Opinion
No. 18-CV-3315 (RA)
07-10-2020
MARIO CASTRO, Petitioner, v. JAMIE LAMANA, Superintendent of the Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent.
AMENDED ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
:
Petitioner Mario Castro, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in connection with his July 2013 state-law conviction for murder in the second degree. On February 28, 2019, Petitioner filed an amended petition (the "Petition" or "Pet."). See Dkt. 19. On March 30, 2020, Magistrate Judge Stewart Aaron issued a Report and Recommendation (the "Report") recommending that the Court deny the Petition in its entirety. See Dkt. 26. As this Court has previously detailed, although the Report outlined the procedures for the parties to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and warned that failure to object within fourteen (14) days would result in a waiver of objections and preclude appellate review, see Report at 27, neither party filed objections within the requisite time period. In light of Petitioner's pro se status, his filing of a "Notice of Appeal" on April 21, 2020, and the COVID-19 crisis, however, the Court extended his time to file written objections to May 12, 2020. See Dkt. 28. When no objections were received, on May 28, 2020, the Court reviewed the Report for clear error and, finding none, issued an order adopting it in full. See Dkt. 30. Later that day, however, Petitioner's written objections—dated May 12, 2020—were received by the Pro Se Office and filed on the docket. See Dkt. 31. As noted in its May 29, 2020 Order, see Dkt. 32, the Court will now consider Petitioner's objections, as well as the response filed by Respondent on June 12, 2020, see Dkt. 34.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts, as outlined in detail by the Report. For the following reasons, the Court adopts Judge Aaron's through and well-reasoned Report in its entirety. The Petition is therefore denied.
LEGAL STANDARDS
When a magistrate judge has issued a report and recommendation, the district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made [therein]." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "When a timely and specific objection to a report and recommendation is made, the Court reviews de novo the portion of the report and recommendation to which the party objects." Razzoli v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 12 Civ. 3774 (LAP) (KNF), 2014 WL 2440771, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)). "To accept those portions of the report to which no timely objection has been made, however, 'a district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record.'" Id. (quoting Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., 262 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
Moreover, "[w]hen a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error." Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F. Supp. 2d 290, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Crum v. Billingsby, No. 11 Civ. 2979 (GBD) (RLE), 2014 WL 2855030, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2014) ("[W]here the objections are merely perfunctory responses, argued in an attempt to engage the district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original petition, reviewing courts should review a report and recommendation for clear error.") (citation omitted). "A magistrate judge's decision is clearly erroneous only if the district court is 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Stenson v. Heath, No. 11-CV-5680 (RJS) (AJP), 2015 WL 3826596, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2015) (citation omitted).
The Court must also be mindful that a pro se litigant's submissions are to be "construed liberally and interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Restea v. Brown Harris Stevens LLC, No. 17-CV-4801 (VEC) (GWG), 2018 WL 3435060, at* 1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2018) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). Nevertheless, "even a pro se party's objections to a Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the magistrate's proposal, such that no party be allowed a second bite at the apple by simply relitigating a prior argument." Crum, 2014 WL 2855030, at * 1 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner makes four main objections to the Report. Each of these arguments, however, was previously raised in the Petition and considered by Judge Aaron. Moreover, Petitioner's objections are not "specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the [Report]," but rather, seek to "simply relitigat[e] [his] prior argument[s]." Crum, 2014 WL 2855030, at * 1 (citation omitted). The Court thus reviews the objections only for clear error. See Walker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
First, Petitioner objects to the Report on the grounds that his rights to a fair trial and due process were violated when the trial court admitted evidence—pursuant to People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901) ("the Molineux ruling")—of an uncharged burglary that Petitioner, Pablo Garcia (a co-defendant at trial), and Ramon Acevedo (a cooperating witness at trial) previously committed in Queens, New York (the "Queens Burglary"). See Obj. at 5. Petitioner raised this precise argument as "Ground 1" in the Petition. See, e.g., Pet. at 3 ("The trial court violated Petitioner's right to a fair trial when it allowed the prosecution to introduce highly inflammatory evidence of alleged prior misconduct . . . [including] Petitioner's alleged participation in an uncharged burglary in the County of Queens."). Judge Aaron specifically considered and rejected this argument, concluding that "[t]he trial court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion" to admit evidence of the Queens Burglary. See Report at 19. Moreover, Judge Aaron found that even if the trial court did err in admitting this evidence, "the evidence of Petitioner's guilt was overwhelming, including DNA evidence, testimony by his accomplices and his own incriminating statement," such that Petitioner's due process rights were not violated. See id. at 19. The Court discerns no clear error in the Report's conclusions regarding the Molineux ruling.
