Opinion
C/A 0:23-3975-SAL-PJG
07-30-2024
Travis Chambers, Plaintiff, v. Martin J. O'Malley, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,[1] Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S DENIAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
[X] Affirm [] Reverse and Remand
This social security matter is before the court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02 (D.S.C.). The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying the plaintiff's claims for social security benefits.
Part I-Plaintiff seeks:
[] Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”): Plaintiff's age at filing:
[X] Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”): Date last insured: September 30, 2018
[] Other:
Application Dated: April 8, 2020
Plaintiff's Year of Birth: 1979
Plaintiff's alleged onset Dated: September 1, 2018
Part II-Social Security Disability Generally
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(5), and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) and/or § 416.905(a); see also Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973). The regulations generally require the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to consider five issues in sequence, as outlined below. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(4) and/or § 416.920(a)(4). If the ALJ can make a determination that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review does not proceed to the next step. Id.
A claimant has the initial burden of showing that he/she is unable to return to past relevant work because of his/her impairments. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) and/or § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); see also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The Commissioner may carry this burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1983).
Part III-Administrative Proceedings
Date of ALJ Decision: May 18, 2022
In applying the requisite five-step sequential process, the ALJ found:
Step 1: Plaintiff was engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period:
[] Yes [X] No
Step 2: [] Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
[S]tatus post decompression and fusion at ¶ 5-6 (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
[] Plaintiff does not have a severe impairment.
Step 3: [X] Plaintiff's impairment(s) does/do not meet or medically equal a Listing. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Step 4: Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity is as follows:
[F]rom the claimant's alleged onset date of September 1, 2018 through the date last insured of September 30, 2018, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), the claimant can occasionally lift and/or carry, including upward pulling of twenty pounds, and can frequently lift and[/]or carry including upward pulling of ten pounds. The claimant can sit for six[]hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks and stand and/or walk with normal breaks for six hours in an eight-hour workday. The claimant's ability to push and[/]or pull, including operation of hand controls is unlimited up to the lift and carry restrictions of twenty and ten pounds. The claimant can frequently climb ramps and stairs, frequently stoop, kneel, crouch but no crawling. No overhead reaching bilaterally. . . .
[] Plaintiff could return to his/her past relevant work.
Step 5: [] Plaintiff could not return to his/her past relevant work, but using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) as a framework supports a finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 2.
[X] Plaintiff could not return to his/her past relevant work, but there are representative jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, as follows:
Occupation
DOT Code
Jobs In the National Economy
Laundry work
302.685-010
103K
Shirt Presser
363.685-026
252K
Assembler
706.684-022
211K
Date of Appeals Council decision: September 21, 2022
Part IV-Standard of Review
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings “are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court may review only whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019); Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence' to support the agency's factual determinations.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775.
Part V-Issues for Judicial Review
Issue I Failure to obtain additional treatment. Social Security regulations do not allow the ALJ to discount disability because of a failure to obtain treatment without further investigation. Here, the ALJ made an assumption about Chambers' failure to pursue treatment without the requisite consideration.
Issue II Evaluation of the Subjective Complaints. In assessing a claimant's subjective complaints the ALJ's decision must contain specific reasons for his finding, supported by the evidence in the case record. When the ALJ fails to provide adequate reasons for his credibility determination, can his decision be based on substantial evidence?(Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 10.)
Oral Argument:
[] Held on __.
[ X] Not necessary for recommendation.
Summary of Reasons
Although Plaintiff raises two issues for this judicial review, both arguments challenge the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective complaints and, ultimately, the propriety of the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ drew an improper adverse inference from Plaintiff's failure to seek medical treatment or follow the treatment recommendations without considering Plaintiff's potential inability to afford treatment or access to free or low-cost medical services. (See Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 10 at 21-23.) Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide specific support for his findings that Plaintiff's subjective reports were not supported by the record. Therefore, the court will address these arguments together.
A claimant's residual functional capacity is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite his limitations” and is determined by assessing all of the relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing residual functional capacity, an ALJ should scrutinize “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). Social Security Ruling 96-8p requires an ALJ to reference the evidence supporting his conclusions with respect to a claimant's residual functional capacity. Further, “[r]emand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)) (alteration and omission in original); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016).
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly stated that “[a]n ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.” Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 869 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Arakas v. Comm'r, 983 F.3d 83, 98 (4th Cir. 2020). Moreover, an ALJ continues to have an obligation to “include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion.” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 190 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015)); see also SSR 968p. Similarly, remand may be appropriate when the courts are left to guess at how the ALJ arrived at the conclusions and meaningful review is frustrated. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636-37. The ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusions.” Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189.
