With this provision, HCQIA establishes a “safe harbor” provision that contains a list of procedural guidelines which, if followed, will satisfy the adequate notice and procedures requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(3). Chalal v. Nw. Med. Ctr., Inc., 147 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1173–74 (N.D.Ala.2000).
Crawford, 693 So. 2d at 460 n.1 (citing Thomas v. BSE Industrial Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Ala.1993))(internal quotations and citations omitted).Chalal v. Northwest Med. Center, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1183-84 (N.D. Ala. 2000). In order to state a claim for outrage based on termination, a plaintiff must show that the termination was "for a reason which contravenes public policy" or that it was "accompanied with the sound of fury."
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that, when the meaning of a statute is unambiguous, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary.Manley, 175 Ohio App. 3d at 162, 885 N.E.2d at 975-76. Nevertheless, Defendants cite three cases in support of their contention that Plaintiffs cannot invoke § 2305.252 because they are the plaintiffs: Badri v. Huron Hosp., 691 F. supp. 2d 744 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Wall v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 119 Ohio App. 3d 654, 695 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1997); and Chalal v. Nw. Med. Cntr., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Ala. 2000). The courts in Badriand Chalaladdressed claims under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act ("HCQIA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 through 11152, and Defendants do not explain the relevance of those cases to this case.
A party can violate this rule by failing to previously identify witnesses it may use to support a motion for summary judgment or other pretrial motion. See, e.g., United States v. Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 767, 772 (E.D.N.C. 2003); Chalal v. Northwest Med. Ctr., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (N.D. Ala. 2000), aff'd 250 F.3d 749 (11th Cir. 2001). The "obvious purpose" of the Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosure requirement is to identify for the opposing party persons with knowledge about the case so that the opposing side may, inter alia, include them in a proposed amended complaint.
However, the actual terms of the release, attached to the Plaintiff's amended complaint, are not nearly as broad. See Chalal v. Northwest Med. Cen., Inc., 147 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1178 n. 10 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (cursory reading of the release showed the court it was a limited release of claims related to the sending of the letter of reference and not a general release as the plaintiff claimed). The release instead only incorporates those claims "related to or in anyway connected with the furnishing of the Requested Information to WestCare, Inc."
Even, assuming arguendo, that plaintiff suffered an antitrust violation, this claim could still fail if plaintiff has failed to establish that she has antitrust standing. Chalal v. Northwest Med. Center. Inc., 147 F. Supp.2d 1160, 1182 (N.D.Ala. 2000). Plaintiff attempts to establish standing by arguing that the revocation of her privileges eliminated her from the Missouri side of the Greater Kansas City Metropolitan area market of providing treatment for HIV/AIDS patients, and caused her to suffer the injury of a substantially decreased patient base, to wit, the loss of Missouri Medicaid patients.
Without any evidence of a connection between a professional review action and its allegedly illegitimate basis, courts cannot presume that one exists. See, e.g., Chalal v. Nw. Med. Ctr., Inc., 147 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1172 (N.D.Ala.2000) (granting summary judgment because there was “no evidence on record to suggest that the Hospital did not act ‘in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care[.]’ ” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 11112(a) (1))); Egan v. Athol Mem. Hosp., 971 F.Supp. 37, 42–43 (D.Mass.1997) (granting summary judgment because the “Plaintiff ... presented no evidence that the professional review action ... was motivated by anything other than a reasonable belief that it would further quality health care”).
See Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019, 115 S.Ct. 1363, 131 L.Ed.2d 220. The "reasonableness" requirement that a professional review action must meet in order for participants to qualify for immunity under the HCQIA is an objective standard of performance, rather than a subjective, good-faith standard. See Chalal v. Northwest Med. Ctr., Inc., 147 F.Supp.2d 1160 (N.D.Ala. 2000), aff'd, 250 F.3d 749 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 891, 122 S.Ct. 207, 151 L.Ed.2d 147. Whether a defendant is entitled to immunity under the HCQIA is a question of law for the court to decide. Reyes v. Wilson Mem. Hosp., 102 F.Supp.2d 798 (S.D.Ohio 1998).
2. Dr. Patrick correctly argues that the immunity afforded by the Act is limited to monetary damages and does not extend to equitable relief, Chalal v. Northwest Medical Center, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1184 (VIII) (N.D. Alabama, 2000); Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 37 F3rd 1026, 1031 (4th Cir. 1994); Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1040-1041 (6th Cir.) (1993); Decker v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 436 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 3041, 125 L.Ed.2d 727 (1993). However, although Count 1 of Dr. Patrick's complaint, in effect, seeks injunctive relief in the nature of reinstatement of staff privileges, nothing of record shows that he moved the superior court for an injunction or otherwise pursued injunctive relief as surviving his claim for monetary damages. Under these circumstances, to the extent that Count 1 sought equitable relief in the nature of an injunction requiring the reinstatement of Dr. Patrick's staff privileges, it was abandoned.