Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5729-11T3
06-19-2014
CENTRAL REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOROUGH OF SEASIDE PARK, Defendant-Appellant.
Phillip C. Bauknight argued the cause for appellant (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C., attorneys; Vito A. Gagliardi, Jr., of counsel and on the brief; Kerri A. Wright, on the brief). Arthur Stein argued the cause for respondent (Stein & Supsie, attorneys; Mr. Stein, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No. 197-11.
Phillip C. Bauknight argued the cause for appellant (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C., attorneys; Vito A. Gagliardi, Jr., of counsel and on the brief; Kerri A. Wright, on the brief).
Arthur Stein argued the cause for respondent (Stein & Supsie, attorneys; Mr. Stein, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant, Borough of Seaside Park (Borough), appeals from the June 7, 2012 order directing it to: (1) forward all future tax payments to plaintiff, Central Regional School District Board of Education (Central Regional), in a timely manner, as required by N.J.S.A. 54:4-75; (2) continue to make such payments until and unless the Superior Court, Appellate Division, or the Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Education (DOE), determines otherwise regarding such payments; and (3) dismiss all remaining claims asserted by the Borough. While this appeal was pending, the Borough moved for a remand to the trial court for clarification of the scope of the June 7 order. Central Regional opposed the motion and moved for summary disposition of this appeal. We deny the Borough's motion. We grant Central Regional's motion and affirm.
The dispute arises out of the Borough's withholding of the second installment of its total tax levy assessed, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-75, for its share of school costs for Central Regional's education of Borough students in grades seven through twelve. Central Regional filed an order to show cause (OTSC) and verified complaint in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, seeking an order compelling the Borough to remit the second installment. The court granted Central Regional temporary relief, directing the Borough to remit $845,334.74 to Central Regional, and to continue making timely payments of all taxes requisitioned by Central Regional in accordance with N.J.S.A. 54:4-75 until further order of the court and the scheduling of a return date for the OTSC. The Borough filed an answer denying Central Regional's right to receive the levied funds and asserted a counterclaim, alleging that Central Regional committed fraud by misrepresenting student residency figures in its 2011-2012 application to the DOE for school state aid.
On the return date of the OTSC, in addition to the issues embodied in the complaint and counterclaim, the court considered Central Regional's motion to dismiss the Borough's answer and counterclaim. The Borough acknowledged that student enrollment issues were governed by Title 18A and proposed to the court that it transfer the issue to the Commissioner before addressing the merits of Central Regional's request for an order compelling the delivery of the second installment. In addition, the Borough maintained it was challenging the facial validity of Central Regional's requisition request for the second installment and urged that the court had jurisdiction to consider this issue.
Judge Frank A. Buczynski, Jr. rejected the Borough's arguments, concluding that any appeal of a final agency determination rests within the Appellate Division and there was no statutory authority for the Borough to withhold the payment sought by Central Regional. Accordingly, the judge ruled the Borough was obligated to deliver the levied funds to Central Regional until the Commissioner or Appellate Division determined otherwise. The court memorialized its decision in its June 7, 2012 order. The order also dismissed, without prejudice, the Borough's fraud and misrepresentation counterclaims. The present appeal followed. While the appeal was pending, the Borough sought a remand to Judge Buczynski to clarify the intended scope of the June 7, 2012 order. Central Regional opposed the motion and filed its motion seeking summary disposition.
On appeal, the Borough raises the following points:
POINT I
TO THE EXTENT THAT THE ORDER GRANTS UNCHALLENGEABLE PROSPECTIVE RELIEF IT IS IMPERMISSIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II
TO THE EXTENT THAT THE ORDER GRANTS UNCHALLENGEABLE FUTURE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IT IS IMPERMISSIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT JURISDICTION OVER SEASIDE PARK'S DEFENSES OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO TRANSFER THE MATTER TO THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION.
Summary disposition is appropriate when "the issues on appeal do not require further briefs or full record." R. 2:8-3(b). It "is intended to provide a pre-transcript, pre-argument opportunity for the screening out of appeals whose ultimate outcome is so clear as not to require full perfection and hearing for decision." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 2:8-3(b) (2013). Despite the extensive record and the fact that we entertained oral argument, summary disposition is appropriate.
The Borough's appeal is predicated upon its belief that clarification of the order is needed to protect its right to seek a modification or a reduction in its tax share from either the Law or Chancery Division. The Borough contends the court's order is problematic because it grants "perpetual future injunctive relief." We disagree. The language of Judge Buczynski's order reflects otherwise. The order simply requires the Borough to comply with the law "until and unless the Superior Court, Appellate Division or the New Jersey Commissioner of Education" directs otherwise.
The Borough next complains the order deprives it of the right to apply to the trial court for a modification of its share of school costs. This contention is without merit as Title 18A vests DOE with exclusive jurisdiction to address the amount of a municipality's fair share of a particular school budget. To that end, the Commissioner has the sole authority to resolve "all controversies and disputes arising under the school laws, excepting those governing higher education, or under the rules of the State board or of the commissioner." N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.
In Board of Education v. Fair Lawn, 143 N.J. Super. 259, 268 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 153 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 1977), the Law Division judge observed that funds collected under N.J.S.A. 54:4-75 are trust funds, and that the local municipality is "merely the collection agent for the county and the school district of these funds as to which its relationship is basically custodial." We agree with this characterization of a municipality's role as a fiscal agent in the context of collection of taxes and remitting payments in accordance with Title 18A.
We therefore conclude the Borough lacks the discretion to decline to remit the collected funds. To permit the exercise of such discretion would "result in a serious potential for grievous interference with a continuous and efficient school operation and for the creation of intolerable crisis and chaos throughout the school year." Fair Lawn, supra, 143 N.J. Super. at 270.
In short, the scope of Judge Buczynski's order appropriately defined the Borough's statutory obligations. N.J.S.A. 54:4-75 does not authorize the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over a municipality's claim seeking modification or reduction of its tax share under N.J.S.A. 54:4-75. Accordingly, we grant Central Regional's motion for summary disposition, and deny defendant's motion for a remand.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION