Opinion
No. 3D19-1179
04-29-2020
Hector M. CASTRO, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. MERCANTIL COMMERCEBANK, N.A., Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Law Offices of Lisette M. Blanco, and Lisette M. Blanco, for appellant/cross-appellee. Law Offices of Victor K. Rones, P.A., and Victor K. Rones, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Law Offices of Lisette M. Blanco, and Lisette M. Blanco, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Law Offices of Victor K. Rones, P.A., and Victor K. Rones, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before SALTER, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Hector M. Castro, challenges a nonfinal order authorizing the garnishment of his disposable earnings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). On appeal, Castro contends the lower tribunal erred in determining his written consent to the garnishment of his earnings divested him of his right to avail himself of Florida's "head of family" statutory exemption. We discern no error, thus affirm.
We affirm the wage issue raised by Mercantil in its cross-appeal without further elaboration. See In re Bhalla, No. 8:16-bk-00265-RCT (Bankr. M.D. Fla. July 12, 2018); In re Crespo, No. 16-24842, 2017 WL 2437240 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 5, 2017).
BACKGROUND
In late 2009, Halmac Development, Inc. ("Halmac") executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $250,000.00 payable in stipulated installments to the order of appellee, Mercantil Commercebank, N.A. ("Mercantil"). The note was personally guaranteed by Castro, as evidenced by an unlimited continuing guaranty, and secured by certain collateral. Under the terms of the guaranty, upon default, Mercantil was entitled to "collect any deficiency balance with or without resorting to legal process."
The guaranty contained the following capitalized provision: "GUARANTOR HEREBY CONSENTS TO THE ATTACHMENT OR GARNISHMENT OF HIS/HER/ITS EARNINGS." It further specified, the "[o]bligations [hereunder] ... shall not be affected or impaired [by] ... [a]ny present or future law ... purporting to reduce, amend or otherwise affect the indebtedness ... or any other terms of payment." Less than one year later, Halmac defaulted under the terms of the note by failing to tender the requisite principal and interest payments. Mercantil filed suit and, in 2015, obtained final summary judgments against both Castro, in his individual capacity as guarantor, and Halmac, as the corporate borrower.
In 2019, Mercantil filed a motion for a continuing writ of garnishment against Castro. The trial court issued the writ, which was promptly served upon Castro's employer. Thereafter, Castro filed a motion to dissolve, claiming his wages were exempt from garnishment because he was the "head of family," as defined under section 222.11, Florida Statutes. The lower tribunal duly conducted a hearing and subsequently determined that Castro had renounced his right to avoid garnishment in writing. The instant appeal ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, Castro contends the contractual language is deficient to effectuate a waiver of his claim of exemption. Because this issue requires us to interpret a contractual provision, along with Florida garnishment law, we apply a de novo standard of review. See Command Sec. Corp. v. Moffa, 84 So. 3d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (" ‘The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law’ and the appellate court construes the contract ‘under a de novo standard of review.’ ") (quoting Gilman Yacht Sales, Inc. v. FMB Invs., Inc., 766 So. 2d 294, 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ); Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 2004) ("The construction of a statute is an issue of law subject to de novo review.") (citation omitted).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Florida law confers upon "[e]very person or entity who has sued to recover a debt or has recovered judgment in any court against any person or entity ... a right to a writ of garnishment." § 77.01, Fla. Stat. (2019). Nonetheless, the debtor may seek to avoid the garnishment. § 77.07, Fla. Stat. (2019). By statute, "[a]ll of the disposable earnings of a head of family whose disposable earnings are less than or equal to $500 a week are exempt from attachment or garnishment." § 222.11(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). However, a debtor is vested with the power to waive his or her right to the garnishment of disposable earnings "which are greater than $500 a week," by "agree[ing] otherwise in writing." § 222.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009).
The head of family exemption is designed to "protect citizens against financial reverses and difficulties and to permit the citizen when residing in Florida and head of a family to be secure in money coming to him for his labor and services thereby supporting his family and preventing it from becoming a public charge." Mazzella v. Boinis, 617 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (quoting Holmes v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 369 So. 2d 987, 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) ). Therefore, the exemption should be liberally construed in favor of the debtor. Id. (citations omitted). Nonetheless, " section 222.11(2)(b), [Florida Statutes (2009),] does not prescribe any particular language to effect a waiver of the wage exemption." USAmeriBank v. Klepal, 100 So. 3d 56, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that Castro qualifies as the head of family. Instead, they diverge in their urged conclusions regarding the ramifications of the guaranty, as penned. Mercantil asserts that, by executing the consent to garnishment, Castro renounced his claim of exemption as to any earnings in excess of $500.00 per week, whereas Castro avers he assented to the mere issuance of a writ of garnishment.
