Opinion
NUMBER 13-16-00079-CR
11-20-2019
JOHN CHAMBERS, Appellant, v. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
ORDER
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria
Order Per Curiam
The Honorable Nelda V. Rodriguez, former Justice of this Court, was a member of the panel at the time this case was originally submitted but did not participate in this order because her term of office expired on December 31, 2018.
This case is on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Appellant John Chambers was convicted of fourteen counts of tampering with governmental records with intent to defraud or harm, each a state jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.10(c)(1). In 2017, we affirmed the convictions, concluding that: (1) the documents appellant directed to be falsified were "governmental records" under the broad statutory definition; (2) appellant was not entitled to a jury charge instruction on local government code § 341.012, which authorizes a municipality to establish a reserve police force; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant acted with the "intent to defraud or harm" the State, despite the fact there was no allegation or proof that he deprived the State of a pecuniary or property interest. Chambers v. State, 523 S.W.3d 681, 685-91 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 580 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed our judgment with respect to appellant's first and second issues. See 580 S.W.3d at 157-58 (agreeing that the documents were "governmental records" and noting that appellant was not harmed by the lack of a jury instruction on local government code § 341.012). However, the Court reversed as to appellant's third issue, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show appellant acted with the "intent to defraud or harm" because "it was legally impossible for TCOLE to be defrauded by Appellant's deceit and for Appellant to intend to defraud TCOLE through his deceit." Id. at 157. The Court further held that our sufficiency analysis was "incomplete" because we did not address appellant's argument, made for the first time in his reply brief, that the evidence was insufficient to overcome his statutory defense under penal code § 37.10(f). 580 S.W.3d at 156-61 (stating that, though "new issues raised in a reply brief should not be considered," appellant's argument regarding the insufficiency of the evidence to overcome his § 37.10(f) defense was "related to the arguments in his original brief"). The Court remanded to us to consider that issue, noting that its "resolution of the issue (if any should even be necessary after a remand) would benefit from a carefully wrought decision from the court of appeals." Id. at 161 (observing that "[t]he meaning of the phrase 'government's purpose for requiring the governmental record' is unclear in the context of the statute").
We are presently unable to generate a "carefully wrought decision" because, as we noted in 2017, the parties did not discuss this issue in their briefs. See Chambers, 523 S.W.3d at 688 n.4.
In light of the court of criminal appeals' directive, we hereby ORDER the parties to submit supplemental briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9(b). The supplemental briefs shall discuss only the issue remanded to us by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—i.e., whether the evidence was sufficient to overcome appellant's statutory defense under penal code § 37.10(f). This discussion should include an analysis of the meaning of the phrase "government's purpose for requiring the governmental record" as it appears in the statute. See Chambers, 580 S.W.3d at 161.
Appellant's supplemental brief is ORDERED to be filed within thirty (30) days of this order, and the State's supplemental brief is ORDERED to be filed within thirty (30) days after appellant's brief has been filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 20th day of November, 2019.