Petitioner's additional objections to Judge Aaron's recommendations regarding the Queens Burglary are either unsupported or contradicted by the record. Petitioner's contention that no curative instruction regarding the Molineux ruling was given to the jury, see Obj. at 6, for instance, is directly contradicted by the findings of the Report. See Report at 9 (explaining that the jury was instructed that testimony regarding the Queens Burglary could only be used for a limited purpose, and not "as any evidence that [Petitioner] committed any of the crimes he is on trial for here" (citing Dkt. 25-5 at 780 (trial transcript)). Petitioner also fails to explain how the Report purportedly "brushes past the precept in Cox that . . . habeas relief may be warranted based on a state court's evidentiary ruling in the rare case where a petitioner can demonstrate that an erroneous evidentiary ruling resulted in a violation of a fundamental constitutional right." Obj. at 5 (citing Cox v. Bradt, No. 10-CV-09175 (CM) (JLC), 2012 WL 2282508, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012)). To the contrary, Judge Aaron did not "brush[] past" this "precept"; rather, he concluded that because the trial court is afforded discretion with respect to its evidentiary rulings, and in light of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner's guilt, this was not the "rare case" in which an evidentiary ruling amounts to a violation of a petitioner's constitutional rights to a fair trial or due process. See Report at 19. In short, Judge Aaron did not err in applying Molineux or in concluding that the trial court's admission of this evidence did not violate Petitioner's constitutional rights. See Report at 20.
Second, Petitioner objects to the Report's conclusion that Ground Two and Ground Three of the Petition are procedurally barred. See Obj. at 7. Petitioner argues that these claims were "fully exhausted" because they were included in his leave to appeal application to the New York Court of Appeals. See id. Again, however, Petitioner specifically raised this argument before Judge Aaron, see Pet. Reply, Dkt. 22, at 17, and it was carefully considered and rejected. See Report at 20-21. The Court finds no error in Judge Aaron's determination that Petitioner's appeal "was confined to the Molineux ruling regarding the Queens Burglary." See Report at 20; see also Dkt. 20-5 (Leave Application).
As discussed below, Judge Aaron also rejected Grounds Two and Three on the merits, despite the procedural bar. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State."). --------
Third, Petitioner objects to the Report's conclusion that the trial court did not err in its failure to give an "accomplice-corroboration charge" with respect to the testimony of Joshua Mendez-Torres, a cooperating witness. See Obj. at 8. This is the same argument made in Ground Two of the Petition, see Pet. at 7-8, which Judge Aaron already addressed, see Report at 21-22. Judge Aaron did not err in concluding that "New York's preservation rules constitute an adequate and independent state law ground" such that Ground Two was procedurally barred. Id. at 21. Moreover, despite the procedural bar, Judge Aaron addressed the merits of Petitioner's claim and correctly concluded that the failure to give an accomplice-corroboration charge did not raise an issue of federal constitutional law. The Court finds no clear error in those determinations.
Finally, Petitioner objects to the Report's determination that Ground Three of the Petition should be denied. See Obj. at 9. Petitioner contends that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated because Acevedo provided "false testimony" at trial, and because the trial court failed to charge the jury with "a particular instruction" about "Acevedo's guilty plea." See Obj. at 9-10. As with his other objections, Petitioner again attempts to merely relitigate the arguments he raised in his Petition. Indeed, in Ground Three of the Petition, Petitioner argued that his right to a fair trial was violated by Acevedo's "inaccurate testimony" and by the trial court's "refusal to charge that [Acevedo's] guilty plea was not evidence of Petitioner's guilt." See Pet. at 10. Judge Aaron carefully considered these arguments, and rightly concluded that they were not only procedurally barred, see Report at 23, but also should be denied on the merits, see Report at 23-26. The Court finds no clear error in these determinations.
In sum, the Court finds no error—clear or otherwise—in Judge Aaron's Report. See Walker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 292. Even if the Court were to review the Report de novo, its conclusions would be the same, and would rest on the same reasoning as that articulated by Judge Aaron.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied, and the action is dismissed. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to Petitioner and close this case. SO ORDERED. Dated: July 10, 2020
New York, New York
/s/_________
Ronnie Abrams
United States District Judge