Summary
In Cataldo v. Pono, 89 R.I. 240, we held that the provisions of § 9-21-4 which provide for the time within which the relief contemplated therein may be granted was unambiguous and would be interpreted literally. It is our further opinion that those provisions of this section of the statute which relate to the grounds upon which a grant of such relief is predicated are also unambiguous and must be interpreted literally.
Summary of this case from In re deBrabantOpinion
June 12, 1959.
PRESENT: Condon, C.J., Roberts, Paolino and Powers, JJ.
1. JUDGMENT. Judgment Entered by Accident or Mistake. Petition for New Trial Under Statute. Timeliness of Petition. Petitioners sought a trial after judgment had been rendered against them by default on the basis that they had no notice of the suit until some sixteen months after entry of the judgment and that they had a meritorious defense. Held, that assuming the judgment complained of ran against the petitioners, of which there was some doubt, the judgment was entered more than one year prior to the filing of the petition and supreme court was without power to grant the relief prayed since the statute provided that a petition such as the one at bar must be filed within one year after judgment and the argument of petitioners that the court should construe the language of the statute to mean that petitioners like the instant one can be brought within one year after knowledge of the entry of judgment rather than from the date judgment was entered was not persuasive in the face of the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. G.L. 1956, § 9-21-4.
2. STATUTES. Construction. Unambiguous Language. Where statute was clear and unambiguous it did not lend itself to alternative interpretation and court has repeatedly held that where there can be no doubt or misunderstanding as to meaning of the statute it will be interpreted literally. G.L. 1956, § 9-21-4.
PETITION for trial brought pursuant to general laws 1956, § 9-21-4, more than one year after entry of a judgment by default in superior court. Petition denied and dismissed.
John Quattrocchi, Jr., for petitioners.
Aram K. Berberian, for respondent.
This petition for a trial was brought, pursuant to general laws 1956, § 9-21-4, more than one year after entry of a judgment by default in an action at law brought in the superior court by the plaintiff, the respondent here, against the defendants, the petitioners here. The section on which petitioners rely provides: "A party or garnishee in any action or proceeding in the superior court or in any district court wherein no trial has been had, against whom a judgment has been rendered on nonsuit, default, or report of referees, by reason of accident, mistake, or unforeseen cause, may, within one (1) year after such judgment, petition the supreme court for a trial * * *."
The petition recites that the plaintiff caused to be issued a writ of attachment dated November 9, 1956 and returnable December 1, 1956; that by order of the court the return date was extended to January 2, 1957; and that the plaintiff was authorized to serve the defendants by certified mail, with return receipt requested. It further appears that this notice was addressed to the wrong Frank Cataldo and the return receipt bears the signature of another Frank Cataldo. The case was not answered and judgment by default was entered for the plaintiff on February 15, 1957.
The petitioners here allege that the misdirection of the certified letter constitutes an accident or mistake within the meaning of § 9-21-4, and they attached an affidavit alleging a meritorious defense. They further allege that they had no notice of the suit until June 1958, some sixteen months after the entry of judgment. The petitioners pray that this court vacate the judgment and order a trial in the superior court so that they may have their day in court.
From the allegations in the petition there appears to be some question as to whether or not the judgment complained of runs against these petitioners. Assuming that it does, such judgment was entered more than one year prior to the filing of this petition. The petitioners urge, however, that this court should construe the language of § 9-21-4 so that a petition like the instant one can be brought within one year after knowledge of the entry of judgment rather than from the date the judgment was entered. We are not so persuaded.
The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. It does not lend itself to alternative interpretation. The statute is explicit, and this court has repeatedly held that where there can be no doubt or misunderstanding as to its meaning the statute will be interpreted literally. Berard v. Blais, 56 R.I. 431; Weimar v. Newman, 78 R.I. 221; United Transit Co. v. Hawksley, 86 R.I. 53, 133 A.2d 132.
For the reasons stated, the petition is denied and dismissed.