Opinion
C. A. 20-2160-MGL-PJG
07-28-2020
Warrick Dwayne Castille, Petitioner, v. Dobbs Warden, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Warrick Dwayne Castille, a self-represented federal prisoner, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The action is filed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Petition in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2011, Petitioner pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana to bank robbery by force or violence and was sentenced to 235 months' imprisonment and five years' supervised release. United States v. Castille, Cr. No. 2:11-cr-61-PM-KK-1. Petitioner indicates that his sentence was enhanced under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the use of a dangerous weapon, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D); a career offender designation, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; and Petitioner's criminal history, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 3, 5-6, 9.) Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 2.) Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which the district court dismissed. (Id. at 3-4.)
Petitioner now files this petition for a writ of a habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner argues he should be resentenced because he is “actually innocent” of the use of a dangerous weapon enhancement, one of the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence, and the career offender enhancement under the Guidelines. (Id. at 3-8.) Petitioner also argues that the trial court erroneously computed his criminal history under the Guidelines and that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the enhancements. (Id. at 9-13.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in this case pursuant to the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
A petitioner cannot challenge his federal conviction and sentence through § 2241 unless he can show under the “savings clause” of § 2255(e) that a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing that if a federal prisoner brings a § 2241 petition that does not fall within the scope of the savings clause, the district court must dismiss the unauthorized habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a petitioner must establish the following criteria to demonstrate that a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner's sentence:
(1) [A]t the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018).
Here, Petitioner fails to meet the second element of the Wheeler standard-that is, Petitioner fails to point to a substantive change in the law that would retroactively apply to Petitioner's sentence. Petitioner's grounds for relief about his sentence enhancements include only allegations that the sentencing court erred in applying different guideline provisions based on facts known at the time of his sentencing. Similarly, Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not rely on a substantive change in the law that occurred after he filed his direct appeal and § 2255 motion. Consequently, the grounds for relief asserted by Petitioner provide no basis for the court's jurisdiction.
Because Petitioner is foreclosed from bringing a § 2241 habeas petition in this court to challenge his sentence, Petitioner's remedy, if any, appears to be to seek permission to file a § 2255 motion in the court in which he was sentenced by filing a motion for leave to file a successive § 2255 motion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Therefore, this case should be dismissed because this court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 426 (holding that the failure to meet the requirements of the savings clause is a jurisdictional defect that may not be waived).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that the Petition in the above-captioned case be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).