Opinion
CIVIL 3:13-CV-02953
11-02-2020
MICKEY CASTILLO, Plaintiff, v. TPR. CHRISTOPHER MAGUIRE, et al., Defendants.
Mariani Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction.
This civil rights case comes before us on a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. Because the plaintiff, Mickey Castillo, failed to file his complaint within the statute of limitations, his claims fail. Thus, we recommend that the court grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Castillo began this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action by filing a complaint on December 9, 2013. Castillo amended his complaint several times. On April 10, 2015, he filed a third amended complaint, (doc. 42), which is the operative complaint. Castillo presents claims based on a search of his home and his arrest.
The third amended complaint names as defendants Pennsylvania State Troopers Christopher Maguire, Michael Minsavage, Christopher O'Brien, Joseph Prula, Joseph Koehler, Jessie Knott, Jeffrey Lamm, and William Langman (collectively the “PSP defendants”) as well as Luzerne County Assistant District Attorneys Frank McCabe and Jarrett Ferentino. Doc. 42 at 2-3. The court dismissed the claims against McCabe and Ferentino. Doc. 90. Castillo proceeded pro se with his claims against the PSP defendants until January 30, 2018, when counsel entered an appearance on his behalf. Doc. 114.
On September 13, 2019, the PSP defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support of that motion, and a statement of material facts. Docs. 142-144. Castillo filed a brief in opposition and a response to the PSP defendants' statement of material facts. Docs. 145-146. The PSP defendants filed a reply brief. Doc. 147. Castillo then filed a motion for leave to file a sur reply brief, which we granted, (docs. 148-149), and on November 5, 2019, Castillo filed his sur reply brief, (doc. 150).
The motion for summary judgment is ripe for decision, and for the reasons discussed below, we recommend that the court grant the motion.
III. Summary Judgment Standards.
The PSP defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact' and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality.” Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 811 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that burden by “‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party must show a genuine dispute by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial, ” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is enough evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. When “faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts ‘in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'” N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The proper inquiry of the court “is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.
Summary judgment is warranted, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Under such circumstances, ‘there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'” Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up' time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
Further, a party that moves for summary judgment on an issue for which he bears the ultimate burden of proof faces a difficult road. United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2011). “[I]t is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial unless a reasonable juror would be compelled to find its way on the facts needed to rule in its favor on the law.” El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted). A party who has the burden of proof must persuade the factfinder that his propositions of fact are true, and “if there is a chance that a reasonable factfinder would not accept a moving party's necessary propositions of fact, pre-trial judgment cannot be granted.” Id. “Specious objections will not, of course, defeat a motion for summary judgment, but real questions about credibility, gaps in the evidence, and doubts as to the sufficiency of the movant's proof, will.” Id.
IV. Material Facts.
Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file “a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. The Rule, in turn, requires the non-moving party to file “a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [by the moving party], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” Id. The “[s]tatements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements, ” and “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.” Id.
Here, the PSP defendants filed a statement of material facts in support of their motion for summary judgment, and Castillo filed a response to that statement of material facts. See docs. 143, 146. In his response, Castillo purports to deny many of the facts set forth by the defendants. See doc. 146. He does not, however, point to evidence to support his denials or provide us with a single citation to the record. Id. Rather, Castillo responds to many of the facts set forth by the PSP defendants merely by asserting that the PSP defendants based their version of the facts on inadmissible evidence, without asserting why it is inadmissible, and by asserting time and again that Castillo's “complete interrogatory answers, the answers of [Castillo] and his witnesses in their Oral Depositions, along with the Complaint and Exhibits filed by [Castillo]” create a genuine factual dispute. Id. But at the summary-judgment stage, he must show that there is a genuine factual dispute warranting a trial. “It has been oft-noted that ‘Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in' the record.” United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 307 (3d Cir. 2014) (Cowen, J., concurring) (quoting Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 2006)). And it is the parties who “bear the responsibility to comb the record and point the Court to the facts that support their arguments.” Id.; see STI Oilfield Servs., Inc. v. Access Midstream Partners, No. 3:13-cv-02923, 2017 WL 890179, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2017) (“This Court will not scour the record to search for the support [a party] failed to cite.”). Further, Castillo was made aware of his deficiencies relative to Local Rule 56.1 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 by the PSP defendants' reply brief, (doc. 147 at 1-5), and he addressed these concerns in his sur reply brief, (doc. 150 at 1-3), by reassuring us that he was “very familiar with the factual disputes in this case” and asserting, again without citation, that the PSP defendants “cannot argue the credibility of [Castillo] while relying on a technical defense” that their material facts should be deemed admitted. But the PSP defendants and this court may rely upon the operation of Local Rule 56.1 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, both of which Castillo is well aware.
