Opinion
CIVIL 3:19-CV-193 (GROH)
11-17-2021
CONSTANTINO CEJAS, Petitioner, v. PAUL ADAMS, WARDEN, Respondent.
Unless otherwise noted, ECF citations refer to the instant case, No. 3:19-CV-193.
ROBERT W. TRUMBLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 2019, the pro se Petitioner filed an Application for Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Petitioner is currently housed at Hazelton FCI, with a projected release date of May 25, 2046. Petitioner is challenging the validity of his conviction and sentence, imposed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, in case number 2:11-CR-37. ECF No. 1 at 2.
Inmate Locator, BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
The matter is now before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation to the District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and LR PL P 2. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Docket entries for Criminal Action No. 2:11CR37 and Civil Action No. 2:15CV339, Southern District of Indiana, available on PACER will be cited with the case number followed by (S.D. Ind.). Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (Courts “may properly take judicial notice of public record); Colonial Penns. Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the contents of court records.'”).
A. Conviction and Sentence
On December 28, 2011, Petitioner was charged in a multi-defendant Indictment in the Southern District of Indiana in case number 2:11-CR-37. In Count 1, Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine (mixture), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and 846. Counts 2 and 4 charged Petitioner with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (mixture), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts 3 and 5 charged Petitioner with possession of firearm(s) in furtherance of the drug trafficking crimes specified in Counts 2 and 4, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count 6 charged Petitioner with one count of possession of a firearm by an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States.
On July 30, 2012, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to Count 6 of the indictment and admitted that he was an illegal alien in the United States and that he knowingly possessed a firearm which traveled in interstate commerce. ECF No. 177. Following his jury trial and conviction on the five remaining counts of the indictment, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 480 months of imprisonment, comprised of: 120 months as to Counts 1, 2, 4 and 6, all of which were to be served concurrently with one another; 60 months as to Count 3 which was to be served consecutively to the sentences for Counts 1, 2, 4, and 6; and 300 months as to Count 5 which was to be served consecutively to all other counts. ECF Nos. 81, 109 at 2 - 3. The 300-month sentence was imposed pursuant to the mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), which provides that, “In the case of a violation of this subsection that occurs after a prior conviction under this subsection has become final, the person shall [ ] be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.”
B. Direct Appeal
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in that court's docket 12-3896. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Petitioner's conviction by order entered August 1, 2014. United States v. Cejas, 761 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2014).
Petitioner's case was consolidated with the case of his co-defendant and brother, Nicholas Cejas, 131034. United States v. Cejas, 761 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2014).
C. Post-Conviction Relief - Other Petitions and Motions
On October 28, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 2:11CR37, ECF No. 162 (S.D.Ind.). Petitioner argued ineffective assistance of counsel and sought to have his convictions and sentences vacated as to Counts 3 and 5 of the indictment alleging that was part of his bargain to plead guilty to Count 6. A hearing was held on February 27, 2017, where his attorney testified regarding the plea. His petition was decided on the merits and dismissed with prejudice by order entered April 25, 2017. Id., ECF No. 197.
That motion served as the basis to open a separate civil action, 2:15-CV-339, in the Southern District of Indiana.
Petitioner filed a motion for adjustment of sentence which was processed as a second motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id., ECF No. 208. As support for the motion, Petitioner cited to United States v. Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) and Section 403 of the First Step Act of 2018. On October 28, 2019, the court dismissed that action as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion, and denied Petitioner a certificate of appealability. Id., ECF No. 210.
That motion served as the basis to open a separate civil action, 2:19CV484, in the Southern District of Indiana.
On February 11, 2019, Petitioner filed a § 2241 petition before this Court challenging his conviction and sentence. 3:19CV8, ECF No. 1 (N.D. W.Va.). Petitioner alleged that his previously imposed 924(c) sentence was improper under the terms of the First Step Act of 2018. Id. In addition, in his objections, Petitioner asked the Court to consider his case under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). This Court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed it without prejudice. ECF No. 28 at 5. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider based on the Rehaif case. ECF No. 30. The Court denied the motion stating the Petitioner was not entitled to relief under Rehaif. ECF No. 31.
Docket entries for the other § 2241 case in this District will be cited as 3:19CV8 followed by (N.D. W.Va.).
