Opinion
E076179
04-13-2021
C.F., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Friedland & Associates and Kathy L. Garcia, for Petitioner. No appearance by Respondent. David R. Guardado and Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J265552) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Petition granted. Friedland & Associates and Kathy L. Garcia, for Petitioner. No appearance by Respondent. David R. Guardado and Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel for Real Party in Interest.
California has a relatively new process for families that seek to provide foster care for juvenile dependents; those deemed eligible under this process are called "resource families." (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 16519.5, subds. (a), (c)(1); Legis. Counsel's Dig. § 1, Assem. Bill No. 1997 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2016, ch. 612 [noting statewide implementation beginning in 2017]; all undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) The statute on resource families is specific and detailed. However, that statute does not specify what, if anything, a juvenile court must do when all of the following occur after the parents' legal rights have been terminated: (1) a child is placed with a relative who was approved under the prior scheme, (2) the agency responsible for approving resource families declines to designate the relative as a resource family, (3) the child services agency removes the child from the relative's home because of that denial, and (4) the juvenile court does not believe that the removal would be in the child's best interest. The juvenile court faced such a scenario here.
The juvenile court, believing itself constrained by section 16519.5 and by this court's recent decision in In re C.P. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 17, approved the removal of the child from his maternal grandmother, despite finding that it was in the child's best interest for him to remain in the grandmother's home.
As we explain, neither section 16519.5 nor In re C.P. mandated removal. In fact, because the juvenile court had designated the grandmother as a "prospective adoptive parent," a different statutory provision applied, and that provision mandated that the child not be removed from the grandmother's home. Under section 366.26, subdivision (n), a child "may not be removed from the home of the designated prospective adoptive parent unless the court finds that removal is in the child's best interest." (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B), italics added.) Absent such a finding, removal is improper. And here, not only was there no such finding, there was an express finding to the contrary. We therefore grant the petition and vacate the juvenile court's order removing the child from grandmother's care.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
D.C. (child) was born in 2014. In May 2016, real party in interest San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) detained the child after his parents were arrested for child neglect. CFS filed a dependency petition alleging both parents' failure to protect and provide support, and at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing the following month, the juvenile court found the allegations true and declared the child a dependent of the court. After reunification efforts failed, the court terminated the parents' legal rights over the child in June 2017 and selected adoption as the permanent plan.
The child had been placed with petitioner C.F. (grandmother) in March 2017 after receiving approval from the relative approval unit, which at the time was responsible for granting such approvals. Grandmother already had legal guardianship over the child's two siblings, and the child had been living in grandmother's house with his parents from birth to shortly before his detention in 2016.
At the termination hearing in 2017, the juvenile court found that the child's adoption would likely be finalized within the next 12 months. However, adoption has yet to take place. The delay arose in part because, following the child's initial placement with grandmother, CFS removed him from grandmother's home on two occasions. Grandmother's writ petition arises from the juvenile court's order regarding the second (i.e., later) removal, so we focus here on the circumstances surrounding that event.
In October 2018, the juvenile court modified the permanent plan to a planned permanent living arrangement with a specific goal of adoption. In November 2020, the permanent plan again became adoption.
We describe the circumstances surrounding the child's first removal from grandmother's home when addressing CFS's contentions. (See footnote 7, post.)
In December 2019, CFS filed a "Notice of Emergency Removal." The notice, as well as a later report, stated that the child had been removed from grandmother's home because her housing conditions failed to satisfy the standards under the new resource family approval process. Those conditions included the fact that the grandmother had moved into a home where the children were sleeping on couches due to a lack of space and the fact that one of the other adults in the new home had a non-exemptible criminal record. (See § 16519.5, subd. (d)(2)(A)(i); In re C.P., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 25 [describing criminal record clearance process].) CFS also stated that it removed the child from grandmother's home "as there has been consistent housing instability" since 2018.