The closest Castillo comes to providing a citation to the record is referencing, in their entirety, the PSP defendants' Exhibits I, N, and O. See doc. 146-1 at 1-2. We note that such reference to the record is not specific, as these three exhibits comprise over 150 pages of deposition testimony. See doc. 143-1 at 191-229, 301-342. Additionally, Castillo makes general references to other depositions and filings in the record, the entirety of which totals nearly 500 pages.
Castillo also mentions his pleadings to support his denials. But a party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings” or upon assertions made in his briefs. D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985)); Berckeley Inv. Grp., 455 F.3d at 201 (“[T]he non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.”).
Castillo's third amended complaint is verified because he signed it and claims “all to be true correct under penalty of perjury.” Doc. 42 at 18. We may treat a verified complaint as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment. Behler v. Barbeau, No. 1:19-cv-01243, 2020 WL 3172704, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2020); accord Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating a verified complaint as an affidavit opposing summary judgment). But Castillo does not orient us to any particular part of his complaint. Thus, the same citation deficiency that plagues Castillo's general citation to the record also afflicts his citation to his verified complaint.
Castillo's slipshod brief in opposition to the PSP defendants' motion for summary judgment is nonspecific nonetheless. The following example will suffice: Castillo asserts without citation that “disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment” because he “has raised material facts and issues in his Complaint, in his Answers to Interrogatories, in his Oral Deposition and in the Oral Depositions of [his] witnesses Justin Castillo, Jennifer Black and Pete Breslin . . . [and Castillo] also incorporated the Oral Depositions of [each PSP defendant].” Doc. 145 at 5-6 (assuring us that a “cursory review” of the depositions “readily discloses” the denial of each material). Thus, Castillo “incorporates” at least fourteen voluminous documents and expects us to divine the details he inexplicably determined to be detrimental to the PSP defendants' motion for summary judgment. This we decline to do.
Because the statement of material facts set forth by the PSP defendants is supported by evidence, complete with specific citations to the record, and Castillo does not point to evidence to create a genuine factual dispute, in accordance with Local Rule 56.1, we deem Castillo to have admitted the facts set forth by the PSP defendants in their statement of material facts. Below, we set forth those material facts.
Trooper Maguire interviewed a confidential informant in January of 2006, who stated that a drug dealer named David Moyer sold drugs that he received from a man in Pittston City. Doc. 143 at ¶¶ 10-11. Maguire interviewed another confidential informant in September of 2008 (“2008 informant”), who stated that Moyer sold drugs that he received for years from his supplier, “Mick, ” at 20 Market Street in Pittston City. Id. at ¶¶ 12-15. Maguire searched the Pittston City address in law-enforcement databases and found that Castillo lived there. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. In the databases, Maguire also found a photograph of Castillo, which he showed to the 2008 informant, who identified Castillo as “Mick, ” Moyer's supplier. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.
In September 2008, the 2008 informant agreed to conduct a controlled buy from Moyer, and following police procedures for such buys, met with Moyer and returned with cocaine. Id. at ¶¶ 20-26. During the controlled buy, after the 2008 informant gave Moyer the money for the buy, police followed Moyer, watched him enter and then exit 20 Market Street, Pittston City, followed him back to the location of the 2008 informant, and observed an exchange between the 2008 informant and Moyer. Id. at ¶¶ 22-25. Castillo does not dispute that he sold drugs to Moyer on September 24, 2008. Id. at ¶ 27.
In October 2008, the 2008 informant again conducted a controlled buy from Moyer and gave Moyer money for cocaine. Id. at ¶ 29. The PSP defendants again followed Moyer to 20 Market Street, Pittston City, where they observed Moyer enter and exit the residence. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. They again followed Moyer back to meet with the 2008 informant, and they observed the exchange of cocaine. Id. at ¶ 33-34. Castillo does not dispute that he sold drugs to Moyer on October 9, 2008. Id. at ¶ 35.
