Opinion
Docket No. 161683
07-06-2022
Norman CHAMPINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Johnson Law, PLC (by Christopher Patrick Desmond and Ven R. Johnson, Detroit) for Norman Champine. Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, and Philip L. Bladen, Assistant Attorney General, for the Michigan Department of Transportation.
Johnson Law, PLC (by Christopher Patrick Desmond and Ven R. Johnson, Detroit) for Norman Champine.
Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, and Philip L. Bladen, Assistant Attorney General, for the Michigan Department of Transportation.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
Bernstein, J. This case concerns a negligence claim, governed by the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. , brought against defendant under the highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402(1). The specific question before us is whether plaintiff provided proper notice in accordance with MCL 691.1404(2). We hold that notice was proper but find that a question still remains regarding whether plaintiff met the statutory requirement to provide a description of the "exact location" of the highway defect under MCL 691.1404(1). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 17, 2017, plaintiff was driving the posted speed limit on I-696 in Macomb County when a 20-pound chunk of concrete became dislodged from the road and smashed through the windshield of his car. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his head and face. According to plaintiff, this was at least the fourth time in which a motorist sustained injuries caused by the poor condition of the freeway on the same stretch of road in a six-month period.
The Warren Police Department took photographs of plaintiff's car and the bloody chunk of concrete that had smashed through the windshield. The police notified defendant of the incident on the same day that it occurred, and plaintiff sent a separate notice to defendant on December 28, 2017. Defendant acknowledged receipt of the notice on December 30, 2017. The notice stated:
Please allow this letter to serve as notification pursuant to MCL 691.1404 of a highway defect. The location of the defect is the Hoover Road bridge over I-696 West ("overpass"), approximately above the third travel lane or the travel lane itself. Our client, Norman Champine, was operating his vehicle west on I-696 at approximately 1:45 p.m. on December 17, 2017, when a piece of concrete either from the overpass or dislodged from the roadway surface, came through his windshield. Mr. Champine
sustained severe injuries, including fractures to his face, jaw, and orbital bones, loss of teeth, severe contusions to his face and right eye, and lacerations. We are unaware of any eye witnesses, but believe the incident was investigated by the Warren Police Department.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Claims on February 6, 2018. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was injured on a section of I-696 between Gratiot Avenue and Mound Road and that defendant had breached its duty to maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it was reasonably safe and convenient for public travel under MCL 691.1402(1). On February 7, 2018, plaintiff mailed an amended notice to defendant and attached a police report about the incident. This notice alleged that the chunk of concrete came "from the roadbed" and explained that the precise location of the defect could not be determined with any more specificity because of the extremely poor condition of this stretch of highway, which plaintiff stated contained more than "one thousand" potholes. Finally, on March 26, 2018, plaintiff served defendant with a copy of the complaint. Notably, plaintiff did not file either the notice or the amended notice with the clerk of the Court of Claims, as required by MCL 691.1404, which states that if a suit is filed against the state government, the requisite notice must be "filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court of claims." MCL 691.1404(2).
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that plaintiff had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements of MCL 691.1404 before bringing suit under the highway exception to governmental immunity. Defendant argued that because no notice was filed with the clerk of the Court of Claims within 120 days of the accident, plaintiff had failed to meet the statutory notice requirement. Defendant then argued that none of plaintiff's pleadings gave proper notice because plaintiff had failed to describe the location of the accident with sufficient specificity. The Court of Claims granted defendant's motion for summary disposition, holding that a complaint could not serve as notice under MCL 691.1404(2). It also held that the notice was deficient because it failed to identify the exact location of the highway defect as required by MCL 691.1404(1).
Plaintiff appealed by right to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the Court of Claims that a complaint could not serve as notice. Champine v. Dep't of Transp. , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 16, 2020 (Docket No. 347398), 2020 WL 1897415 ). The Court of Appeals declined to address whether the complaint adequately identified the location of the defect.
Plaintiff timely sought leave to appeal in this Court. On April 28, 2021, we directed the clerk to schedule oral argument on the application. Champine v. Dep't of Transp. , 507 Mich. 935, 957 N.W.2d 815 (2021).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The applicability of governmental immunity is a question of law that is reviewed de novo." Ray v. Swager , 501 Mich. 52, 61, 903 N.W.2d 366 (2017). We also review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Id. at 61-62, 903 N.W.2d 366.