“[T]he determination of whether a person is disabled by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th Cir. 1996). The first step requires there to “be objective medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). At the second step, the ALJ must expressly consider “the intensity and persistence of the claimant's [symptom] and the extent to which it affects her ability to work.” Id. The ALJ's decision “must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10.
Further, “claims of disabling pain may not be rejected ‘solely because the available objective evidence does not substantiate [the claimant's] statements' as to the severity and persistence of her pain.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595 (citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Arakas v. Comm'r, 983 F.3d 83, 95-96 (4th Cir. 2020) (finding that the ALJ disregarded “longstanding precedent and the agency's own policy by improperly discounting Arakas's subjective complaints of pain and fatigue, based largely on the lack of objective evidence substantiating her statements”). “This is not to say, however, that objective medical evidence and other objective evidence are not crucial to evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant's pain and the extent to which it impairs [her] ability to work.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. A claimant's subjective complaints “need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence, including objective evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the [symptoms] the claimant alleges she suffers.” Id. The social security regulations inform claimants that in evaluating subjective complaints, the Commissioner will consider the following relevant factors:
(i) Your daily activities;
(ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of your pain or other symptoms;
(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;
(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication you take or have taken to alleviate your pain or other symptoms;
(v) Treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms;
(vi) Any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and
(vii) Other factors concerning your functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
In this case, the relevant time period for disability is September 1, 2018 (Plaintiff's alleged onset date) through September 30, 2018 (Plaintiff's date last insured), which is a narrow window of time. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.101(a), 404.131(a) (providing that a claimant must prove he was disabled prior to his date last insured). Although Plaintiff did not have any medical treatment during the relevant period, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's prior treatment as well as Plaintiff's treatment after his date last insured to the extent that it may provide evidence of the existence of his impairments during the relevant time. Here, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff's allegations as follows:
At the hearing, the claimant alleged the following: He had a cervical fusion surgery in 2011. He did not work from 2013 to 2017 because he had a workers compensation injury to his radial bone in the right elbow, in 2012, and was living off of workers compensation. He had elbow surgery in March 2012. He was
released to go back to work in 2013 but did not return to work saying he lived off his “settlement.” He worked again in construction doing renovations/construction in 2018 but reported he was let go from that job due to neck pain radiating down his left arm, most days in 2018. He reported they were dull aches to sharp shooting pain. He complained he had had problems with his range of motion, and it hurt to look up and down and side to side. He complained he had problems reaching with his left arm, and reaching in any direction, including reaching in front, and he could not reach any more than ten minutes before he would have to stop. That if he looked up too quickly, his hands would go numb. He also complained of problems extending his right elbow and problems turning his arm. In August 2018, a C6-7 surgery was recommended, but reported he did not have that surgery because he lost Medicaid. He treated with ibuprofen, ice and heat. In 2018, he reported the most comfortable position was lying down, which he said he did most of the day in 2018. He could walk for thirty minutes, sit for twenty minutes, stand still for twenty minutes, and lift fifteen to twenty pounds. In 2018, he did not have any assistance with bathing, dressing, and putting his socks on. During that time, he spent his day sitting or lying down watching television.
The claimant testified that during 2018, he lived with his mother and reported she was disabled. He reported that he did ‘normal' housekeeping, such as washing dishes, but his disabled mother did all of the cooking and vacuuming. He was not driving a car at that time because he does not have a license. The claimant completed a function report in April 2020, writing he was driving and he shopped for groceries. He also said he still was hunting and fishing a few times a year. He testified that he was hunting and fishing in 2020, but not 2018. He testified that in 2018 he used a computer, including using Facebook thirty minutes at a time, two to three times a day. He smoked a pack of cigarettes a day, would go outside to smoke. His mother bought the claimant's tobacco. He drank alcohol on the weekends. He testified that his girlfriend bought his alcohol. Also, he would occasionally go to a fast-food restaurant. The claimant currently lives with wife and two stepchildren. He testified he occasionally cooks for his stepchildren. In the claimant's function report in 2020, he said he went to his son's sporting events.(Tr. 31-32.)