On February 2, 2009, Trooper Maguire applied for an anticipatory search warrant for 20 Market Street, Pittston City. Id. at ¶ 36. The warrant application included an affidavit of probable cause and was approved by the district attorney. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38. The warrant was issued. Doc. 42 at 19 (bearing signature of Magisterial District Judge David Barilla).
The affidavit of probable cause explained the conditions of the anticipatory search as follows:
Your AFFIANT anticipates that on 02/02/09, the CI [confidential informant] will again contact David MOYER in reference to making a controlled purchase of Cocaine from him and that MOYER in return will go to 20 Market St. Pittston City, Luzerne County, Pa. and purchase Cocaine there and then return to the CI and give CI the Cocaine purchased. THIS SEARCH WARRANT WILL ONLY BE EXECUTED AND SERVED UPON MOYER GOING TO 20 MARKET ST., PITTSTON CITY, LUZERNE COUNTY, PA ENTER THE RESIDENCE AND THEN EXIT THE RESIDENCE AND RETURN TO THE CI AND SELL CI AN AMOUNT OF COCAINE.Doc. 143-1 at 234 (capitalization in original).
On February 2, 2009, the 2008 informant received buy money from the PSP defendants, again met with Moyer to purchase cocaine, and again gave Moyer the buy money. Doc. 143 at ¶¶ at 41-43. The PSP defendants followed Moyer directly to 20 Market Street, Pittston City, watched Moyer enter and exit the residence, and followed Moyer after he left. Id. at ¶¶ 44-46. While following Moyer, Trooper Lamm observed Moyer snort a powder “off the dashboard of his truck, ” which prompted Lamm to request a uniformed officer pull Moyer over to prevent an unsafe situation. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48. Trooper Knott then pulled Moyer over and recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia, but he did not find the buy money. Id. at ¶¶ 49-51.
After the traffic stop of Moyer, Trooper Maguire decided to execute the search warrant at 20 Market Street, Pittston City, concluding that “all conditions of the anticipatory search warrant had been met.” Id. at ¶¶ 52-53. As the PSP defendants approached the door of Castillo's residence, “two men exited the house.” Id. at ¶ 55. The PSP defendants “immediately identified themselves [as] police and their purpose for being there by yelling ‘State Police' and ‘Search Warrant.'” Id. at ¶ 56. The PSP defendants “did not make a dynamic, or forcible, entry into the home.” Id. at ¶ 57. “Instead, they entered through the door left open by the men exiting.” Id. Castillo did not see the PSP defendants enter the residence. Id. at ¶ 58. And Castillo did not see any damage to his door on February 2, 2009. Id. at ¶ 69. Rather, he first observed that his door was damaged 36 hours after his arrest, after he posted bail. Id.
During the search of Castillo's home, the PSP defendants recovered, among other things, 144 grams of cocaine, 20 grams of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Id. at ¶¶ 59, 61. And from Castillo's bedroom, they recovered the buy money that the 2008 informant had given to Moyer. Id. at ¶ 60. The PSP defendants arrested Castillo and charged him with drug crimes. Id. at ¶ 62. The district attorney approved the charges, all of which arose from the February 2, 2009 search of Castillo's residence. Id. at ¶¶ 63-64.
Castillo “was represented by an attorney in his criminal case, ” and his attorney “filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of [Castillo's] home based upon inadequacies with the search warrant and affidavit of probable cause.” Doc. 143 at ¶¶ 67-68. On April 14, 2010, Castillo pleaded guilty to two of the charges against him, and when he pleaded guilty, Castillo knew that “the charges brought against him were based upon a search warrant executed on February 2, 2009, and that the search warrant was premised upon controlled buys conducted on September 24, 2008, and October 9, 2008.” Id. at ¶¶ 65-66; Doc. 143-1 at 356 (docket sheet showing date of guilty plea).