In part due to the coronavirus pandemic, substantive hearings on the propriety of the emergency removal were not held until some nine months later. During that time, the county agency responsible for resource family approvals formally denied grandmother's application. The denial letter made no mention of sleeping on couches, non-exemptible criminal records, or anything else as to why grandmother's home in December 2019 was inadequate. This was unsurprising, given that the letter stated it was reviewing grandmother's application from July 2019, when the family was living in a different home. Nevertheless, it was notable, since CFS had specifically informed the juvenile court in December 2019 that the pending denial—and therefore the emergency removal—was due to the conditions of the December 2019 home. Regardless, by February 2020, grandmother had moved again, into her own home.
At the first substantive hearing on the issue, held in September 2020, the juvenile court ruled on three preliminary issues. First, it considered whether grandmother was a prospective adoptive parent and found that she was. Second, the juvenile court considered whether it had the authority to place a child in a home that had been denied as a resource family. Relying on its reading of section 16519.5 and In re C.P., the court held that it did not. Third, the court considered whether it could order the resource family approval agency to reassess grandmother's home. It held that it could and ordered that grandmother's home be reassessed. On the ultimate question of whether the child's removal was appropriate, the juvenile court did not rule, seeking instead to revisit the issue after the home reassessment had been completed.
The juvenile court as well as the parties expressed a belief that grandmother had previously been designated as a prospective adoptive parent. However, we find nothing in the record confirming this.
At the second substantive hearing, held in November 2020, grandmother stated that the home reassessment had resulted in another denial. Following testimony from grandmother and argument from the parties, the court ordered the child's removal. In doing so, however, the court unambiguously expressed that it believed it was constrained from doing otherwise and indicated it would have ruled differently if it believed it could have:
Also at the hearing, grandmother stated that an administrative appeal of the denial was pending.
"So I'm going to make a very clear record. I'm removing the child from the grandmother and denying current placement with her, simply because [resource family approval] has been denied and I don't believe that there's statutory authority to the contrary. [¶] . . . [¶]
"That being said, the Court wants to make some factual findings that I do find that it would be in the child's best interest to be placed with his grandmother and I would immediately do so if [I] felt I had such authority.
"It's clear to the Court the child shares a parental-type bond with his grandmother, that he's lived with her for the majority of [his] life, that the denial of the [resource family approvals] . . . , none of those concerns rose to the level that caused a removal for his two full siblings that remain with the grandmother, he has a bond with them as well and I believe it's detrimental to the child to not be able to grow up with both his siblings and the one person that's been a constant in his life which is the grandmother.
"I'll note that she has been the only stability he's ever known, that the prior reports that were considered at the last hearing shows that he has a close bond to her, and I think it would be in his best interest to both protect the bond he has with the grandmother and his siblings. . . .
"I'll note that [the child] is now over six-years-old and he had always lived with his siblings except for the brief time period to which the evaluation[s] were ongoing for the grandmother, that he had lived with her for a substantial period of time, the majority of his life, and does refer to her as mom and that he's bonded to her, that although he's been removed from the grandmother twice, neither of those circumstances rose to the level of risk to his siblings, and in the Court's estimation appeared more to be a product of a resource or lack of resources on behalf of the grandmother."
Grandmother then filed a petition for extraordinary writ in this court seeking to vacate the removal order. (See §§ 366.26, subd. (n)(5), 366.28; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.456.)
The juvenile court's next scheduled hearing in this matter is on April 30, 2021 for a post permanency review hearing.
II. ANALYSIS
The juvenile court misunderstood the scope of its authority because it failed to apply the law applicable to a prospective adoptive parent such as grandmother. The juvenile court was not required to order the child's removal from her care, as it believed. To the contrary, in light of its factual findings, it was required not to do so. A. Applicable Law
Section 366.26, subdivision (n) (section 366.26(n)) governs prospective adoptive parents. It states that, "[n]otwithstanding . . . any other law, the court . . . may designate a current caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent if the child has lived with the caretaker for at least six months, the caretaker currently expresses a commitment to adopt the child, and the caretaker has taken at least one step to facilitate the adoption process." (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(1).)
