Opinion
No. 1D20-74
03-24-2021
Erika Rivers CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, Jasmine Russell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Adam B. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, Jasmine Russell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Adam B. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
B.L. Thomas, J.
Appellant challenges the trial court's order denying her motion to suppress. We affirm.
Appellant was sentenced to three years for trafficking in methamphetamine and a concurrent three years for possession of more than twenty grams of cannabis following a traffic stop and search of her vehicle. Deputy Robinson pulled Appellant over for traveling 87 miles per hour in a 70 mile per hour zone. Appellant was the sole occupant. When Deputy Robinson asked for Appellant's driver's license, she gave him a learner's license and confirmed that she did not have a valid driver's license.
Deputy Robinson then asked Appellant who owned the vehicle. Appellant claimed it was a rental vehicle, but she did not know who rented it and was unable to provide any rental documents. Appellant told Deputy Robinson that she was traveling to Ocala to meet someone, but she was unable to provide the name of that person. She stated that she was then traveling to Bowling Green, Ohio, to meet someone else but was also unable to provide that person's name.
At trial, Deputy Robinson testified that he smelled fresh marijuana coming from inside the vehicle while Appellant searched for rental documents; however, he did not mention this in his report, instead relying on Appellant's voluntary consent to justify his search of the vehicle. The trial court properly determined that it did not need to rely on the smell of marijuana to uphold the search of Appellant's vehicle.
Deputy Robinson prepared a citation for speeding and returned to Appellant's vehicle with Appellant's learner's license and the citation. He explained the reason for the stop and then asked to search Appellant's vehicle. Deputy Robinson did not threaten Appellant in any way when asking for her consent. He was the only officer at the scene, he did not have his hand on his service weapon, and he did not act in an aggressive manner. He informed Appellant that during the search she would be placed in his patrol vehicle, but she was not being detained and was not under arrest. Appellant allowed Deputy Robinson to search the car.
Another deputy arrived on scene and both deputies conducted the search during which they discovered marijuana and methamphetamine in the trunk of the car. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search, arguing that the stop was unlawfully prolonged and that she did not voluntarily consent to the search of the vehicle. The trial court denied Appellant's motion and Appellant entered a no contest plea, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress.
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts. Channell v. State , 257 So. 3d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). "A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct, and we must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." Id.
In Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), the United States Supreme Court held that a police stop may not exceed the time needed to resolve the concern which instigated the stop. However, a traffic stop may be prolonged if an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 ; Cresswell v. State , 564 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1990) ; Cowart-Darling v. State , 256 So. 3d 250, 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Reasonable suspicion requires an officer to consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. Cresswell , 564 So. 2d at 482 (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ).
Both the Florida Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that the totality of the circumstances during a traffic stop can support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. See Cresswell , 564 So. 2d at 483 (holding that officer had reasonable suspicion justifying the continued detention of Cresswell after observing that Cresswell was very nervous, was driving along a known drug route in a vehicle with a large trunk, had a Massachusetts driver's license but was driving a car registered in Maine, with New York state insurance and inspection stickers, there was a CB radio in the car, the ignition key was separate from the other keys, and the back seat contained items normally found in the trunk); Cowart-Darling , 256 So. 3d at 252 (holding that deputy had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify detaining Cowart-Darling where Cowart-Darling exhibited signs of nervousness and nodded in affirmation when the deputy asked him if there were illegal substances in the vehicle despite later stating that there were no drugs).
Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, there were articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaging in criminal activity. See Cresswell , 564 So. 2d at 483 ; Cowart-Darling , 256 So. 3d at 252. In addition to the facts noted above, Deputy Robinson noticed that there was no luggage inside Appellant's vehicle despite Appellant's assertion that she was traveling extensively. These facts created reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaging in drug trafficking. See Cresswell , 564 So. 2d at 483 ; Cowart-Darling , 256 So. 3d at 252. Because Deputy Robinson had reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaging in criminal activity, he did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. See Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609.
We also hold that the circumstances surrounding the stop amply show that Appellant was not coerced into consenting to the search. See Cox v. State , 975 So. 2d 1163, 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding whether consent is voluntary is to be determined under the totality of the circumstances and established by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Parrish , 731 So. 2d 101, 103–04 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (finding no evidence supporting the contention that the defendant acquiesced to authority where defendant did not testify that he believed he had no choice but to consent and there was no testimony that the officers’ actions were coercive, oppressive, or dominating).
AFFIRMED .
Rowe and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.