last 36 months, pled guilty or paid a fine for, or otherwise been convicted, of three or more moving violations or two [or] more accidents; and (4) [t]he drivers have not, during the last 48 months, pled guilty or paid a fine for, or otherwise been convicted, of one or more reckless driving, one or more accidents with a fatality or bodily injury, operating a vehicle, or permitting the operation of a vehicle, without a license or without insurance, possession of a stolen vehicle or using a vehicle in a crime, or failure to report an accident or leaving the scene of an accident."
Enterprise Rent A Car: "All [d]rivers . . . [m]ust meet the renting location's minimum age requirements, [h]ave a valid driver's license and [h]ave a major credit card in their name at the time of rental."
By failing to comply with the plaintiff's request for admissions, Camrac has admitted that it rented a car to Herren without making any inquiry into his driving history. Camrac submits, however, that it cannot be held liable for renting the vehicle to Herren because it was acting in the ordinary course of its business, and as such, is protected by the Graves Amendment. It also maintains that it had no duty to inspect Herren's driving history prior to renting him the vehicle, and that any evidence submitted by the plaintiff regarding the rental requirements of other rental car companies should not be considered by the court as evidence that a duty exists as the documents do not address the policies adopted by the rental car industry as they existed in August of 2006, but rather reflect the 2009 and 2010 rental requirements of some rental car companies.
"The request for admissions is an instrument of discovery . . . governed by Practice Book §§ 13-22 through 13-25 . . . A party's response to a request for admissions is binding as a judicial admission unless the judicial authority permits withdrawal or amendment . . . Similarly, a failure to respond timely to a request for admissions means that the matters sought to be answered were conclusively admitted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) East Haven Builders Supply, Inc. v. Fanton, 80 Conn.App. 734, 744, 837 A.2d 866 (2004). In the present case, the plaintiff served request for admissions on Camrac on November 12, 2009. Camrac did not respond to the requests. Accordingly, for the purposes of this motion for summary judgment, the court deems the request for admissions as being conclusively admitted by Camrac.
While Camrac did not brief its argument that it did not owe a duty to the plaintiff to inquire into Herren's driving record, it presented such an argument at short calendar. The plaintiff was given an opportunity to respond at short calendar.
"[O]nly a handful [of courts] have considered the applicability of the savings clause in § 30106(a)(2). See Berkan v. Penske Truck Leasing Canada, Inc., 535 F.Sup.2d 341 (W.D. N.Y. 2008) (granting lessor's motion for summary judgment where plaintiffs failed to adduce any evidence of lessor's negligence, including lessor's failure to maintain brakes on 2003 Freightliner tractor-trailer); Vedder v. Cox et al., 18 Misc.3d 1142A, 859 N.Y.S.2d 900 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2008) (granting defendant-lessor's motion to dismiss where, inter alia, plaintiff failed to supply any legal authority imposing a legal duty on lessors to investigate lessees' driving records); Novovic v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. CV-08-390, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94176, 2008 WL 5000228 (E.D. N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008) (relying on Colon v. Bernabe, infra, and concluding that plaintiff could assert claim for negligent maintenance against bus leasing company where leasing company agreed to maintain bus in lease agreement); Colon v. Bernabe, No. 07-CV-3369, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51981, 2007 WL 2068093 (S.D. N.Y. July 19, 2007) (conducting cursory examination of Grave's Amendment legislative history and concluding that, where lease agreement requires a lessor to maintain vehicle, § 30106(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to assert a negligence claim against the lessor for failure to maintain vehicle, but also expressing concern that "plaintiffs can defeat the spirit of § 30106" on a motion to dismiss by merely alleging that the leasing company was negligent in maintaining the vehicle); Escaleria v. Powell, No. CV 065004566S, 2007 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2956, 2007 WL 4210982 (Conn.Super.Ct. Nov. 6, 2007) [ 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 468] (granting motion to strike plaintiff's negligence claim against defendant-lessor where State law did not require lessor to ensure that lessee maintained insurance coverage and where defendant-lessor's failure to ensure that lessee maintained adequate insurance was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury)." Dubose v. Transport Enterprise Leasing, LLC, No. 6:08-cv-385-Orl-31DAB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5693, *13-15 (M.D.Fla. January 27, 2009). See also Peterson v. Swain, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 5001192 (April 6, 2010, Wilson, J.) (holding that Graves Amendment does not forestall suit against lessor when genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether lessor intentionally or negligently entrusted vehicle to lessee after disregarding red flags apparent on the face of stolen or fraudulent license); Johnson v. Alamo Financing, L.P., No. 6:09-cv-1768-Orl-19GJK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109062 (M.D.Fla. November 19, 2009) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's allegation of negligent maintenance); and Carton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 639 F.Sup.2d 982 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss upon finding that § 30106(a)(2) applies only to claims predicated on criminal wrongdoing and negligent maintenance).
