Opinion
F063029 Super. Ct. No. JP000427
11-10-2011
CESAR G., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY, Respondent; MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.
Cesar G., in pro per., for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. James N. Fincher, County Counsel, and James B. Tarhalla, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Dawson, J.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Richard M. Curtis, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Monterey Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Cesar G., in pro per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
James N. Fincher, County Counsel, and James B. Tarhalla, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. We will deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Petitioner is the alleged father of Gage, the subject of this writ petition. In June 2011, newborn Gage was removed from the custody of his mother, Rita, after he tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. At the time, petitioner was incarcerated for violating probation and evading law enforcement.
Rita did not file a writ petition.
In June 2011, the juvenile court ordered Gage detained and ordered petitioner to submit to paternity testing.
In July 2011, the Merced County Human Services Agency (agency) received information that petitioner was sentenced in July 2011 to two years eight months in prison. The agency also received information from petitioner that he and Rita were not married, were not living together when Gage was born, and petitioner was not present at the time of Gage's birth. Petitioner also advised the agency that he wanted his parents considered for placement if he turned out to be Gage's biological father.
In July 2011, the juvenile court conducted a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Petitioner had yet to participate in paternity testing. The juvenile court exercised its dependency jurisdiction, denied petitioner and Rita reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing (setting hearing). This petition ensued.
Genetic testing subsequently failed to exclude petitioner as Gage's biological father. The agency appended the testing results in a motion to augment the record filed in this court on September 22, 2011. We denied the motion to augment the appellate record with the genetic testing results and will not consider them.
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DISCUSSION
Petitioner raises as juvenile court error the fact that the juvenile court denied him reunification services because paternity testing had not been conducted. By way of relief, he asks for reunification services. He also requests that Gage be temporarily placed with his (petitioner's) parents. We find no error.
At all times during the dependency proceedings on review, petitioner was Gage's alleged father. An alleged father is a man who may be the child's father but has not elevated his status to presumed or biological father. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15.) Under the dependency law, an alleged father is not entitled to reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) A biological father may be considered for reunification services if the juvenile court determines that services will benefit the child. (Ibid) A presumed father is entitled to reunification services unless an exception applies. (§ 361.5, subds. (a) & (b).) A presumed father is one who qualifies for any of the presumptions under Family Code section 7611. Petitioner never claimed to be Gage's presumed father.
When the juvenile court denied petitioner reunification services at the setting hearing, petitioner was Gage's alleged father and, as such, not entitled to services under the statute. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err.
Further, requests for placement must be raised in the juvenile court. Consequently, we will not review petitioner's request to have Gage placed with petitioner's parents.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion is final as to this court.