D. Instant § 2241 Petition
Docket entries for this case 3:19CV193 will cite directly to the ECF No. without reference to the case number.
Petitioner filed this second § 2241 petition on November 18, 2019. ECF No. 1. He claims once again that he is entitled to relief under the ruling in Rehaif. Petitioner claims that the government failed to prove the necessary element that he knowingly possessed a firearm while knowingly being a person prohibited from possession of a firearm and therefore he is actually innocent of the crime to which he plead guilty. ECF No. 1 at 5.
Petitioner later filed supplements to his petition on April 16, 2020, and November 15, 2021. ECF Nos. 14, 17. In the first supplement, Petitioner cites to United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2020), which held that the District Court erred in accepting defendant's plea of guilty without first informing him that government was required to prove that defendant knew that he belonged to a class of persons barred from possessing a firearm, which the Court deemed to be a structural error. However, the Gary case was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090 (2021).
In Petitioner's second supplement, he cites to James v. Adams, No 21-6519 (5:20CV248) arguing that the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district judge's order because the petitioner did meet the second prong in Jones. 5:20CV248, ECF No. 17 (N.D.W.Va.). However, this is an incorrect reading of the Fourth Circuit's Order, which merely stated that the order was vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090 (2021). Id., ECF No. 19. In fact, on November 8, 2021, the District Judge issued another Order [ECF No. 22] Re-adopting Report and Recommendation and stating that,
This Court, having reread Greer several times, is frankly unsure of the purpose of the remand, especially in light of the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Allen v. Dobbs, No. 20-647 1 (August 10, 2021), Rhodes v. Dobbs, No. 21-6373 (September 17, 2021), and Asarv. Travis, No.20-7299 (September20, 2021). In each of these case, the district court found that the petitioner could not satisfy the second prong of Jones, inasmuch as the crime remains a criminal offense. In each case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. In Rhodes and Travis, the Court stated, “We have reviewed the record and, following the Supreme Court's decision in Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090 (2021), find no reversible error.5:20CV248, ECF No. 22 at 4.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Reviews of Petitions for Relief
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Court's Local Rules of Prisoner Litigation Procedure, this Court is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. This Court is charged with screening Petitioner's case to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts; see also Rule 1(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254).
B. Pro Se Litigants
Courts must read pro se allegations in a liberal fashion and hold those pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court is required to perform a judicial review of certain suits brought by prisoners and must dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A complaint is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (superseded by statute). The Supreme Court in Neitzke recognized that:
Section 1915(d) is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.Id. at 327.
The version of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) which was effective when Neitzke was decided provided, “The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.” As of April 26, 1996, the statute was revised and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) now provides, “On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-- (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."
IV. ANALYSIS
Petitioner asserts one ground for relief: (1) that his conviction is invalid based on the holding of Rehaif.
See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019).
A. Petitioner's Challenge to his Conviction
Prisoners seeking to challenge the validity of their convictions or their sentences are required to proceed under § 2255 in the district court of conviction. By contrast, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to § 2241, is generally intended to address the execution of a sentence, rather than its validity, and is to be filed in the district where the prisoner is incarcerated. Fontanez v. O'Brien, 807 F.3d 84, 85 (4th Cir. 2015). In a § 2241 petition, a prisoner may seek relief from such things as the administration of his parole, computation of good time or jail time credits, prison disciplinary actions, the type of detention, and prison conditions in the facility where incarcerated. Id.; see also Adams v. United States, 372 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
While the terms of § 2255 expressly prohibit prisoners from challenging their convictions and sentences through a habeas corpus petition under § 2241, there is nonetheless a “savings clause” in § 2255, which allows a prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction and/or his sentence under § 2241, if he can demonstrate that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The law is clearly developed, however, that relief under § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because relief has become unavailable under § 2255 because of (1) a limitation bar, (2) the prohibition against successive petitions, or (3) a procedural bar due to failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997).
In 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) was enacted, establishing a one-year limitation period within which to file any federal habeas corpus motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The limitation period shall run from the last of:
a. The date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
b. The date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
c. The date on which the right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or d. The date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
A petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective,” and the standard is an exacting one. The Fourth Circuit has announced two tests for evaluating whether a petitioner's claim satisfies the § 2255(e) savings clause. Which test is to be applied depends on whether the petitioner is challenging the legality of his conviction or the legality of his sentence. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428 (4th Cir. 2018); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000). When a petitioner is challenging the legality of his conviction, § 2255 is deemed to be “inadequate or ineffective” only when all three of the following conditions are satisfied:
This is the equivalent of saying that “the § 2255(e) savings clause is satisfied.”
