โA reasonable opportunity to choose between different levels of coverage โmeans that the shipper had both reasonable notice of the liability limitation and the opportunity to obtain information necessary to making a deliberate and well-informed choice.'โ Carmana Designs Ltd. v. N. Am. Van Lines Inc., 943 F.2d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Bio-Lab, Inc. v. Pony Express Courier Corp., 911 F.2d 1580, 1582 (11th Cir. 1990)); see Chapman v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-00615-BR, 2018 WL 701627, at *9 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 2, 2018) (same). โThe Supreme Court has made clear that this requirement contemplates not only a choice between levels of liability, but also a choice between rates, such that the rate paid by the shipper varies according to the liability borne by the carrier.โ Exel, Inc. v. S. Refrigerated Transp., Inc., 905 F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing New York, N.H. & Hartford R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 135 (1953)). โ[T]he very purpose of the requirement that the carrier provide the shipper with a choice between levels of liability is to allow the shipper to โobtain[] the lower of two or more rates of charges proportioned to the amount of the risk.'โ Id.
Additionally, the cases cited by Azzil involved notice of a different nature than the communications here. See Alstom Power, Inc. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 154 Fed.Appx. 365, 368 (4th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff's attorney submitted an 11-page letter asserting a claim under the Carmack Amendment for damages caused by delayed deliveries); Chapman v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 2018 WL 701627, at *7 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 2, 2018) (plaintiff sent emails in which it noted the specific type of damages, later submitted a repair estimate, and sent a complaint indicating that plaintiff asserted defendant was liable for alleged losses and damage).
Rather, Defendant cites a slew of nonbinding circuit decisions to that effect (doc. 22 at 10), and its ultimate argument-that, consistent with ยง 1005.2(b), there must be prior approval to receive a written claim electronically-is based on two district court cases from outside this Circuit (doc. 22 at 11 (citing Raineri v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 906 F.Supp.2d 334, 341-42 (D.N.J. 2012); and Chapman v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-00615, 2018 WL 701627, at *7 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 2, 2018)).
Plaintiff presumably read these instructions, as he signed and dated the lines located directly below the Instructions section. See Hood v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 1:16-CV-998, 2019 WL 93546, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 2019) ("[C]ourts generally presume that readers of important documents have a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care."); see, e.g., Chapman v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-615, 2018 WL 701627, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 2, 2018) (noting "courts must presume that person who signs a contract has read it in its entirety"). The Court has, however, liberally considered the strike through of paragraphs to mean that plaintiff has no income, no assets, and no third-party sources of income, and will grant plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (#2), subject to later revisiting the issue if it is shown that plaintiff does have assets or sources of income.
Second, courts generally presume that readers of important documents have a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting presumption in FDCPA cases involving collection letters); Chapman v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-00615-BR, 2018 WL 701627, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 2, 2018) (noting in Carmack Amendment case that "courts must presume that person who signs a contract has read it in its entirety"). Finally, class members here affirmatively took action to opt out of arbitration when they signed up to be Uber drivers, indicating that they carefully examine materials related to their work.