Opinion
04-21-00228-CR
09-28-2022
Jeffrey Allen CHANEY, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Do Not Publish
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No. A20152 Honorable Albert D. Pattillo, III, Judge Presiding.
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice, Irene Rios, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice.
Appellant Jeffrey Allen Chaney appeals his judgment of conviction for two counts of failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements. In two issues, Chaney argues the evidence is insufficient to show he failed to report his change of residence or employment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Due to a 1991 sexual assault conviction, Chaney was required to register as a sex offender and report any changes in his address or employment to local law enforcement. On August 6, 2019, Chaney went to the Kerrville Police Department to report he had moved to Kerrville. Investigator James Machetta, who oversaw the department's sex offender registration process, helped Chaney fill out the sex offender registration form. On the form, Chaney registered his address as 2112 Water Front Drive and indicated he was self-employed in landscaping and groundskeeping. He also verified he understood he was required to report a change in his residence or employment within a specified time. Investigator Machetta used the form to update Chaney's information in the Texas Department of Public Safety's sex offender database.
Over two months later, on October 20, 2019, the Kerr County Sheriff's Office received a phone call from Ashley Hanson, who reported Chaney was living with his wife, Manda, in a trailer park located at 140 Beaver Road in Kerr County. Kerr County Sheriff Sergeant Clint Massingill responded to Hanson's call and went to the trailer park to determine whether Chaney lived there. He was unable to locate Chaney, but he spoke to Manda, who confirmed she was living in the trailer park.
On November 17, 2019, police arrested Chaney at the trailer park for unrelated charges, and during his police interview, Chaney made conflicting statements to Investigator Jeffrey Edwards regarding the location of his residence. Chaney also told Investigator Edwards he was working for Randy Dean Painting. Chaney was eventually released, but on April 30, 2020, two police officers went to the trailer park to question Chaney about a possible theft. When they approached Manda's trailer, Chaney fled. Police were unable to detain Chaney, but about a month later, police arrested him at a nearby Wal-Mart parking lot for driving a stolen vehicle.
The State ultimately charged Chaney with two counts of failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements. At trial, Chaney pled not guilty, and a jury heard testimony from several witnesses, including Investigator Machetta, Sergeant Massingill, Investigator Edwards, Hanson, and Dean. The jury found Chaney guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced Chaney to sixty-five years on each count to run concurrently. Chaney now appeals challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
Analysis
Standard of Review
When determining whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, we apply the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Under this standard, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences therefrom to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Johnson v. State, 560 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We defer to the trier of fact's credibility and weight determinations because the trier of fact is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and weight to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We further recognize "the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to its determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Applicable Law
"Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 62 defines the scope of Texas's sex offender registration program and delineates the legal duties of those who administer it and those subject to its requirements." Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A person commits the offense of failure to comply with registration requirements if he is required to register as a sex offender and fails to comply with any requirement of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.102(a). Pertinent to this case, Chapter 62 requires a sex offender who intends to change his residence to give seven days' notice of his intent to change addresses and report any change in employment status within seven days of the change to the relevant local law-enforcement authority. Id. art. 62.055, 62.057(b); Mantooth v. State, 269 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Sept. 30, 2008, no pet.).
Application A. Residence
Here, the jury heard evidence showing on August 6, 2019, Chaney registered his address as 2112 Water Front Drive with Investigator Machetta of the Kerrville Police Department. Then, in October 2019, the Kerrville Police Department received a call from Hanson reporting Chaney had moved to a lot in her trailer park located at 140 Beaver Road during the first week of October. According to Hanson, she observed a woman named Manda move into a neighboring trailer in mid-September, and Chaney moved in with her. She further testified she witnessed a domestic disturbance between Chaney and Manda in October 2019.
The jury also heard testimony from Randy Dean, who testified he hired Chaney as a painter after Chaney married Manda. Dean testified Chaney told him he was moving to Beaver Road. A copy of Chaney's marriage license was admitted into evidence, and it showed Chaney married Manda on September 7, 2019. The return address on the marriage license was listed as "210 Beaver Road, Lot 14, Ingram, Texas 78025."
The State also produced evidence indicating on November 17, 2019, the Kerrville Police Department arrested Chaney at the 140 Beaver Road location for unrelated charges. Investigator Edwards testified he interviewed Chaney and learned Chaney had moved to Beaver Road. Both Investigator Machetta and Investigator Edwards testified Chaney never updated his address from 2112 Water Front Drive to 140 Beaver Road. When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to the jury's credibility and weight determinations, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt Chaney moved to 140 Beaver Road after he married Manda and failed to provide notice seven days before he intended to change his address to the required authority. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Johnson, 560 S.W.3d at 226; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.055.
Chaney argues, however, this evidence does not show he was "actually resid[ing]" at the trailer park. According to Chaney, the evidence shows at most, he was present at the trailer park on different occasions, but it does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt his intent to make the trailer park his residence. Chapter 62 does not provide a legal definition for "residence," but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held "[r]esidence is an elastic term" and "[n]either bodily presence alone nor intention alone will suffice to create the residence." Whitney v. State, 472 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); see Herron v. State, 625 S.W.3d 144, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (defining "resides" in section 62.051 as a person's physical presence and establishment of a domicile). The moment the two coincide is when residence is fixed and determined. Id. In this case, the State produced evidence of both Chaney's presence and intent. The jury heard testimony from Hanson who saw Chaney living with Manda at the trailer park in October 2019 and from two different people-Dean and Investigator Edwards-who testified Chaney told each of them he moved to the trailer park. Based on this evidence, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have drawn a reasonable inference and determined Chaney resided with Manda at 140 Beaver Road. See Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (holding evidence was sufficient to support failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements when parole officer testified defendant told him he intended to move but did not report his change of address). We therefore overrule Chaney's first sufficiency argument.
B. Employment
Regarding Chaney's employment, the jury heard testimony from Dean, who testified Chaney worked for him as a painter. Specifically, Dean testified he hired Chaney sometime in July 2019, the Monday after Chaney married Manda. But, when provided with a copy of Chaney's marriage license showing Chaney married Manda in September, Dean clarified he hired Chaney in September. Dean further testified Chaney worked for him everyday until he stopped showing up at the end of October 2019. In addition to Dean's testimony, the jury heard testimony from Investigator Edwards, who testified in November 2019, Chaney told him he was working for Randy Dean Painting.
Chaney contends this evidence is insufficient to show he failed to report a change in employment because the State did not establish when he started working for Dean. For support, he points to Dean's conflicting testimony regarding Chaney's start date. As the factfinder, the jury was free to resolve the conflict in Dean's testimony regarding Chaney's start date by crediting the date on Chaney's marriage license and reasonably inferring Chaney started working for Dean in September of 2019 after he married Manda. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860; see also Cloud v. State, 579 S.W.3d 788, 791 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (stating fact finder was free to disbelieve a witness's testimony, disregard a witness's recantation, and believe other evidence to determine whether defendant complied with sex offender registration requirements). Accordingly, we conclude the jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt Chaney failed to report his change in employment and therefore failed to comply with the sex offender registration requirements. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Johnson, 560 S.W.3d at 226; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.057(b). We therefore overrule Chaney's second sufficiency argument.
Conclusion
Having determined the evidence to be sufficient, we affirm the trial court's judgment.