III. ANALYSIS
The GTLA immunizes a state agency from tort liability when the agency is "engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function," subject to certain exceptions. MCL 691.1407(1). One such exception is the "highway exception," which allows for claims arising from defective highways—if those claims otherwise meet the narrow conditions provided by statute—to survive summary disposition. Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm. , 463 Mich. 143, 158, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000). All plaintiffs seeking to recover under the highway exception to governmental immunity must comply with the notice requirements of MCL 691.1404, which states, in relevant part:
(1) As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury occurred ... shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.
(2) The notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with civil process directed against the governmental agency .... In case of the state, such notice shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court of claims. Filing of such notice shall constitute compliance with [ MCL 600.6431 ] ..., requiring the filing of notice of intention to file a claim against the state.
Determining whether the highway exception applies is a matter of statutory interpretation. When interpreting a statute, courts must consider "the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme." Andrie Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 496 Mich. 161, 167, 853 N.W.2d 310 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted). If a word in a statute is undefined, it must be given its "plain and ordinary meaning[ ], and it is proper to consult a dictionary for definitions." Halloran v. Bhan , 470 Mich. 572, 578, 683 N.W.2d 129 (2004). Here, the word "notice" is not defined in MCL 691.1404, so we may look to the dictionary for guidance. Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.) defines "notice" as "[l]egal notification required by law or agreement, or imparted by operation of law as a result of some fact (such as the recording of an instrument); definite legal cognizance, actual or constructive, of an existing right or title[.]" Similarly, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) defines "notice" as "warning or intimation of something," as through an announcement.
Because the legal definition of notice is substantially similar to the lay definition of "notice," we refer to both definitions in parsing the plain meaning of "notice" as it is used in MCL 691.1404.
Taking the plain meaning of "notice" into account, we find that nothing in the text of MCL 691.1404(2) suggests that notice cannot be provided through the filing of a plaintiff's complaint within the statutory notice period. A complaint filed within the statutory notice period, listing the factual circumstances and legal theories relevant to the cause of action, undoubtedly gives sufficient "warning" or "legal notification" of "the occurrence of the injury and the defect." See MCL 691.1404(1). We do not read "notice" in this context as requiring advance notice beyond the filing of the complaint. The text of the statute does not indicate that there must be some temporal gap between the filing of a notice and the initiation of a lawsuit; rather, the plain meaning of the word "notice" in this context only suggests that the state must be made aware of the injury and the defect in accordance with MCL 691.1404(2). Here, plaintiff gave timely notice by filing his complaint in the Court of Claims "within 120 days from the time the injury occurred," as required by MCL 691.1404(1). IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that plaintiff's complaint may serve as notice under MCL 691.1404(1) and (2). However, the Court of Appeals did not address whether the complaint adequately "specif[ied] the exact location and nature of the defect" as required by MCL 691.1404(1). Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether these requirements were met.
McCormack, C.J., and Viviano, Clement, Cavanagh, and Welch, JJ., concurred with Bernstein, J.
Zahra, J. (dissenting).
I do not dispute the alleged facts claiming that on December 17, 2017, plaintiff was driving his vehicle on I-696 westbound near Hoover Road when a large chunk of concrete apparently dislodged from the roadbed, projected through plaintiff's windshield, and struck him. Plaintiff lost consciousness for a short period of time and woke to find himself safely exiting the freeway, from which he drove to a local gas station. He suffered significant injuries to his head and torso that were readily explained by the bloodied chunk of concrete recovered from his vehicle.
Plaintiff asserts a statutory right to recovery under the highway exception to the governmental tort liability act (GTLA). Given that " ‘the Legislature is not even required to provide a defective highway exception to governmental immunity, it surely has the authority to allow such suits only upon compliance with rational notice limits.’ " Here, the GTLA expressly provides that "[c]laims against the state authorized under [the GTLA] shall be brought in the manner provided in" the revised judicature act of 1961 (RJA). I conclude that this language means that a prospective highway-defect claim against the state must be separately "authorized" under the GTLA and separately "brought in the manner provided" in the RJA. A timely notice filed under the GTLA is required to "authorize" the filing of a claim under the RJA irrespective of when a plaintiff files this statutory claim. Plaintiff did not duly file a single document under the GTLA to have "authorized " the filing of a claim under the RJA. Since plaintiff's claim was not authorized under the GTLA, it could not be brought under the RJA. There is no statutory basis that permits an unauthorized RJA claim to become authorized if the claim contains content that arguably would have satisfied a GTLA notice had that notice been properly and timely filed. Accordingly, I would affirm the result of our lower courts and deny plaintiff's application.
