Opinion
A22-1476
05-16-2023
Chang Vang, Appellant, v. Acuity Insurance Company, Respondent, Rasheed Iben Abdullah, Respondent.
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-21-4693
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Jeanne M. Cochran, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Chang Vang challenges the district court's dismissal of his no-fault and uninsured motorist (UM) benefits claims. He also challenges the denial of his motion to amend his pleading as moot. For the reasons below, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the no-fault benefits claim, but we reverse the district court's dismissal of the UM benefits claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In the event that, on remand, the district court does not dismiss Vang's UM benefits claim, we also reverse and remand the denial of the motion to amend.
2. On March 8, 2021, Vang filed a statement of claim in conciliation court against his automobile insurer, respondent Acuity Insurance Company (Acuity), and respondent Rasheed Iben Abdullah, alleging that Abdullah rear-ended Vang in April 2015 and lacked automobile insurance at the time of the accident. Vang sought $15,000 in damages for "unpaid bills and bodily injury." Vang submitted $4,988.69 in outstanding medical bills and claimed an additional $10,011.31 for uncompensated "pain and suffering" to reach the conciliation court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. The conciliation court determined that Vang was not entitled to relief and denied his claims. Vang removed the case to district court and did not amend his pleading. Acuity moved to dismiss Vang's claims, arguing that Vang's no-fault benefits claim could only be resolved through binding arbitration and that his UM benefits claim improperly sought relief for the same damages as his no-fault benefits claim. Vang opposed the motion and asked the district court to allow him to pursue both claims and to amend his pleading to claim additional damages.
Abdullah has not appeared or been involved in this appeal.
3. While the conciliation court proceedings were ongoing, Vang filed a petition for no-fault arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. In support of his petition, Vang apparently submitted the same outstanding medical bills as he filed in district court.
4. On August 18, 2022, the district court granted Acuity's motion to dismiss any and all claims for no-fault benefits and any and all claims for UM benefits. The district court also denied Vang's various requests for relief.
5. On appeal, Vang argues that he should be allowed to proceed in district court with his no-fault benefits claim for unpaid medical bills even though he is pursuing the same relief through arbitration. Vang also asserts that he should be allowed to proceed in district court with his UM benefits claim for pain and suffering because he cannot pursue this claim through arbitration. Lastly, Vang contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to amend his pleading without explanation.
6. Acuity argues that the district court properly dismissed Vang's no-fault benefits claim because a no-fault benefits claim for less than $10,000, as Vang's claim undisputedly is, must be submitted to binding arbitration under Minn. Stat. § 65B.525, subd. 1 (2022). Acuity also asserts that the district court properly dismissed Vang's UM benefits claim because he improperly combined this claim with his no-fault benefits claim. Lastly, Acuity contends that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying as moot Vang's "eleventh-hour motion to amend."
7. Based on our review of the district court's order, it is unclear whether the district court based its dismissal of Vang's claims on failure to state a claim, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or other grounds. Regardless, we review de novo a district court's dismissal of claims. See, e.g., DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019) (reviewing de novo a district court's dismissal based on failure to state a claim); Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. 2012) (reviewing de novo a district court's dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
8. The district court dismissed Vang's no-fault benefits claim with prejudice, concluding that the no-fault claim could be pursued only through arbitration. Under Minnesota law, a claim for no-fault benefits in an amount less than $10,000 must be submitted to binding arbitration. Minn. Stat. § 65B.525, subd. 1; Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Glass Serv. Co., 683 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Minn. 2004). The record indicates, and the parties agree, that Vang's no-fault benefits claim is for an amount less than $10,000. Thus, the district court did not err by dismissing Vang's no-fault benefits claim with prejudice.
9. The district court also dismissed Vang's UM benefits claim with prejudice. The district court concluded that allowing Vang's UM benefits claim to proceed while his no-fault benefits claim was being arbitrated would result in improper claim splitting. The district court cited Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 2007) to support its decision. In Copeland, the supreme court explained that a plaintiff cannot split his cause of action by "bring[ing] successive suits involving the same set of factual circumstances." 732 N.W.2d at 224 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Here, by contrast, Vang brought all of his claims together. Because Vang did not split his claims, the district court erred by relying on claim splitting as the basis for dismissing Vang's UM benefits claim.
10. Acuity argues that we should affirm the dismissal of Vang's UM benefits claim on an alternative legal basis-namely, that Vang improperly combined his no-fault benefits claim with his UM benefits claim. We generally only address issues presented to and decided by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). As noted above, the district court based its decision to dismiss Vang's UM benefits claim solely on claim splitting. Because the district court did not dismiss Vang's UM benefits claim on the alternative legal ground advanced by Acuity, we decline to address it for the first time on appeal. We also note that Acuity's appellate brief raised this issue but only in a conclusory manner without citing adequate legal authority, which provides an additional basis for declining to address the argument on appeal. See State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 477 (Minn.App. 2019) ("Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a summary and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming that errors of law occurred." (quotation omitted)). Consequently, we express no opinion about whether a properly pleaded UM benefits claim can proceed in district court while a no-fault benefits claim proceeds in arbitration. Similarly, we offer no opinion about whether Vang properly pleaded a UM benefits claim in his conciliation court pleading.
11. On remand, the district court may consider whether any ground argued by Acuity other than claim splitting supports dismissal of Vang's UM benefits claim or, alternatively, whether Vang's UM benefits claim should be allowed to proceed in district court, excluding damages for economic losses subject to arbitration.
12. In addition, if the district court does not dismiss Vang's UM benefits claim, the district court shall consider Vang's motion to amend his conciliation court pleading. The motion to amend will no longer be moot if, on remand, the UM benefits claim proceeds. Cf. Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015) (providing that "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible").
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.