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record ....” (Tr. 32.) The ALJ stated that Plaintiff's physical and objective examination findings related to his neck impairment prior to the date last insured have failed to establish the limitations alleged. The ALJ then proceeded to address evidence from prior to Plaintiff's alleged onset date including the following: In February 2011 Plaintiff had a post anterior cervical diskectomy, decompression, and fusion at ¶ 5-6 for bilateral C6 distribution and radiculopathy surgery performed by Dr. Kilburn, resulting in a complete resolution of Plaintiff's neck and arm pain. In March 2012, Plaintiff returned for a follow up, reporting pain in his left arm and shoulder that radiated down his arm to his fingers and his neck was stiff and tight. Plaintiff's MRI was found to show no evidence of cord or neural foraminal impingement per se and conservative treatment was recommended. (Tr. 555.)
Plaintiff next returned to Dr. Kilburn in July 2018 reporting three years of intermittent neck and left arm pain that increased the last two to three months. Plaintiff reported that the pain increased with looking up and tilting his head and improved with lying down, and that ibuprofen and rest have not provided adequate relief. (Tr. 590.) The ALJ observed that Dr. Kilburn found triceps weakness and diminished sensation in the C8 versus C7 distribution; however, the ALJ detailed the remainder of the unremarkable examination. (Tr. 32-33.). Plaintiff also received treatment in early August 2018 at an orthopedic clinic for right thumb pain and swelling with no issues or abnormal findings noted regarding Plaintiff's neck, arm, or shoulder. (Tr. 448, 461, 464.) On August 13, 2018, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Kilburn that his left arm pain, numbness, and tingling had completely subsided with normal physical findings. (Tr. 586-88.) Dr. Kilburn stated that Plaintiff's “MRI shows instrumented fusion at ¶ 5-6 with disc bulge above and below at ¶ 6-7 there is left-sided disc protrusion with impingement of the left C7 nerve root.” (Tr. 588.) However, the ALJ observed that Dr. Kilburn stated, “Given that the patient is not myelopathic[,] is not hav[ing] any motor or sensory deficits and is improving in terms of his pain control I would not recommend any surgical intervention at this time. I would like to see him back in 2 weeks['] time for clinical review as well as AP and lateral cervical spine x-rays.” (Id.) However, on August 28, 2018, Plaintiff returned reporting “very severe left C7 distribution arm pain and numbness as well as weakness.” (Tr. 584.) Plaintiff's x-rays showed “good placement of his plate at ¶ 5-6 and what appears to be adequate room to place a 0 profile biomechanical interbody device at ¶ 6-7.” (Id.) Dr. Kilburn discussed Plaintiff's options, which included “ongoing medical management versus pain management intervention versus surgical intervention,” and Plaintiff indicated that he would like to proceed with surgery. (Id.) Dr. Kilburn proceeded to state the following:
I do believe this patient presents with an adequate history presenting illness consistent with a left C7 myeloradiculopathy. His physical examination clearly document[s] progression of his neurological deficit with loss of extremity strength activity modification and pain levels measuring 10 out of 10. His MRI clearly shows a large left-sided C6-7 disc herniation with impingement of the spinal cord and exiting left C7 nerve root. He has tried and failed previous nonsurgical intervention and I do not think further nonsurgical intervention is likely to help and that with time he will continue to worsen neurologically. This [has] had a significant profound effect upon his activities of daily living and ability to work and function. He is therefore a candidate for surgical intervention.(Id.) However, the record revealed no further treatment.
After discussing the above evidence, the ALJ found that
[t]he claimant did not undergo surgery, testifying that he lost his Medicaid. However, the undersigned notes that in treatment notes from October 18, 2021, (the next time he presented with any cervical spine complaints), he reported that he needed surgery three years ago, but “admits that he was ‘positive' for drugs at the time and couldn't have the surgery done” (8F/6).
If the claimant contends that his lack of medical treatment is due to financial reasons, the undersigned does not find this persuasive, as there is no indication in the record that the claimant has sought government-subsidized health care or sought health care and been turned down due to financial reasons. The medical records fail[] to show the claimant sought or contacted any local Free Clinic or a reduced fee clinic. There is no record that the claimant sought treatment and was turned down for financial reasons. The record is more consistent with the claimant's symptoms not being of the frequency, duration, or severity to need routine medical monitoring or care.(Tr. 33.)
