Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-CV-76205-DT.
July 21, 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PETITION FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Christopher Chaperon, a state prisoner currently in custody at the Camp Brighton Correctional Facility in Pinckney, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is incarcerated in violation of his constitutional rights. Petitioner was convicted of aggravated stalking following a bench trial in the Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit in 1996 and was sentenced to two to five years imprisonment. This matter is before the Court on Respondent's motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the habeas petition for failure to comply with the statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth below, Respondent's motion is granted and the petition is dismissed.
II. Procedural History
Following his conviction and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals. His conviction was affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. People v. Chaperon, No. 197667 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 4, 1997). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Chaperon, No. 111105 (Mich. Aug. 28, 1998). Petitioner has not sought other post-conviction or collateral relief in the state courts.
Petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated December 17, 1999, on December 27, 1999. Petitioner asserts the following claims as grounds for habeas relief:
I. His probation was revoked based upon an impermissibly vague condition of probation.
II. There was insufficient evidence of a probation violation.
III. The trial court considered uncharged probation violations, tainting the proceedings.
IV. He was denied his constitutional right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on June 27, 2000, seeking to dismiss the habeas petition for failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitations established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1). Petitioner has not filed a response to the motion.
III. Discussion
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, became effective on April 24, 1996. The AEDPA governs the filing date for the habeas application in this case because Petitioner filed his application after the effective date of the AEDPA. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to include a new one-year period of limitations for habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging state court judgments. Matthews v. Abramajtys, 39 F. Supp.2d 871, 872 (Tarnow, E.D. Mich. 1999). In most cases, a prisoner is required to file a federal habeas petition within one year of completing direct review of the habeas claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A). The revised statute provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered though the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d).
In this case, Petitioner completed his state court direct appeals on August 28, 1998. He then had 90 days in which to seek a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See Rule 13(1), Supreme Court Rules. With regard to the statute of limitations, therefore, his convictions became final on November 26, 1998 — 90 days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal his conviction. Accordingly, Petitioner was required to file his habeas petition on or before November 26, 1999, excluding any time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or collateral review was pending in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2).
As noted, Petitioner did not seek any post-conviction relief or collateral review in the state courts prior to filing his federal habeas petition. The AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations period thus began to run on November 26, 1998 and expired on November 26, 1999. Petitioner did not file the present petition until, at the earliest, December 17, 1999, the date upon which he signed the petition — 21 days after the expiration of the one-year period. Thus, Petitioner's present habeas petition is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d).
Several courts have concluded that the limitations period is not a jurisdictional bar and may be subject to equitable modifications such as tolling. See, e.g., Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998); Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 617-19 (3rd Cir. 1998); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998); cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 210 (1998); Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1287; Thomas v. Straub, 10 F. Supp.2d 834, 835-36 (Duggan, E.D. Mich. 1998). Petitioner, however, has not established that the State created an obstacle to the filing of his application, that his claims are based upon newly-created rights or newly-discovered facts, or that the one-year period should otherwise be tolled due to extraordinary circumstances. The fact that Petitioner may have been unaware of the limitations period does not warrant tolling. See Sperling v. White, 30 F. Supp.2d 1246, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing cases establishing that ignorance of the law, illiteracy, and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F. Supp.2d 650, 654-56 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
IV. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that Petitioner failed to file his habeas petition within the one-year limitations period set by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) and has not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances caused him to file his petition after the expiration of the statutory period.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.