The present case is similar to Dubose v. Transport Enterprise Leasing, LLC, supra, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5693. In Dubose, the plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident when a tractor owned by the defendant leasing company rear-ended their vehicle. The plaintiffs brought suit against the owner-lessor (Transport), asserting that "Transport was negligent in failing to ensure that its lessee . . . carried the minimum amount of liability insurance, in leasing and delivering the [t]ractor to . . . [the lessee] when Transport knew or should have known that . . . [the lessee] was conducting a "lease-on" operation and using unqualified drivers." Id., *2-3. Transport moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune to suit pursuant to the Graves Amendment. Id., *3. The plaintiff submitted evidence demonstrating that the lessee did not check on driver qualifications before leasing the tractor. Id., *6-7. The court ultimately granted the defendant lessor's motion for summary judgment, holding that "[a]bsent some evidence of a lessor's failure to properly maintain a vehicle which it has expressly agreed to maintain pursuant to a lease agreement, or some similar active negligence on the part of the lessor, the conclusion reached . . . is that § 30106(a)(2) is rarely applicable and should be cautiously applied in light of Congress' clear intent to forestall suits against vehicle leasing companies . . . Indeed, unless a State specifically imposes a legal duty on lessors . . . to ensure that their lessees have adequate driving records, § 30106(a)(2) only appears to apply to claims predicated on criminal wrongdoing and negligent maintenance claims — not claims of negligent entrustment." (Citation omitted.) Id., *15. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the "[p]laintiffs . . . failed to provide the [c]ourt with any legal authority which would require a long-term lessor to investigate a potential lessee's driving record, or on the facts of this case, the lessee's trucking operation, before entrusting a vehicle to a lessee. On the contrary, there is no duty to investigate or determine an individual's competency to operate an automobile before making a sale or entering into a lease." Id., *17.
Like the Dubose court, this court must determine whether Connecticut imposes a legal duty on rental car companies to investigate or inquire into a renter's driving record. "A duty . . . may arise from a contract, from a statute, or from circumstances under which a reasonable person, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result from his act or failure to act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 286 Conn. 563, 578, 945 A.2d 388 (2008). "The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand . . . We have stated that the test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant's responsibilities for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case . . . The first part of the test invokes the question of foreseeability, and the second part invokes the question of policy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neuhaus v. Decholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 217-18, 905 A.2d 1135 (2006). "[A court is] not required to address the first prong as to foreseeability if [it] . . . determine[s], based on the public policy prong, that no duty of care existed." Id., 218.
The plaintiff relies upon Greely v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 165 A. 678 (1933) in support of her argument that Camrac owed a duty to the plaintiff. In Greeley, the unlicensed driver was operating the vehicle under the supervision of a licensed driver, as authorized by statute. The court held that "[w]hen the evidence proves that the owner of an automobile knows or ought to know that one to whom he entrusts is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in such injury, a basis of recovery by the person injured is established. The recovery rests primarily upon the negligence of the owner in entrusting the automobile to the incompetent driver." Id., 520. While Greely undoubtedly recognizes the validity of a negligent entrustment cause of action, it cannot be said that the case recognizes or creates a legal duty upon rental car companies to investigate a renter's driving record.