V. Discussion.
Castillo brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Id. To establish a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that a person acting under color of state law committed this deprivation. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
Castillo claims that the anticipatory warrant lacked probable cause, which resulted in the illegal seizure of drugs from his residence and his arrest. Castillo claims in his third amended complaint that the defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but Castillo focuses his attention on the alleged lack of probable cause for the anticipatory search warrant and his arrest which followed. Doc. 42 at 16. Castillo complains that the defendants violated his rights “by without probable cause illegally search[ing] [and] seiz[ing] evidence, and using . . . illegally obtained evidence to arrest, detain, [and] limit his freedom.” Id. While Castillo variously frames these allegations as violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, we construe Castillo's third amended complaint as attempting to state a claim for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under theories of unlawful seizure and false arrest. Id. at 16-17 (describing Fourth Amendment violations from “illegally obtained evidence” and seeking compensatory damages for bail money “due to being falsely arrested”).
While it is unclear on the face of Castillo's third amended complaint, he may also be attempting to raise a malicious prosecution claim. But Castillo has not alleged that “the criminal proceeding ended in [his] favor, ” which is one of the necessary elements of a malicious prosecution claim. McCormack v. Livergood, 353 F.Supp.3d 357, 364 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 365 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[F]avorable termination is established by showing that the proceeding ended in any manner ‘that indicates the innocence of the accused.'” (quoting Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009)). Thus, we do not construe Castillo's third amended complaint as attempting to raise a malicious prosecution claim.
In his brief in opposition, Castillo argues that the search and his arrest violated his right to substantive due process. See doc. 145 at 7-9. But where, as here, the Fourth Amendment applies, substantive due process does not. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process, ” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Regardless of how the claims are framed, for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that summary judgment be granted to the PSP defendants because Castillo's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
A. Castillo did not file this action within the two-year statute of limitations.
The PSP defendants argue that Castillo's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We agree.
The statute of limitations for bringing a § 1983 claim “is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (citations omitted). In Pennsylvania, a two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims. Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburg, 882 F.2d 74, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1989); see also LeBlanc v. Stedman, 483 Fed.Appx. 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524(1); Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Generally, a statute of limitations “begin[s] to run ‘when the cause of action accrues'-that is, ‘when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.'” California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S.Ct. 2042, 2049 (2017) (quoting CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2014)). Even when a statute of limitations is borrowed from state law, however, federal law governs “what constitutes accrual.” Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). A cause of action ‘“accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, when the wrongful act or omission results in damages.'” Id. at 185-86 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391). In other words, the cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action,' that is, when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.'” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (citations omitted).
A Fourth Amendment illegal search claim accrues at “the moment of the search.” Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018). Here, the search occurred on February 2, 2009. Thus, Castillo's illegal search claim accrued on February 2, 2009.
A Fourth Amendment false arrest claim accrues “the moment when legal process justifies the detention or, absent legal process, the moment of release.” Id. (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390-91). “Detention pursuant to legal process occurs when, for example, the claimant “is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Allen v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 19-1066, 2020 WL 134204, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2020). Here, Castillo was arrested on February 2, 2009, and he had a formal arraignment on May 8, 2009. See doc. 143-1 at 355 (criminal docket sheet). Thus, his false arrest cause of action accrued at that latest on May 8, 2009. Because Castillo's illegal search and false arrest claims accrued on February 2, 2009, and May 8, 2009, respectively, but Castillo did not file the complaint in this case until December 9, 2013, more than four and half years after his claims accrued, absent tolling, the two-year statute of limitations bars his claims.
B. Neither the discovery rule nor the fraudulent-concealment doctrine saves Castillo's claims from being barred by the statute of limitations.
Invoking the discovery rule, Castillo argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until he discovered though legal research while in prison that the search warrant was purportedly improper. That discovery, according to Castillo, occurred years after the search and his arrest.
Unless inconsistent with federal law, state law governs whether the statute of limitations should be tolled. Dique, 603 F.3d at 185. Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations may be tolled by the discovery rule. Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006). “Pennsylvania's discovery rule delays the start of the statute-of-limitations period until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know she has suffered an injury caused by another.” Adams v. Zimmer US, Inc., 943 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2019). “The discovery rule ‘tolls the statute of limitations during the plaintiff's complete inability, due to facts and circumstances not within his control, to discover an injury despite the exercise of due diligence.'” Blanyar v. Genova Prod. Inc., 861 F.3d 426, 431-32 (3d Cir. 2017) (italics in original) (quoting Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 152 (3d Cir. 1998)). “Under the rule, even if a plaintiff suffers an injury, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until ‘the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, (1) that he has been injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by another party's conduct.'” Id. (quoting Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Because the parties do not contend that Pennsylvania's tolling principles are inconsistent with federal law, we apply Pennsylvania's tolling principles.
