Opinion
No. 11-14-00031-CR
02-04-2016
ISIDRO CASTANEDA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1301246D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Isidro Castaneda appeals his jury conviction for burglary of a habitation. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(c)(2) (West 2011). The jury assessed his punishment at confinement for a term of thirty-five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In one issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.
Background Facts
In July 2011, Doug Mocek traveled with his fiancée from their home in Fort Worth to San Antonio to get married. Mocek testified that, when they returned home on July 24, their television was not on its stand. He then saw that their back door was open and their television was propped up against the back fence. Mocek noticed a broken window pane on a back window. Inside the home, he saw a blood spot on their game console. Mocek then called the police, who swabbed the blood spot for evidentiary purposes. Appellant's DNA, which was in CODIS, was a match to the blood found on the game console. Appellant provided a sample of his DNA, which was also a match to the blood found in the Moceks' home.
Ethan Wiley, the Moceks' neighbor, testified that, on the day before the burglary, a man approached him and his friends while they were in Wiley's front yard. The man introduced himself as "Benny" and began asking questions about the Moceks' house. Wiley testified that the man asked who lived there, whether they were home at the time, and whether they had any dogs. Wiley identified Appellant as the man who had approached him that day. Wiley remembered two distinctive tattoos, one on Appellant's face and another one on his neck.
Appellant testified at trial. He denied that he committed the burglary. Appellant explained that his blood was inside the house because he was there several days prior to the burglary. Appellant testified that he and Mocek had been doing drugs inside the house. However, Mocek had previously testified that he had never seen Appellant before and that he did not give Appellant permission to enter his home. Appellant testified that Mocek had denied knowing him because Mocek was upset with him.
Analysis
We review a sufficiency of the evidence issue under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288-89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref'd). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson., 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder's role as the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
As charged in the indictment, a person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person intentionally or knowingly enters a habitation with the intent to commit theft. See PENAL § 30.02(a)(1). Appellant contends that there is no evidence to show that he entered the habitation to commit theft based upon his testimony denying that he committed the burglary and his explanation as to how his blood was inside the home. Appellant contends that "a rational fact finder could not have disbelieved Appellant's testimony that he had been in the residence before July 23, 2011." We disagree.
The State was not required to produce evidence that refutes Appellant's claim that his DNA was in the house lawfully. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Instead, we determine whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Appellant's explanation for how his blood got inside the residence, as well as Mocek's denial of knowing Appellant, was a conflict for the jury to resolve based upon its determination of which person's testimony was credible. As noted previously, when the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The jury was free to disbelieve Appellant's testimony that his blood was in the house from the previous time when he allegedly used methamphetamine with Mocek, and we defer to that determination.
In addition to the DNA evidence, Appellant questioned the Moceks' neighbor prior to the burglary about whether the residents were in town and whether there were dogs in the house. The neighbor identified Appellant in court based on the distinctive tattoos on his face and neck. Reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule Appellant's sole issue.
This Court's Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JOHN M. BAILEY
JUSTICE February 4, 2016 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
Willson, J., and Bailey, J.