The plaintiff has cited no legal authority for its position that a rental car company has a duty to investigate a potential renter's driving record before entering into a rental agreement. Further, this court's own research has not disclosed that such legal authority exists within Connecticut or elsewhere. Indeed, other jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held in opposite of the plaintiff's argument. See Palacios v. Aris, Inc., No. 08-CV-0746, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22984, *23 (E.D.N.Y. March 11, 2010) ("[A] rental company may be liable if it allows an unlicensed driver, or a driver without a valid license, to operate a vehicle. Although this obviously requires that rental car companies assess the facial validity of a driver's license before renting to that driver or otherwise allowing that driver to operate a vehicle, this duty does not require the company to investigate a renter's driving record where that renter has presented a valid driver's license"); Henderson v. Your Kar Express Rentals, Inc., No. 06C-03-131JAP, 2009 Del.Super LEXIS 229 (Del.Super.Ct. June 30, 2009) (concluding that it would be "quantum leap" to require rental car companies to verify facially valid driver's licenses or run driving record report); Dubose v. Transport Enterprise Leasing, LLC, supra, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5693, *17 (under Florida law, "there is no duty to investigate or determine an individual's competency to operate an automobile before making a sale or entering into a lease"); Cousin v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 948 So.2d 1287, 1292 (Miss. 2007) (holding that Mississippi law "only places a burden on rental car companies to accept facially valid, unexpired driver's licenses"); Dortch v. Jack, No. 1:01CV289LG-RHW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41115, *11 (S.D.Miss. May 11, 2005) ("[I]n North Carolina . . . if a customer presents a valid driver's license, the rental company is under no duty to inquire further"); Barksdale v. National Bank of Detroit, 186 Mich.App. 286, 291, 463 N.W.2d 258 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) ("To impose [a duty on a lessor to investigate a potential lessee's driving record before accepting a lease] . . . would place upon them an intolerable burden and would subject them to unwarranted liability where they retain no control over the lessee's use of the vehicle"); Osborn v. Hertz Corp., 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 252 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Cal.Ct.App. 1988) (absent enactment by legislature, California law does not require rental car companies to make inquiries into renters' driving record).
Our legislature has already enacted a statutory scheme governing the requirements of rental car companies. General Statutes § 14-153 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny person, firm or corporation which rents a motor vehicle without a driver . . . shall inspect or cause to be inspected the motor vehicle operator's license of the person initially operating such motor vehicle, [and] shall compare the signature on such license with that of the alleged licensee written in his presence . . ." Under this statute, a rental car company is not required to investigate a potential renter's driving record; rather, the rental car company must only assess the facial validity of a driver's license before renting to that driver. The legislature could have mandated that rental car companies run driving record reports if it intended that such a duty would exist.
Here, legislation exists at both the federal and the state level regulating the rental car industry. This makes for a difficult arena for the court to impose a duty where there is silence in the statutory scheme. If legislation was passed mandating the review of driving license history or criminal records before renting a vehicle then a much closer question would be presented with regard to federal preemption. There are many public policy issues presented by the plaintiff's argument to impose this duty on the car rental industry. How would such a requirement impact the available of rental vehicles with the stream of commerce? Could this issue be addressed by a requirement of minimum insurance? What impact would this have on those individuals who need to travel for business, who need to rent a vehicle while on vacation, or those who need to rent a vehicle while their own vehicles are being repaired? One court determined that "[r]ental cars play an indispensable role in contemporary American [society and] business." Osborn v. Hertz, 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 711. This court would not go that far, as it has no evidential basis for such an assertion. However, given the legislative silence and the absence of case law imposing an obligation on rental car companies to investigate renters' driving records, this court cannot find that rental car companies have a legal duty to investigate renters' driving records.
In reaching this decision, the court has considered the plaintiff's argument that the rental car industry custom creates a duty upon rental companies to make an inquiry into a renter's driving record, and it finds the argument to be unpersuasive. The plaintiff has not introduced any case law, in Connecticut or elsewhere, recognizing the existence of an industry standard which requires rental car companies to inquire into a renter's driving history or run a driving record report. Furthermore, the documents submitted by the plaintiff detailing the rental requirements of other rental car companies do not reflect the industry standards as they existed in August 2006, at the time the incident took place. The fact that some rental car companies have recently developed their own internal policies and procedures for determining what type of drivers they wish to rent to is not proof that every rental car company operating in 2006 had a duty to inquire into a renter's driving record.
Thus the court concludes that a public policy analysis does not compel the court to establish a legal duty that car rental companies must perform an investigation of the driving record of the lessee.
III CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Camrac is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Camrac's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.