Carter Sp. Sch. Dist. v. Hollis Sp. Sch. Dist

7 Citing cases

  1. Fall River Joint Union High School District v. Shasta Union High School District

    104 Cal.App. 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930)   Cited 7 times
    In Fall River Joint Union High School Dist. v. Shasta Union High School Dist. (1930), 104 Cal.App. 444, 285 P. 1091, Fall River sued to recover $8,293.84 for taxes levied and collected for Shasta on property within Fall River's boundaries.

    In Mabelvale Special School District v. Halstead Special School District, 169 Ark. 645 [ 276 S.W. 584], the Supreme Court of Arkansas held as follows: "A special school district, in a suit to recover taxes on disputed lands held not entitled to recover taxes which had been regularly, though erroneously distributed to another school district, and consumed in educational purposes, but to be entitled only to taxes in the hands of the treasurer at the time suit was commenced," etc. In Carter Special School District v. Hollis Special School District, 173 Ark. 781 [ 293 S.W. 722], it was again held by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in the opinion rendered in 1927, that a school district rightfully entitled thereto, could not recover school funds erroneously distributed to, and consumed in educational purposes by the district to which the funds had been apportioned. In the case of School District No. 153 v. School District No. 154, 232 Ill. 322 [83 N.E. 849], the Supreme Court held, upon facts identical with those here presented, that "where property has been assessed for school purposes in one district, and the taxes collected by that district, an adjoining district cannot recover the taxes from the first district on the ground that by mistake in making a map of the school district of the county, the property was assessed in the wrong district."

  2. Lavaca School Dist. v. Charleston School

    800 S.W.2d 703 (Ark. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    Though admittedly dicta and unnecessary to the decision in that case, the court observed that neither the school directors nor the people had acquiesced over a long period to the condition created by the void order and thus were not estopped from seeking their remedy. Again, in Carter Special District v. Hollis Special School District, 173 Ark. 781, 293 S.W. 722 (1927), the court, quoting with approval the estoppel language contained in Cotter Special School District No. 60, observed that a delay of ten years, absent any "special circumstances," was insufficient in that case to create an estoppel. In Magnolia School District No. 14 v. Rural Special District No. 3, 202 Ark. 49, 149 S.W.2d 579 (1941), the court quoted the language from Cotter and went on to observe that "special circumstances" as referred to in Cotter existed; the court then applied the doctrine of estoppel to avoid an inequitable result.

  3. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Reed

    449 S.W.2d 178 (Ark. 1970)   Cited 7 times

    This point, raised below, is based upon the fact that only six persons joined in the original petition. While the circuit court tried the case de novo, Its jurisdiction on appeal was dependent upon county court jurisdiction, and no greater than that of the latter court. Carter Special School District v. Hollis Spell School District, 173 Ark. 781, 293 S.W. 722. The circuit court could render only such judgment as the county court could have rendered. Price v. Madison County Bank, 90 Ark. 195, 118 S.W. 706. The jurisdiction of this court is also dependent upon the county court jurisdiction, so our discussion of other points would not be of any consequence and would constitute an advisory opinion merely.

  4. Rockefeller v. Hogue

    439 S.W.2d 805 (Ark. 1969)   Cited 4 times

    Since there was a want of jurisdiction of the subject matter or a want of power in the trial court, the jurisdiction of this court, being derivative, is no greater. Jurisdiction of an appellate court is derived from and depends upon that of the court of origin. Rucker v. Cox, 200 Ark. 247, 138 S.W.2d 778; Markham v. Evans, 239 Ark. 1154, 397 S.W.2d 365; Whitesides v. Kershaw, 44 Ark. 377; Wright v. Wooldridge, 94 Ark. 276, 126 S.W. 841. Where the court from which an appeal is taken has no jurisdiction, the appeal confers none. Gregory v. Williams, 24 Ark. 177; Dunnington v. Bailey, 27 Ark. 508; Smyrna Baptist Church v. Burbridge, 205 Ark. 108, 167 S.W.2d 501; Carter Special School District v. Hollis School District, 173 Ark. 781, 293 S.W. 722; Harris v. Hare, 183 Ark. 259, 35 S.W.2d 340; See 4 Am.Jur.2d 539, Appeal and Error, 9. This court has no jurisdiction where the trial court had none. Trapnall v. Jordon, 7 Ark. 430. Since an appellate court acquires only such jurisdiction as the court wherein the case originated had, it may render only such judgment as the trial court could or should have rendered. Pride v. State, 52 Ark. 502, 13 S.W. 135; Price v. Madison County Bank, 90 Ark. 195, 118 S.W. 706; Markham v. Evans, supra; Carter Special School District v. Hollis Special School District, supra; Baughman v. Overton, 183 Ark. 561, 37 S.W.2d 81; Wright v. Wooldridge, 94 Ark. 276, 126 S.W. 841; Woolverton v. Freeman, 77 Ark. 234, 91 S.W. 190.

  5. Butt v. Southwestern Distilled Products, Inc.

    135 S.W.2d 857 (Ark. 1940)   Cited 2 times

    Having held that the chancery court was without jurisdiction, it becomes unimportant to determine whether the decree was correct as to what, if any, taxes were due on the liquor, or the amount thereof. Gregory v. Williams, 24 Ark. 177; Dunnington v. Bailey, 27 Ark. 508; Prire v. Madison County, 90 Ark. 118 S.W. 706; Carter Special School District v. Hollis Special School District, 173 Ark. 781, 293 S.W. 722.

  6. Manley v. Moon

    6 S.W.2d 281 (Ark. 1928)   Cited 13 times
    In Manley v. Moon, 177 Ark. 260, 6 S.W.2d 281 (1928), the court, in interpreting the language of a statute, stated that "`[a]ny school district' is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include any school district and every school district in the State."

    We also said, in the case of McCrory Spec. School Dist. v. Curtis, 174 Ark. 343, 295 S.W. 971, that the county board of education has no jurisdiction to annex territory already comprised in a special rural district created by special act. We also said, in the case of Carter Special School Dist. v. Hollis Special School Dist., 173 Ark. 781, 293 S.W. 722, that the county board of education had no right to dissolve a district created by the Legislature. And in the case of Park v. Rural Special School Dist. 26, 173 Ark. 514, 292 S.W. 697, that the county board of education had no authority to change the boundaries of rural special school districts.

  7. McCrory Spec. School Dist. v. Curtis

    295 S.W. 971 (Ark. 1927)   Cited 7 times
    In McCrory Special School District v. Curtis, 174 Ark. 343, 295 S.W. 971, this court held that the county board of education was without jurisdiction to annex territory within a rural special school district, created by special act of the Legislature, to another special school district, and that its order of annexation could be quashed upon certiorari, the order being void, notwithstanding the parties could have appealed from it.

    School District No. 25 v. Pyatt Special School District, 172 Ark. 602, 289 S.W. 778; Park v. Rural Special School Dist. No. 26, 173 Ark. 514, 892, 292 S.W. 697. In a still later case the court said that, when the Legislature itself creates a special school district, neither the county board of education nor any other governmental agency has the power to change the boundaries thereof, without express authority from the Legislature so to do. Carter Special School District v. Hollis Special School District, 173 Ark. 781, 293 S.W. 722. Hence, it may be said that the county board of education has no jurisdiction to annex territory already comprised in a special rural school district created by the Legislature to another special school district. Again, it is insisted that the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed because certiorari was not the proper remedy.