But “[f]or the statute of limitations to run, a plaintiff need not know the ‘exact nature' of his injury, as long as it objectively appears that the plaintiff ‘is reasonably charged with the knowledge that he has an injury caused by another.'” Id. at 510-11 (quoting Ackler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 551 A.2d 291, 293 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1988)); see also Brawner v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 513 Fed.Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that knowledge of every fact necessary to succeed on a claim is not required to trigger the accrual period). “Ultimately, ‘the salient point giving rise to [the discovery rule's] application is the inability of the injured, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, to know that he is injured and by what cause.'” Blanyar, 861 F.3d at 432 (quoting Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005)).
Castillo contends that he is “a quintessential ‘blamelessly ignorant' plaintiff[, ]” and that “he only learned of the actions of the Defendants and the existence and meaning of an anticipatory search warrant when he was imprisoned and began researching Habeas Corpus Relief.” Doc. 145 at 12-13. But even if Castillo did not know of the legal significance of anticipatory search warrants, he was aware of the search of his residence since he was in the residence at the time, and he cannot have missed the fact that he was arrested. He thus knew that he was injured by the conduct of another at the time of the search and his arrest. Thus, the discovery rule does not save his untimely claims.
Castillo also mentions that he was in prison and that he had limited time in the law library to research anticipatory search warrants. To the extent that he is suggesting that his imprisonment should toll the statute of limitations, he is incorrect. Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations is not tolled merely because the plaintiff is in prison. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, insanity or imprisonment does not extend the time limited by this subchapter for the commencement of a matter.”).
Further, other than the discovery rule, “[i]n Pennsylvania, judicial extensions of the statute of limitations are expressly forbidden absent fraud or its equivalent.” Poole v. Marks, 441 Fed.Appx. 854, 857 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5504(a) and Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)). Here, Castillo suggests that the statute of limitations should be tolled by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.
Pennsylvania's fraudulent-concealment doctrine “is based on a theory of estoppel.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 860. The “doctrine tolls the statute of limitations where ‘through fraud or concealment the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax vigilance or deviate from the right of inquiry.'” Mest, 449 F.3d at 516 (quoting Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 556 (3d Cir.1985)). “The doctrine does not require fraud in the strictest sense encompassing an intent to deceive, but rather, fraud in the broadest sense, which includes an unintentional deception.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 860. But “[f]or fraudulent concealment to toll a statute of limitations, ‘the defendant must have committed some affirmative independent act of concealment upon which the plaintiffs justifiably relied.'” Brady v. W.C. Eshenaur & Son, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-1280, 2020 WL 5801407, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2020) (quoting Kingston Coal Co. v. Felton Min. Co., 690 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)).
Here, Castillo contends that during his criminal proceedings, his criminal defense counsel misrepresented and concealed facts, inducing him to plead guilty. But Castillo's criminal defense attorney is not a defendant in this case. Thus, any misrepresentations on his part are not sufficient to show that the fraudulent-concealment doctrine applies here.
Castillo also contends that the State Police “refused to produce a January 2006 Police Incident Report that is mentioned in and was used in the Application for [the search warrant], ” which “would have exposed the lies and defects of the State Police warrants and the untruths told to him by his criminal defense lawyer.” Doc. 145 at 15-16. But Castillo has not shown that any of the defendants engaged in an affirmative act of concealment. Moreover, he has failed to show that without the report, he did not know or could not have reasonably discovered his injury. Accordingly, his contention that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment saves his claims from being barred by the statute of limitations is without merit.
In sum, Castillo's claims are time barred by the statute of limitations, and for that reason, we will recommend that the PSP defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. Given that Castillo's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, we need not, and do not, address the PSP defendants' other arguments for why they are entitled to summary judgment.
VI. Conclusion.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the PSP defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 142) be granted.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.