Paragraph (3) of section 366.26(n) outlines what must happen when a child services agency decides to remove a child from a prospective adoptive parent (or someone who potentially qualifies as one) in a nonemergency situation. Generally, in a nonemergency situation, a notice of proposed removal is filed and the issue is litigated before any physical removal occurs:
"(3) Prior to a change in placement and as soon as possible after a decision is made to remove a child from the home of a designated prospective adoptive parent, the agency shall notify the court, the designated prospective adoptive parent or the current caretaker, if that caretaker would have met the threshold criteria to be designated as a prospective adoptive parent pursuant to paragraph (1) on the date of service of this notice," and other persons of the proposed removal. The child, prospective adoptive parent, and certain others can object to the proposed removal by filing a petition within five court days or seven calendar days (or longer for good cause). (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(A).)
Subparagraph (B) provides information about the hearing on the proposed removal. It states that the hearing "shall be held as soon as possible and not later than five court days after the petition is filed with the court," unless good cause prevents such speed, in which case "the court shall set the matter for hearing as soon as possible." (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).)
Subparagraph (B) also provides that a prospective adoptive parent designation can be made at the hearing (if it has not been made already) and states the protection against removal such a designation affords: "At the hearing, the court shall determine whether the caretaker has met the threshold criteria to be designated as a prospective adoptive parent pursuant to [section 366.26(n)(1)], and whether the proposed removal of the child from the home of the designated prospective adoptive parent is in the child's best interest, and the child may not be removed from the home of the designated prospective adoptive parent unless the court finds that removal is in the child's best interest." (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).) Thus, the juvenile court must agree that removal from a prospective adoptive parent's home is in the child's best interest before the child may be removed.
Paragraph (4) outlines a similar removal process that applies only when a child must be removed "immediately, due to a risk of physical or emotional harm." In such emergencies, a child may be removed from the home first, before the issue is litigated. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(4).) "However, as soon as possible and not longer than two court days after the removal, the agency shall notify the court, the caretaker who is or may be a designated prospective adoptive parent," and others of the removal. (Ibid.) The hearing process is otherwise the same. (Ibid.; see also State Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 273, 285 ["With the exception of the notice requirements, the same hearing procedures apply to both types of removal and, in each case, the agency 'must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the removal is in the best interest of the child.'"].) Thus, the child or prospective adoptive parent can object to the removal by filing a petition within five court days or seven calendar days, and the hearing must take place within five court days of the petition, although either or both deadlines can be extended for good cause. B. Application
It is disappointing that the first substantive hearing on the child's emergency removal was held nine months after removal instead of the approximately two weeks required by statute, during which time the child was away from "the only stability he's ever known." Moreover, the record unambiguously shows that grandmother was designated a prospective adoptive parent at the September 2020 hearing. By statute, therefore, removal could be proper only if the court found it was in the child's best interest. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).) Here, no such finding was made, so the juvenile court erred by ordering the child removed.
Indeed, section 366.26(n) was designed specifically for situations where, as here, a child services agency and a court disagree as to "a dependent child's adoptive placement after termination of parental rights." (T.W. v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 30, 44.) The 2005 legislation enacting section 366.26(n) "was designed to correct the '"nearly complete, unchecked authority"' appellate courts had given to a welfare child agency" in such situations. (T.W. v. Superior Court , supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 44.; see also Wayne F. v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1338 [noting that under prior law "'the court's oversight function essentially evaporate[d] between the order to place the child for adoption and the order granting the petition for adoption'"].) Section 366.26(n) accordingly "represents 'a paradigm shift in the standards to be applied to agency decisions in the narrow category of posttermination removal of children from designated prospective adoptive placements and gives to the court the wide discretion previously afforded the adoption agencies to determine whether the placement is in the best interest of the child.'" (T.W. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 44; see also id. at p. 46 ["Although an agency has exclusive care and control of the child at all times until a petition for adoption is granted [citation], the Legislature has determined that it is the province of the judicial branch to decide whether removal from the home of a prospective adoptive parent is in the child's best interests."].) The removal here fell within that "'narrow category'" requiring judicial approval (T.W. v. Superior Court, at p. 44), and such approval was clearly lacking.
