Opinion
NUMBER 2012 CA 0390
09-24-2012
CHARLES RAY CHAMPAGNE, JR. CHOCTAW MOBILE HOME PARK v. MITCHELL CHAMPAGNE JAMS CHAMPAGNE
Michael M. Distefano, Sr. Chad M. Brown Plaquemine, LA Attorneys for Plaintiff- Appellee Charles Ray Champagne, Jr. S. Stephen Spring, II Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Defendant - Appellant Mitchell Champagne
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
18th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Iberville
Trial Court Number 70712
Honorable J. Robin Free, Judge
Michael M. Distefano, Sr.
Chad M. Brown
Plaquemine, LA
Attorneys for
Plaintiff- Appellee
Charles Ray Champagne, Jr.
S. Stephen Spring, II
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorney for
Defendant - Appellant
Mitchell Champagne
BEFORE: PARRO, HUGHES, AND WELCH, JJ.
WELCH , J.
The defendant, Mitchell Champagne, appeals a judgment ordering him to remove his mobile home from the leased premises owned by the plaintiff, Charles Champagne, Jr. We affirm in accordance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule2-16.1(B).
Janis Champagne, Mitchell Champagne's former wife, is also named as a defendant in these proceedings. However, she did not sign the lease as lessee and has not made any appearance in these proceedings and has not appealed the judgment at issue.
On May 1, 1982, the plaintiff and Mitchell Champagne entered into a written contract of lease for a lot owned by the plaintiff. The contract provided that the lease was for an indefinite period of time on a month-to-month basis and that the defendant would pay rent in the amount of $80 per month. The contract also provided "that in the event Lessor desires possession of the premises herein at any time, Lessor agrees to give Lessee thirty (30) days written notice of his intention to terminate this contract, said notice to be mailed to the premises herein leased to Lessee or said notice being handed to Lessee personally."
Apparently, the defendant failed to pay rent in accordance with the lease agreement. Accordingly, on August 16, 2011, the plaintiff gave the defendant written notice to vacate the premises and to remove the mobile home from the leased premises. The defendant did not vacate the premises; therefore, on September 20, 2011, the plaintiff filed a rule to show cause seeking to evict the defendant from the premises.
A hearing was held on October 12, 2011. At the hearing, the defendant orally requested a continuance. The trial court denied the continuance and rendered a judgment of eviction. On October 24, 2011, the trial court signed a judgment ordering the defendant to remove his mobile home and all personal belongings located at the premises and recognizing the plaintiff's agreement to waive all past due rent, including court costs and professional fees, pending removal of the defendant's mobile home on or before November 15, 2011. From this judgment, the defendant has appealed. On appeal, the defendant essentially claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance.
Throughout the record, the parties refer to the October 24, 2011 judgment as the October 12, 2011 judgment, the date it was rendered in open court.
On December 21, 2011, the defendant filed a petition to annul the October 24, 2011 judgment based on fraud and ill practices under La. C.C.P. art. 2004. On appeal, the defendant raises several assignments of error that pertain to the merits of the petition to annul. However, the record does not reveal that a judgment has been rendered (or an appeal taken) on the merits of the petition to annul. Thus, any issues relating to the merits of the petition to annul are not properly before this court, and we will not address those assignments of error.
The denial of a motion for continuance is generally considered an interlocutory ruling or judgment and is not appealable. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1841 and 2083. However, in this case, we can consider the correctness of this interlocutory ruling in conjunction with the appeal of the October 24, 2011 judgment ordering the eviction of the defendant from the leased property, which is a final and appealable judgment. See Ballard v. Waitz, 2006-0307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 335, 338, writ denied, 2007-0846 (La. 6/15/07), 958 So.2d 1193; People of Living God v. Chantilly Corp., 251 La. 943, 947-48, 207 So.2d 752, 753 (La. 1968).
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"A continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor." La. C.C.P. art. 1601. The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests with the sound discretion of the trial court. Gilmore v. Wickes Lumber, 2004-2769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/17/06), 928 So.2d 668, 674. The trial court must consider the particular facts of a case when deciding whether to grant a continuance. Id. In addition, the trial court should consider the diligence and good faith of the party seeking the continuance and other reasonable grounds, and may also weigh the condition of the court docket, fairness to the parties and other litigants before the court, and the need for orderly and prompt administration of justice. Absent a clear abuse of discretion in granting or denying a continuance, the ruling of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal. Id.
In this case, at the hearing, the defendant moved for a continuance on the basis that he was trying to obtain documentation concerning rental payments he had made to the plaintiff. However, the defendant admitted that he had not made full rental payments and that he was in arrears, and the plaintiff agreed to waive all past due rent in exchange for the defendant's vacating the premises within a reasonable amount of time. Noting the defendant's admission that he was in arrears and the plaintiff's agreement to "forgive" all past due rent, the trial court determined that any documents establishing rental payments to the plaintiff were immaterial and that the plaintiff had the right under the lease agreement to evict the defendant. Therefore, the trial court denied the request for a continuance. Based on our review of the record, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the motion to continue or any other error in the judgment of eviction.
Accordingly, the October 24, 2011 judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendant-appellant, Mitchell Champagne.
AFFIRMED.