(1) at the time of the conviction, the settled law of this Circuit or of the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction;
(2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first section 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and
(3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gate-keeping provisions of section 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34. Because the requirements of the savings clause are jurisdictional, a § 2241 petitioner relying on the § 2255(e) savings clause must meet the Jones test (if challenging the legality of his conviction) for the court to have subject-matter jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the petitioner's claims. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 423-26.
When a petitioner is challenging the legality of his sentence, § 2255 is deemed to be “inadequate or ineffective” only when all four of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence;
(2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review;
(3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and
(4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429. The Fourth Circuit has specified that a change of substantive law within the Circuit, not solely in the Supreme Court, would be sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the four-part test established in Wheeler. Id. Because the requirements of the savings clause are jurisdictional, a § 2241 petitioner relying on the § 2255(e) savings clause must meet the Jones test (if challenging the legality of his conviction) or the Wheeler test (if challenging the legality of his sentence) for the court to have subjectmatter jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the petitioner's claims. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 423-26.
Although Petitioner has filed a number of petitions and supplements, he essentially raises a single claim as to his conviction. He asserts that his conviction is invalid because of the Supreme Court's holding of Rehaif, which required the Government to prove both (1) that defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, and (2) that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Further, Petitioner asserts that he is actually innocent of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) based on the holding of Rehaif. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. Because Petitioner's direct appeal rights have expired and Petitioner has already filed at least one unsuccessful § 2255, he may seek leave to file a successive § 2255 under § 2255(h)(2) or he can file a § 2241 relying on the § 2255(e) savings clause.
Because Petitioner's argument does not rely on newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law, relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) is inappropriate. Therefore, in order for Petitioner to obtain relief under § 2241, he must rely on the § 2255(e) savings clause. Because Petitioner is challenging his conviction in a § 2241, he must meet all three prongs of the Jones test to challenge his conviction for this Court to have jurisdiction to hear his challenge on the merits.
In this case, even if Petitioner meets the first and third prongs of the Jones test, he cannot meet the second prong. Subsequent to Petitioner's direct appeal and first § 2 255 motion, the substantive law related to the conduct of which Petitioner was convicted has not changed so that that conduct is no longer deemed to be criminal.
The Supreme Court in Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090 (2021) (vacating and remanding United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2020)), held that the government's failure to prove the element of knowingly being a person in a prohibited class is not a structural error. The Court explained that it “has repeatedly made clear [that] the ‘general rule' is that ‘a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction,” and that “[o]nly in a ‘very limited class of cases' has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal' on appeal.” Id. at 2099 (internal citations omitted).
Further, the Court noted that its “precedents make clear, the omission of a single element from jury instructions is not structural....And it follows that a Rehaif error in a plea colloquy is likewise not structural. The omission of that mens rea element from a plea colloquy-like the omission of that mens rea element from jury instructions-does not affect the entire framework within which the proceeding occurs.” Id. at 2100.
The crime Petitioner was convicted of committing-being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)-is still a violation of law. Therefore, Petitioner cannot satisfy the second prong of Jones. Accordingly, because Petitioner cannot satisfy the savings clause of § 2255(e) under Jones, his challenge to his conviction may not be considered under § 2241, and this Court is without jurisdiction to consider that challenge.