Castro further contends the amended version of section 222.11, Florida Statutes (2019), applies. As the guaranty, executed in 2009, specified the obligations thereunder would not be affected or impaired by any "future law ... purporting to reduce, amend or otherwise affect the indebtedness ... or any other terms of payment," we find no merit to this claim. See Art I, § 10, Fla. Const. ("No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing obligation of contracts shall be passed."); Cenvill Inv'rs, Inc. v. Condo. Owners Org. of Century Vill. E., Inc., 556 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("[T]he law imposes upon the marketplace a presumption that parties enter into contracts in contemplation of existing statutory and case law. That context becomes part of the bargain and thus cannot be relied on by either contracting party to avoid an obligation or enhance a remedy."); see also Hart v. Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 159 So. 3d 244, 246 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("We find that the version of the statute in effect when the [g]uaranty was entered is applicable here. To hold otherwise would allow the 2010 amendments to be an unlawful impairment of contracts in violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Florida Constitution.").
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"Contracts are voluntary undertakings, and contracting parties are free to bargain for—and specify—the terms and conditions." Okeechobee Resorts, L.L.C. v. E Z Cash Pawn, Inc., 145 So. 3d 989, 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Accordingly, "[w]hen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to the contract as written and cannot engage in interpretation or construction as the plain language is the best evidence of the parties’ intent." Talbott v. First Bank Fla., FSB, 59 So. 3d 243, 245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citation omitted); see M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 435, 135 S. Ct. 926, 933, 190 L. Ed. 2d 809 (2015) ("Where the words of a contract in writing are clear and unambiguous, its meaning is to be ascertained in accordance with its plainly expressed intent.") (quoting 11 Williston, Williston on Contracts § 30:6 (4th ed. 2012) ). We are further "constrained by law to construe a contract as a whole so as to give effect ... to all provisions of the agreement if it can be reasonably done." McArthur v. A.A. Green & Co. of Fla., Inc., 637 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (citation omitted).
Here, by the plain language of the guaranty, the default in the payment obligation by the borrower vests Mercantil with expansive collection rights. Moreover, the consent to garnishment clause is both unambiguous and devoid of any limiting language. As the relevant statute merely requires the debtor "agree[ ] otherwise in writing" to garnishment, and, here, there was a "consent" to the "garnishment" of "earnings," the contractual language is sufficient to waive the head of family exemption to which the debtor would otherwise have been entitled. § 222.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009).
Finally, it bears note that, regardless of the contractual terms, Mercantil, as the judgment holder, was already statutorily endowed with the "right to a writ of garnishment." § 77.01, Fla. Stat. Thus, as was so aptly penned by our esteemed sister court in an analogous dispute:
If the garnishment paragraph authorizes only the issuance of a writ of garnishment and nothing more, then the paragraph does not give the Bank any right it did not already have by statute. "Courts must ‘construe contracts in such a way as to give reasonable meaning to all provisions,’ rather than leaving part of the contract useless." Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Wilder Corp. of Del., 876 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Hardwick Props., Inc. v. Newbern, 711 So. 2d 35, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ). The narrow interpretation of the garnishment paragraph urged ... renders the paragraph meaningless. The
garnishment paragraph's purpose is to increase the rights available to the Bank for the enforcement of a judgment in the event of a default. A proper interpretation of the garnishment paragraph avoids rendering it useless by construing it as including an agreement for the waiver of the exemption for wage garnishment for a head of family as authorized by section 222.11(2)(b).
Klepal, 100 So. 3d at 60-61. Accordingly, we conclude that the written consent to garnishment rendered the claim of exemption unavailable, and we affirm the order under review. Id. at 61 ; see Hart v. Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 159 So. 3d 244, 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("We hold that [appellant] ‘agreed otherwise in writing’ to garnishment as required by section 222.11, when he signed the [g]uaranty with the waiver language. To construe the waiver in the [g]uaranty as not allowing the [a]ppellee to seek garnishment is to construe the [g]uaranty in a manner which defeats its purpose.") (citations omitted).
Affirmed.