Nevertheless, the juvenile court believed that other considerations required removal, and CFS relies on those as well as others in its response to grandmother's writ petition. We discuss each of these below. C. Section 16519.5
The juvenile court cited section 16519.5 when determining whether removal was proper, but that section does not apply to the circumstances of this case.
Section 16519.5, subdivision (c)(4)(A) states that a "resource family shall be considered eligible to provide foster care for children in out-of-home placement and approved for adoption and guardianship." As the California Department of Social Services has stated, "all existing licensed foster family homes, all certified family homes, and all approved relatives and [nonrelative extended family members] who wish to continue to care for a foster child must be an approved resource family." (California Department of Social Services, All-County Letter No. 16-10, p. 6, available at <https://www.cdss.ca.gov/lettersnotices/EntRes/getinfo/acl/2016/16-10.pdf> [as of March 10, 2021].) The juvenile court believed that because grandmother had been denied approval as a resource family, removal was necessary.
Here, the requirement that placements be made with resource families did not apply because the child had already been placed with grandmother before the December 2019 removal. This was not a situation where a juvenile court had to decide whether it could place a child with someone whose resource family application had been denied. Rather, the court here was deciding whether the removal from an existing placement was appropriate. (See, e.g., Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (Cheryl M.) (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 509, 520 [holding that, under section 361.4, "a nonexempted disqualifying offense precludes the county from placing a child with the relative, but does not require removal from an existing relative placement," italics added].)
Put another way, the juvenile court appeared to believe that by the September and November 2020 hearings, the issue it needed to decide—the child's removal—had already been a fiat accompli. For instance, the court stated that "after the time frame that the child's been out of the grandmother's care [] effectively a removal had already occurred, and that that is a legal removal." Such a belief may have been understandable, given the time between the emergency removal and the hearings. But it was erroneous. The question before the court remained whether removal was appropriate, and the delay did not mandate the appropriate answer to that question. (See In re M.L. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 210, 224 [emergency placement does not "transform[] into a de facto formal placement due to the 'mere passage of time'"]; In re Cynthia C. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1490 ["mere passage of time" did not "transform the general placement order into some sort of de facto order giving Sharon a right to custody or continued placement"].) The juvenile court's reliance on section 16519.5 was therefore in error. D. In re C.P.
The juvenile court also saw itself constrained by our opinion in In re C.P., but that case did not call for removal here. In re C.P. involved a child who had been placed in long term foster care, and whose maternal grandparents sought to have him placed in their care. (In re C.P., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 21.) The grandparents were statutorily barred from qualifying for placement either as a resource family (on a permanent basis) or as approved relatives (on an emergency basis) due to a criminal conviction on the grandfather's record. (Ibid.) We held that "the absolute statutory bar to placement of the child in their custody would be unconstitutional as to them if they [could] establish that they have a parental relationship with the child, not just a grandparental relationship." (Ibid.) Our holding was based on due process grounds: we stated that a "permanent, irrebuttable statutory presumption regarding certain convictions" could not "absolutely disqualify an adult who shares a parental bond with a child from ever having that child placed in his or her care" because "[d]ue process principles require, at the least, an individualized, case-by-case analysis." (Id. at p. 29.) This case, in contrast, involves removal of the child from an existing placement, and the statutory bars discussed in In re C.P. are inapplicable. Although both cases do share some factual similarities—both involve, for instance, maternal grandparents that have been denied as a resource family despite sharing a close bond with their grandchild—nothing we stated in In re C.P. constrained the juvenile court here. If anything, our holding in In re C.P.—that due process requires consideration of individual circumstances, including and especially the best interests of the child, rather than application of an absolute statutory bar to placement of a child with someone with whom they share a parent-child relationship—should have led the juvenile court to the opposite conclusion from the one it reached. E. Grandmother's Status as a Prospective Adoptive Parent
The juvenile court did not say much as to why it thought that it was bound under In re C.P.; it only stated its belief that the case "in its dicta . . . indicates that [it] cannot make such a placement without [resource family] approval." Having reviewed In re C.P., we find nothing, either in the dicta or the holding, justifying the juvenile court's interpretation.