Further, it is clear from the court records that Defendant made a knowing and intelligently plea of guilty to Count 6 of the indictment. At the July 17, 2012, pre-trial conference, the government advised the Court that it had extended a plea offer to Petitioner pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2:11CR37, ECF No. 137 and 144-6 at 32 (S.D. Ind.). Under the terms of the offer, Petitioner would plead guilty to Counts One, Three, and Six and be sentenced to a 15-year term of imprisonment. In exchange, the government would dismiss Counts Two, Four, and Five. Id. Petitioner's attorney confirmed that he had communicated the offer to Petitioner, and that they had discussed it. When asked by the Court if he rejected the offer, Petitioner replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” Id. Ten days later, with no plea deal, Petitioner filed a Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty to Count Six (charging him with possession of a firearm by an illegal alien) and decided to go to trial on Counts One through Five. 2:11CR37, ECF No. 69 (S.D. Ind.). On the morning of July 30, 2012, Petitioner entered his plea of guilty as to Count Six without a written plea agreement or any concessions made by the government in exchange for the plea of guilty. 2:11CR37, ECF No. 78. Petitioner admitted that he was an illegal alien in the United States and that he knowingly possessed a firearm which traveled in interstate commerce. 2:11CR37, ECF No. 177 at 13-15. It was Petitoner's defense strategy to plead guilty to Count 6, possession of a firearm by an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States, to avoid having a jury hear evidence that Petitioner was in the United States illegally. 2:15CV339, ECF Nos. 26, 29 at 2. Petitioner proceeded to trial on the other 5 counts of the indictment and was found guilty on all counts.
The Defendant plead guilty to Count 6, illegal alien in possession of a firearm, but went to trial on the other 5 Counts in the Indictment and was found guilty of all those charges which were: Count 1, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine (mixture); Counts 2 and 4 possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (mixture); and Counts 3 and 5 charged furtherance of the drug trafficking crimes specified in Counts 2 and 4.
The Seventh Circuit, where Petitioner was convicted, has repeatedly upheld challenges to convictions on Rehaif grounds where the convictions were obtained through guilty pleas. United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Battiste v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2813 (2021), and cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2814 (2021), and cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2838 (2021). Accordingly, Petitioner's challenge to his conviction fails.
B. Petitioner's Challenge to his Sentence
Petitioner's request for relief as to his sentence under § 2241 is unavailable.Even if Petitioner meets the other prongs of Wheeler, Petitioner cannot meet the second prong, which requires a showing that subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review. Being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm remains a federal criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Court further notes that Petitioner cannot satisfy the second Wheeler prong because the case he relies on, Rehaif, has not been ruled to apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif, several courts within the Fourth Circuit have held that Rehaif did not change substantive law because the conduct for which the petitioner was convicted is still illegal. See Hill v. Warden, FCI McDowell, 2021 WL 4443068 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 28, 2021); Davis v. Streeval, 2021 WL 4432514 (W.D.Va. Sept. 27, 2021); Seller v. Dobbs, 2021 WL 4059733 (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 2021); Goldwire v. Warden, 2021 WL 4026072 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2021); Albritton v. Warden, 2021 WL 3432845 (E.D. VA. August 4, 2021); see also Williams v. United States, 2019 WL 6499577 (W.D. N.C. December 3, 2019) (holding that Rehaif “did not announce a new rule of Constitutional law but rather clarified the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)”). Accordingly, Petitioner cannot meet the second prong of the Wheeler test. However, a Petitioner who challenges his sentence in a § 2241, must meet all four prongs of the Wheeler test for this Court to have jurisdiction to hear any challenge on the merits. Because Petitioner cannot meet the second prong of the Wheeler test, Petitioner fails to satisfy the § 2255(e) savings clause and this Court need not consider whether he meets the other prongs of Wheeler.
Defendant was sentenced to 120 months as to Count 6. However, it was to run concurrently with the 120 month sentences he received for each of Counts 1, 2, and 4 to which the Jury found him guilty. Vacating his sentence as to Count 6 would not reduce the time he has to serve.
Because Petitioner cannot satisfy the savings clause of § 2255(e) under Wheeler, his claim may not be considered under § 2241, and this Court is without jurisdiction to consider his petition as to his challenge to his sentence. When subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, “the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-103 (1998); Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 359 n.10 (4th Cir. 1999).
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the petition [ECF No. 1] be DENIED and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Recommendation, any party may file with the Clerk of the Court, specific written objections, identifying the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis of such objection. A copy of such objections should also be submitted to the Honorable Gina M. Groh, Chief United States District Judge. Objections shall not exceed ten (10) typewritten pages or twenty (20) handwritten pages, including exhibits, unless accompanied by a motion for leave to exceed the page limitation, consistent with LR PL P 12.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).
This Report and Recommendation completes the referral from the district court. The Clerk is directed to terminate the Magistrate Judge's association with this case.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the pro se Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested, to his last known address as reflected on the docket sheet.