Opinion
Nos. 77-2200, 77-3508, 78-2369, 78-2914, 79-1139, 79-1584, 79-2227, 79-2340, 79-2449 and 79-2672.
January 12, 1982.
Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler Sarpy, Peter A. Feringa, Jr., Norris S. L. Williams, New Orleans, La., Morton P. Levine, Burgess W. Stone, Atlanta, Ga., for Ford Motor Credit Co., et al.
William J. Wegmann, New Orleans, La., for Bohn Ford, Inc.
E. Penn Nicholson, Paul W. Bonapfel, Atlanta, Ga., for George Thompson Ford, Inc.
Joseph W. Thomas, New Orleans, La., for Janet Cenance.
Keith A. Rodriguez, Lafayette, La., for Nicole Antonio.
Hill, Jones Farrington, Edward L. Baety, Atlanta, Ga., for Marion Shropshire and Solomon Wiggs.
Joseph H. King, Jr., Hill, Jones Farrington, for Jimmy W. Farrell and Thomas J. and Phyllis Rogers.
Bowen, Derrickson, Goldberg West, Ralph Goldberg, Atlanta, Ga., for Randolph Booker, Jr.
Frank L. Derrickson, Atlanta, Ga., for Michael Duane Culver.
Graydon W. Florence, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for Dennis Vissichelli and Nicholas Strzelecki.
David S. Willenzik, New Orleans, La., for amicus curiae Consumer Bankers Ass'n, Washington, D.C., et al.
Larry Samuel, New Orleans, La., for amicus curiae Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia; Newell Edenfield, Richard C. Freeman, William C. O'Kelley, Charles A. Moye, Jr. and Harold L. Murphy, Judges.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Alvin B. Rubin and Charles Schwartz, Jr., Judges.
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESOn June 1, 1981, the United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a decision of this court, 621 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1980), affirming the district courts', 458 F. Supp. 1387, 430 F. Supp. 1064, holdings in each of these cases that Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) was a creditor under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. and remanded the cases to this court for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 68 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981).
The Court agreed with our prior opinion that FMCC was a creditor, not an assignee, under the Act. The Court, however, reversed our holding that FMCC had violated the Act by failing to disclose its status as creditor. The Court concluded that notice to the debtor that the credit contract had been assigned to FMCC satisfied the disclosure requirements of the Act.
In accordance with the Supreme Court mandate, therefore, we remand these cases to the respective district courts and direct those courts to vacate that portion of their judgments finding FMCC liable for failing to disclose its creditor status. Because the Court limited its grant of certiorari to the issue of FMCC as creditor, however, the remainder of our opinion dealing with various other asserted violations of the Act by FMCC is reinstated. IT IS SO ORDERED.
VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.