The majority opinion asserts that "[t]his case concerns a negligence claim, governed by the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. , brought against defendant under the highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402(1)." I do not characterize plaintiff's claim as one grounded in common-law negligence. Rather, plaintiff's claim is purely statutory in nature; it is a claim brought under the highway exception to the GTLA.
Estate of Pearce v. Eaton Co. Rd. Comm. , 507 Mich. 183, 207, 968 N.W.2d 323 (2021) ( Zahra , J. dissenting ), quoting Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd. Comm. , 477 Mich. 197, 212, 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007).
MCL 691.1410(1) (referring to "[MCL] 600.6401 to [MCL] 600.6475") (emphasis added).
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Shortly after the incident giving rise to plaintiff's injuries, his counsel sent correspondence to defendant, the Michigan Department of Transportation, via certified mail; the correspondence was intended to constitute statutory notice as required under the GTLA. On February 6, 2018, plaintiff filed a claim against defendant. The next day, plaintiff's counsel again sent defendant correspondence claiming to be an amended statutory notice.
Defendant moved for summary disposition on governmental immunity grounds under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that plaintiff had failed to comply with the GTLA's statutory notice requirement before filing a claim under the RJA. The Court of Claims granted defendant's motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in a divided unpublished opinion. We directed the clerk to schedule oral argument on the application.
Champine v. Dep't of Transp. , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 16, 2020 (Docket No. 347398), 2020 WL 1897415 ).
Champine v. Dep't of Transp. , 507 Mich. 935, 957 N.W.2d 815 (2021).
II. ANALYSIS
MCL 691.1404(1) of the GTLA generally requires that a person injured because of a highway defect, within 120 days, serve a notice "[a]s a condition to any recovery for injuries ... on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect." The following subsection, MCL 691.1404(2), plainly differentiates the above-described statutory notice, generally served on any governmental agency, from a specific statutory notice that is to be served on a defined entity, which, in this case, is "the state. " Notice provided to the state "shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court of claims." In this case, this statutory notice was never properly filed. Had this notice been filed, the Court of Claims would have forwarded a copy to "the attorney general and to each of the departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies of this state designated in the claim or notice." "Provisions requiring notice to a particular entity, like the Court of Claims in this case, further ensure that notice will be provided to the proper governmental entity, thereby protecting plaintiffs and defendants alike from having the wrong component of government notified."
McCahan v. Brennan , 492 Mich. 730, 744, 822 N.W.2d 747 (2012).
The majority relies on the plain meaning of the term "notice," claiming that notice is not defined in MCL 691.1404. I disagree. First, MCL 691.1404(1) does define the notice in regard to its content, requiring that it "shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant." Second, MCL 691.1404(2) further defines the notice in terms of the place and manner of filing, stating that "[i]n case of the state, such notice shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court of claims." These provisions reflect that the "notice" at issue here is not a common and ordinary notice but a defined "notice" that must contain particular content and must be filed in a particular place and in a particular manner.
I therefore strongly disagree with the majority's purported reliance on "the plain meaning of the word ‘notice’ in this context [to] only suggest[ ] that the state must be made aware of the injury and the defect in accordance with MCL 691.1404(2)." Here, the GTLA expressly provides that "[c]laims against the state authorized under [the GTLA] shall be brought in the manner provided in" the RJA. The state's awareness of the injury and the defect alone does not authorize a claim to be filed under the RJA. Further, there is no legal or logical basis to conclude that an unauthorized claim filed under the RJA can authorize itself to be filed without having complied with the GTLA. A prospective highway-defect claim against the state must be "authorized" under the GTLA and "brought in the manner provided" in the RJA. Plaintiff did not duly file a single document under the GTLA to have "authorized " the filing of a claim under the RJA. Because plaintiff's claim was not authorized under the GTLA, it could not be brought under the RJA.
MCL 691.1410(1) (referring to "[MCL] 600.6401 to [MCL] 600.6475") (emphasis added).
I agree with the majority that "[t]he text of the statute does not indicate that there must be some temporal gap between the filing of a notice and the initiation of a lawsuit ...." None of the requirements of the notice discussed above expressly stipulates that the notice be filed in advance of the claim. Still, even in the very rare instance, such as in this case, when a plaintiff files a claim before filing a notice, the plaintiff must still afterwards file a proper and timely notice that would render the claim "authorized."
Accordingly, I agree with the lower courts that plaintiff failed to comply with the GTLA and that plaintiff's claim should be dismissed.