Opinion
A162935
03-17-2022
CAU LA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. YUANCHENG HE, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CCH-21-583590
RODRÍGUEZ, J.After a hearing, the trial court denied Cau La's (plaintiff) petition for a restraining order under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.; Elder Abuse Act) and dismissed the matter with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals in propria persona. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. The record designated by plaintiff omits the petition, the response, and the order from which this appeal is taken. In reciting the procedural history, we have relied on the limited record available, which includes the reporter's transcript and the documents attached to plaintiff's civil case information sheet. We disregard factual assertions in plaintiff's briefs that are unsupported by record citations. (See Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 212, 222, fn. 15.)
BACKGROUND
In April 2021, then 91-year-old plaintiff filed a petition in propria persona for an elder abuse restraining order against Yuancheng He (defendant), who was living in the "downstairs" portion of plaintiff's San Francisco home. The petition alleged defendant smoked cigarettes inside, and that the "odor and smoke" wafted into plaintiff's living area and interfered with plaintiff's ability to breathe. When plaintiff asked defendant to stop smoking in the house, defendant "yelled and screamed" at plaintiff, and "verbally abused" and "bullied" him. Plaintiff averred he was "afraid" of defendant. According to the petition, plaintiff's daughter had initiated eviction proceedings against defendant; plaintiff believed defendant would "likely attack [plaintiff] for evicting him."
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order requiring defendant to, among other things, move out of the residence. Thereafter, defendant filed a written response and two supporting declarations. At a May 2021 hearing on the petition, plaintiff testified he suffers from cancer and that defendant's smoking harmed plaintiff's health. Plaintiff also testified defendant refused to move out of the house and was "very mean," which affected plaintiff "mentally" and interfered with his ability to sleep. Three other witnesses described the pervasive odor of defendant's cigarette smoke, and the loud and disrespectful language defendant used when plaintiff's family asked defendant to move out.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied plaintiff's petition for a restraining order. It determined the dispute was a "landlord-tenant issue" which should be resolved in housing court, and that the conduct at issue - smoking and yelling - did not constitute harassment. The court dissolved the temporary restraining order, denied the petition for a permanent restraining order, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
DISCUSSION
The "Elder Abuse Act authorizes a trial court to issue a restraining order against any individual who has engaged in abusive conduct, as defined by statute, toward a person age 65 or older." (Darrin v. Miller (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 450, 452; § 15657.03, subd. (a)(1).) "[T]reatment" that causes an elder to experience "serious emotional distress that is brought about by . . . intimidating behavior, threats, [or] harassment" may constitute abuse under the Elder Abuse Act. (§§ 15610.07, subd. (a) [defining abuse], 15610.53 [defining mental suffering]; Darrin, at p. 454.) The party seeking the restraining order bears "the burden of establishing his case by a preponderance of the evidence." (Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 138.)
We review the trial court's order for abuse of discretion, resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party, and indulging all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the lower court's findings. (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137-1138.) "[W]e will only find an abuse of discretion when the trial court exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards the uncontradicted evidence. The party challenging the . . . order bears the burden of showing an abuse of discretion." (Id. at p. 1140.)
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by declining to issue the restraining order. This claim fails. It "is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)"' "A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed." '" (Id. at p. 609.) Self-represented litigants are held to this standard. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.)
Here, plaintiff's failure to provide an adequate record makes it impossible for him to overcome the presumption of correctness necessary to reverse the order. (See Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 498.) But even if we overlook the inadequacy of the record provided, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate reversible error."' "[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at [a hearing], the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law." '" (Estes v. Eaton Corporation (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 651.) "This is 'an onerous standard' [citation] and one that is 'almost impossible' for a losing plaintiff to meet, because unless the trier of fact made specific factual findings in favor of the losing plaintiff, we presume the trier of fact concluded that 'plaintiff's evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof.'" (Ibid.) Plaintiff has failed to show his evidence compelled the trial court to issue a restraining order as a matter of law. On the evidence before it - which included defendant's written opposition to the petition, and two supporting declarations - the court could reasonably conclude defendant's ill-mannered behavior did not constitute abuse under the Elder Abuse Act.
Also unavailing is plaintiff's assertion that the trial court failed to afford him sufficient time to present his case at the hearing on the petition. The court permitted plaintiff - and three additional witnesses - to testify at the hearing. As the court correctly observed, plaintiff had "a right to put on evidence," but the court had a corresponding duty "to manage" the hearing. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [a trial court has inherent power" 'to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with pending litigation'" to" 'insure the orderly administration of justice' "].) The record demonstrates the court appropriately balanced these objectives and gave plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to present information relevant to his request for a restraining order. Plaintiff's frustration appears to stem not from the fact that the court did not "hear more explanation," but from the fact that the court did not agree with him. Plaintiff's unhappiness with the court's ruling is not a basis for reversal.
DISPOSITION
The May 2021 order is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
WE CONCUR: Fujisaki, Acting P. J., Petrou, J.