Opinion
Case No.: 3:17-cv-2104-CAB-WVG
11-01-2017
LEANDRO LEONEL GONZALEZ CASTILLO, Plaintiff, v. A. RENTERIA; L. ROMERO; R. SEGOVIA, Defendants.
ORDER:
(1) DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AND
(2) DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Leandro Leonel Gonzalez Castillo ("Plaintiff"), a state inmate currently housed in Mule Creek State Prison, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint ("Compl.") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 4), along with a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 2.) / / /
I. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one "becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear to defend."). The court may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), an injunction binds only "the parties to the action," their "officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys," and "other persons who are in active concert or participation." FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(A)-(C).
The matter before this Court involves allegations of constitutional violations by Plaintiff against three correctional officers when he was housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") from February 2016 to June 2016. (See Compl., Doc. No. 1, at 1.) In the Motion before the Court, Plaintiff claims he is suffering from "physical sexual abuses and retaliation for speech by defendants, A. Renteria, L. Romero, and R. Segovia and each of their successors in any CDCR facility, agents, employees, inmates, and all person acting in concert and participating with them." (Pl.'s Mot., Doc No. 2, at 1.) Plaintiff also claims he is being denied single cell status at his current place of incarceration. (Id. at 1-2.)
However, at the time Plaintiff filed this Motion, he was housed at Mule Creek State Prison ("MCSP") and not RJD. (See Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff continues to be housed at MCSP. Plaintiff also references administrative grievances in his Motion and attaches several to his Motion. Those grievances appear to have been filed while Plaintiff was housed at Salinas Valley State Prison ("SVSP). There are no plausible allegations that the named RJD Defendants would have any control over Plaintiff's current housing situation.
Moreover, there are no Defendants in this action who are alleged to be employees of MCSP or SVSP. Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief that would require the Court to presume jurisdiction over parties who are not part of this action. The Court cannot grant Plaintiff injunctive relief because it has no personal jurisdiction over unnamed officials at MCSP or SVSP. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1), (d)(2); Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 350; Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727-28. A district court has no authority to grant relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or permanent injunction where it has no jurisdiction over the parties. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) ("Personal jurisdiction, too, is an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district ... court, without which the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.") (citation and internal quotation omitted).
If Plaintiff believes that his constitutional rights have been violated since he was housed at prisons other than RJD, he should proceed with a separate civil action filed in the court with the proper venue.
II. Motion to Proceed IFP
All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a prisoner at the time of filing, he may be granted leave to proceed IFP, but he nevertheless remains obligated to pay the entire fee in "increments," see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). A "prisoner" is defined as "any person" who at the time of filing is "incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847.
In order to comply with the PLRA, prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a "certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) . . . for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (4); see Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850. Thereafter, the institution having custody of the prisoner collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which the prisoner's account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
While Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), he has not attached a certified copy of his trust account statements, or an institutional equivalent, for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2. Section 1915(a)(2) clearly requires that prisoners "seeking to bring a civil action . . . without prepayment of fees . . . shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) . . . for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Without Plaintiff's current trust account statement reflecting the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of this action, the Court is simply unable to assess the appropriate amount of the initial filing fee which is statutorily required to initiate the prosecution of this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). / / /
III. Conclusion and Order
For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 2) is DENIED without prejudice.
(2) Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 4) is DENIED and the action is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to prepay the $400 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
(3) Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days from the date of this Order in which to re-open his case by either: (1) paying the entire $400 statutory and administrative filing fee, or (2) filing a new Motion to Proceed IFP, which includes a certified copy of his trust account statement for the 6-month period preceding the filing of his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2(b).
(4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with a Court-approved form "Motion and Declaration in Support of Motion to Proceed IFP" in this matter. If Plaintiff neither pays the $400 filing fee in full nor sufficiently completes and files the attached Motion to Proceed IFP, together with a certified copy of his trust account statement within 45 days, this action will remained dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), and without further Order of the Court. Dated: November 1, 2017
/s/_________
Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
United States District Judge
See http://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/search.aspx (website last visited Oct. 30, 2017.)