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rejecting instructional error claim based on failure to give lesser-included offense instruction because "the factual record was utterly devoid of any evidence that would have supported [the instruction]"
Summary of this case from Gupta v. BeardOpinion
No. 06-56352.
Argued and Submitted December 9, 2009.
Filed December 22, 2009.
Robert C. Cervantez, Sonoma, CA, pro se.
Vicki Marolt Buchanan, Esquire, Delano, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Gary Brozio, Anthony da Silva, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California, Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Stephen G. Larson, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-04-00625-SGL.
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, TROTT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Appellant Cervantez appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging two errors.
First, in connection with the lesser included offense of manslaughter, he asserts that the state trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State bore the burden of disproving "heat of passion" beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim fails because the failure of a state court to instruct on lesser included offenses does not present a federal constitutional question cognizable on federal habeas review. Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000). Also, the California Court of Appeal held that the factual record was utterly devoid of any evidence that would have supported a finding of "heat of passion." This determination is well supported by the record. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded pursuant to Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), that any instructional omission was harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Likewise, the omission of the instruction had no substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993).
Second, Cervantez argues that the removal by the state trial court of a sitting juror who indicated that she would not follow the court's orders deprived him of his right to due process guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court of Appeal found appropriate factual and legal cause for the trial court's decision. We agree. Moreover, there do not yet exist established rules from the Supreme Court governing the handling of a recalcitrant juror.
AFFIRMED.