In its response to grandmother's writ petition, CFS contends that grandmother was not a prospective adoptive parent in September 2020.
As a preliminary matter, we observe that CFS's arguments place undue significance on events occurring before the child's December 2019 removal. For instance, CFS notes that it is unclear whether grandmother was designated as a prospective adoptive parent prior to the September 2020 hearing. But this does not matter, as the court clearly found grandmother to be a prospective adoptive parent at the September 2020 hearing.
Similarly irrelevant is whether, either automatically upon removal or by order of the court, grandmother lost her status as prospective adoptive parent after the child's first removal from her care in February 2018. Whatever her status may have been in, say, May 2018, or even August 2019, the record is unambiguous that as of the September 2020 hearing, she was—either again or still—the child's prospective adoptive parent. There is nothing in section 366.26(n) that prevents the court from designating a caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent a second time, and CFS has made no attempt to argue otherwise.
There appears to be significant confusion over the circumstances of and legal consequences stemming from the child's "first removal" from grandmother, which began in February 2018 as an emergency removal. Although the juvenile court ordered that the child be returned to grandmother in May 2018, the child was not returned to grandmother at that time. In fact, the child was not placed again in grandmother's care until over a year later in July 2019. In the meantime, in June 2018 CFS filed a "Notice of Intent to Remove Child" (although the child had not been returned), and in October 2018 the juvenile court ordered that the child be removed. We refer to the time between February 2018 and July 2019 as the first removal, even though it is arguable that the October 2018 order constituted a "second" removal.
The failure to return the child in May 2018, notice of intent to remove filed in June 2018, and removal order in October 2018 all appear to be based on beliefs that grandmother's physical home needed to be reassessed under the new family resource approval guidelines and that it would not pass those guidelines. (As noted earlier, the child's removal in December 2019 was based on similar concerns.) The issue is not before us, so we do not rule on it, but we note in passing that the idea that grandmother's physical home needed to be assessed under the new guidelines appears to have been incorrect. (See § 16519.5, subds. (c)(1) [stating that resource family approval requires "home environment" assessment and "permanency" assessment], (d)(2)(B) ["home environment" assessment includes "home and grounds evaluation"], (d)(3) ["permanency" assessment includes "family evaluation" which in turn includes interviews to assess "personal history, family dynamic, and need for support or resources"], (p)(4)(B) ["A licensed foster family home or an approved relative or nonrelative extended family member who had a child in placement at any time between January 1, 2017, and December 31, 2017, inclusive, may be approved as a resource family on the date of successful completion of a family evaluation."], italics added; see also California Department of Social Services, All-County Letter No. 17-16, pp. 4-5 [requiring psychosocial assessment, but not home environment assessment, of relatives who had a child in placement in 2017], available at < https://www.cdss.ca.gov/Portals/9/ACL/2017/17-16.pdf?ver=2019-06-25-134953-037> [as of March 10, 2021].)
CFS contends that "at no point that he was in her care was [the child] under a permanent plan of adoption." Such a statement, however, misstates the record, as the juvenile court selected adoption as the child's permanent plan at the 2017 termination hearing, when the child was in grandmother's care. To the extent CFS argues that adoption was no longer the plan at the time of the December 2019 removal (see fn. 1, ante), we see nothing in the text of section 366.26(n) suggesting that a child's permanent plan is relevant to a determination of whether a caretaker is a prospective adoptive parent. (See § 366.26, subd. (n)(1) [requiring that "the child has lived with the caretaker for at least six months, the caretaker currently express[] a commitment to adopt the child, and the caretaker has taken at least one step to facilitate the adoption process"].) In any event, CFS cites no authority and makes no reasoned argument why the child's permanent plan status in September 2020 should be relevant, so we consider the issue waived. (See, e.g., People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 993, 1029 ["'"[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration."'"].)