The ALJ did not stop his analysis there; rather, he observed that Plaintiff's next treatment record is from December 2018 when Plaintiff went to the emergency room for complaints of abdominal pain that radiated to his back, but no reports of neck, shoulder, or arm pain. (Tr. 3334) (citing Tr. 325). The ALJ found in addition to Plaintiff's allegations being inconsistent with the medical evidence, they were not consistent with the record as a whole, including his daily activities which required physical abilities inconsistent with his limitations. Thus, in summary the ALJ concluded that
[r]egarding his symptoms during the period at issue, the record is generally inconsistent with the severity of his complaints. While the claimant reported chronic neck pain with radiation to the upper extremity, and while his last examination prior to the date last insured he exhibited or complained of weakness in his left C7 distribution and diminished sensation in an absent left triceps reflex (5F/35), other examinations immediately prior to that examination, and even after that examination, are unremarkable. In fact, the last treatment notes regarding his neck are from August 28, 2018, and while he sought treatment for other musculoskeletal complaints since that date, he made no mention of neck pain again until October 2021. For these reasons, and others stated in this decision, the undersigned finds the claimant's allegations as to his symptoms are generally inconsistent with the record as a whole.(Tr. 34.)
Upon careful consideration of the ALJ's decision, the parties' arguments, and the record in this matter, the court is constrained to find that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's findings are unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by an error of law. As stated above, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff's allegations of a disabling condition for his failure to obtain treatment without properly inquiring into Plaintiff's financial constraints. The Fourth Circuit has held that “[a] claimant may not be penalized for failing to seek treatment [he] cannot afford.” Lovejoy v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986). In considering a claimant's treatment history, SSR 16-3p provides that an ALJ will consider and address reasons that a claimant did not pursue treatment that are pertinent to the particular case, including that “[a]n individual may not be able to afford treatment and may not have access to free or low-cost medical services.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10. While Plaintiff may dispute the ALJ's ultimate findings on this issue, the ALJ did not fail to consider the possibility of whether Plaintiff failed to seek treatment due to financial restrictions. The ALJ simply concluded that the failure to seek treatment was due to other reasons. Accordingly, Plaintiff's reliance on cases in this district that were remanded where the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff's inability to afford treatment when the ALJ included Plaintiff's failure to seek treatment as a factor in evaluating Plaintiff's subjective complaints in unavailing. (See Pl.'s Reply, ECF No. 13 at 3-4) (collecting cases). Unlike those cases, the ALJ here explicit considered Plaintiff's lack of medical insurance, and the ALJ did not find that to be the reason Plaintiff failed to obtain additional treatment. In fact, the ALJ specifically considered alternative reasons offered by the record indicating that the true reason Plaintiff did not proceed with additional treatment was that he was positive for drugs and therefore ineligible for the surgery. Moreover, the ALJ also observed that when reporting to the emergency room several months later for abdominal pain, Plaintiff made no mention of his other allegedly disabling condition and did not seek any care-emergent or otherwise-for any cervical pain until three years later.
Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ's overall evaluation, arguing that his analysis includes findings that could support Plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain, such as being recommended for surgery. While this evidence could support Plaintiff's argument, the court finds that the ALJ's conclusion is within the bounds of the requisite standard, as there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff's symptoms are not as disabling as alleged. The ALJ properly considered and resolved conflicting evidence, and it is not within this court's purview to second guess his decision. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].”); Keene v. Berryhill, 732 Fed.Appx. 174, 177 (4th Cir. 2018) (“There were a number of conflicts in the evidence here, and we do not second guess the ALJ in resolving those conflicts.”). Moreover, the ALJ did not reject Plaintiff's allegations of pain completely, and, in fact, he explicitly agreed that Plaintiff is limited. (Tr. 34.) The ALJ observed the importance of the subjective element of incapacity; however, he found that Plaintiff was limited to a reduced range of light work and was not complete completely disabled. (Tr. 35.)
Thus, in accordance with the regulations, the ALJ considered the longitudinal medical record of Plaintiff's pain, along with his alleged symptoms, daily activities, treatment modalities, and effectiveness of those modalities, and reasonably concluded Plaintiff's statements concerning the severity of his symptoms were inconsistent with the other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (“Objective medical evidence . . . is a useful indicator to assist us in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of your symptoms and the effect those symptoms . . . may have on your ability to work ....”); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *5 (“A report of minimal or negative findings or inconsistencies in the objective medical evidence is one of the many factors we must consider in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual's symptoms.”). The ALJ complied with the regulatory framework and provided a logical explanation that permits meaningful judicial review. His RFC finding and subjective symptom analysis are supported by substantial evidence and remand is not warranted. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (defining “substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance” and stating that the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]”); Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775 (indicating that regardless of whether the court agrees or disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence).
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that this matter be
[X] Affirmed. Plaintiff has failed to show that the Commissioner's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by an error of law.
[] Reversed and remanded pursuant to [] Sentence Four [] Sentence Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Order.
[] Reversed and remanded for an award of benefits.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).