Opinion
No. 3D18-1387
11-20-2019
Nancy J. CASTLEMAN-DION, Appellant, v. Michael L. DION, Appellee.
Harvey D. Rogers, P.A., and Harvey D. Rogers, Miami, for appellant. Law Offices of Diane M. Trainor, and Diane M. Trainor, Miami, for appellee.
Harvey D. Rogers, P.A., and Harvey D. Rogers, Miami, for appellant.
Law Offices of Diane M. Trainor, and Diane M. Trainor, Miami, for appellee.
Before SALTER, SCALES and HENDON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980) ("Dissolution proceedings present a trial judge with the difficult problem of apportioning assets acquired by the parties and providing necessary support. The judge possesses broad discretionary authority to do equity between the parties .... Judicial discretion is defined as: The power exercised by courts to determine questions to which no strict rule of law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of the court.") (citation omitted); Viscito v. Viscito, 214 So. 3d 736, 737-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (observing that the appellate court's standard of review for both alimony and equitable distribution determinations is abuse of discretion, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion given the presence of competent evidence to support the trial court's discretionary rulings).