CFS also contends grandmother was not a prospective adoptive parent in September 2020 because the child had not been living with grandmother for six uninterrupted months at the time of the December 2019 removal. But section 366.26(n) imposes no such requirement. It states that, among other requirements, a current caretaker may be deemed a prospective adoptive parent "if the child has lived with the caretaker for at least six months." (Italics added.) There is no express statutory requirement that those six months be the six months immediately prior to removal. (See In re Rudy L. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1011 ["'It is . . . against all settled rules of statutory construction that courts should write into a statute by implication express requirements which the Legislature itself has not seen fit to place in the statute."']; § 366.26, subd. (n)(1) [additionally requiring that "the caretaker currently expresses a commitment to adopt the child" in order to be designated a prospective adoptive parent; italics added].)
In sum, we find no error in the juvenile court's determination in September 2020 that grandmother was a prospective adoptive parent. F. Whether the Child was "Removed"
CFS also contends that section 366.26(n) does not apply to this case because the child was never technically "removed" from grandmother, only moved out of an emergency placement. We are not persuaded.
According to CFS, the child's placement with grandmother—whether in June 2017 at the termination hearing or at any potential placement thereafter (CFS does not specify)—was only an emergency placement under one or both of sections 309 and 361.45. Because it was only an emergency placement, CFS could take the child away without there being a "removal."
See footnote 7, ante.
The flaw with this argument is that it wrongly assumes that one or both of sections 309 and 361.45 apply. Whether CFS is referring to the child's original placement with grandmother in 2017 or any arguable subsequent placement, neither of these sections is relevant.
Section 309 provides that if a relative or other qualified person "is available and requests emergency placement of the child pending the detention hearing, or after the detention hearing and pending the disposition hearing," that person's home shall be assessed for an emergency placement. (§ 309, subd. (d)(1), italics added.) By the time each of the child's placements (or potential placements) were made, both the detention and disposition hearings for the only petition in the matter had already taken place.
Section 361.45 is not limited to emergency placements pending the detention or disposition hearings, but it is limited to situations where "the sudden unavailability of a foster caregiver requires a change in placement." (§ 361.45, subd. (a).) But here, none of the placements here were due to the sudden unavailability of a foster caregiver.
In re M.L., which CFS relies on in making its argument here, involved an emergency placement made prior to the dispositional hearing on a supplemental petition. (See In re M.L., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 214-215.) Nothing in In re M.L. suggests that the emergency placement there was made after the sudden unavailability of a foster caregiver. The fact that In re M.L. appears to have dealt with section 309 accordingly means it provides no help to CFS here.
At oral argument, and relying on section 16519.5, subdivision (e)(1), CFS contended that the return of the child to grandmother in July 2019 was not a formal "placement," so the second removal was not a "removal" at all. We disagree. First, section 16519.5, subdivision (e)(1) expressly refers to an agency's ability to "place a child" with a resource family applicant prior to a completion of a permanency assessment if certain conditions are met. If CFS is correct that section 16519.5, subdivision (e)(1) applies, then the child was "placed" with grandmother, and the subdivision does not describe such a placement as an emergency placement. Secondly, it is not clear from the record that that subdivision's conditions had been met. Section 16519.5, subdivision (e)(1) requires that the resource family applicant whom the child is being placed with have successfully completed a home environment assessment. However, we see nothing in the record substantiating CFS's claim at oral argument that such an assessment had been completed in July 2019. And thirdly, in a review report filed in October 2019, CFS stated multiple times that in July the child had been "placed" with grandmother.
III. DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is granted. Let an extraordinary writ issue directing respondent court to vacate its order removing D.C. from petitioner's care and setting a post permanent plan review hearing. Our decision is immediately final as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.456(h)(5), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.