Opinion
No. 14-06-00687-CV
Opinion filed March 27, 2007.
On Appeal from the 412th District Court Brazoria County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 35184.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices FROST and GUZMAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case arises from the City of Alvin's allegedly negligent actions in issuing building permits and inspecting a particular building. The trial court granted the City of Alvin's plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity. We conclude appellants' claims regarding the alleged waiver or inapplicability of governmental immunity lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellants Virginia and Jose Carrasco hired a contractor to demolish a single-story building and construct a two-story building in its place. The first floor of the new building was intended for commercial use, and appellants planned to use the second floor as a residence. According to appellants, the contractor retrieved the plans for the original one-story structure from the City of Alvin ("the City"), altered the plans to include a second floor, and used the altered plans to obtain construction permits from the City. One or more engineers for the City inspected the work and issued additional permits during the course of construction.
Appellants allege that the contractor abandoned the job when the structure was 80% complete, leaving the new building with numerous construction defects. Appellants emphasize that the City approved the second floor of the building for occupancy, but did not approve the first floor.
Appellants sued the contractor, an engineer, and the City, asserting claims of fraud, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity from suit. The trial court granted the plea and dismissed appellants' claims against the City. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
These claims were asserted against all four defendants; additional claims were asserted against the contractor.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
In four issues, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction because (1) the City expressly waived immunity; (2) the inspection of buildings and enforcement of building codes is a proprietary function for which immunity has been waived by statute; (3) the City failed to comply with its duty under the police power of the State of Texas, and no case or statute grants a municipality immunity when it fails to meet its obligation under its police power; and (4) the City is estopped from asserting the defense of immunity because it promised to seek protection of appellants' safety and welfare.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). In conducting this review, we construe the pleadings in the plaintiffs' favor and look to the pleaders' intent. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). Thus, we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of conferring jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam). When plaintiffs fail to plead facts that establish jurisdiction, but the petition does not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the trial court should afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. County of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 555. On the other hand, if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then the trial court may properly grant a plea to the jurisdiction without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Governing Law
Governmental immunity applies to political subdivisions of the State, including counties, school districts, and cities. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n. 3 (Tex. 2003). It encompasses both immunity from suit and immunity from liability. See Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997) (discussing sovereign immunity, from which governmental immunity is derived), superseded by statute on other grounds. Immunity from suit deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction and bars an action against the governmental unit in the absence of express, clear, and unambiguous consent to suit. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (Vernon 2005) ("[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language."); Travis County v. Pelzel Assocs., Inc., 77 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tex. 2002) ("Express consent is required to show that immunity from suit has been waived."), superseded by statute on other grounds.
B. Express Waiver of Immunity
In their first issue, appellants contend that the City waived immunity from suit because it "expressly acknowledged that it was 'not aware of a theory under which the City's code compliance and building department would be responsible for any engineering defects or construction anomalies other than those which specifically violated the building codes of the City of Alvin.'" Appellants provide no citation to the record in support of their contention that such a statement was made or that it was made by a person authorized to make such a statement on the City's behalf. Moreover, they cite no authority for the proposition that such a statement waives immunity to suit, nor do we find this to be the case.
Appended to appellants' brief is a document purporting to be a letter from a claims specialist for TML Governmental Risk Pool to appellants' attorney. This court is not required to consider evidence attached as exhibits or appendices to briefs and for which no citation to the record is provided. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h); Worldpeace v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 183 S.W.3d 451, 465 n. 23 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). However, it is not necessary for us to consider the document itself. In a civil case, we accept the facts stated by an appellant as true unless another party contradicts them. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f). Here, appellants have quoted the relevant portion of the letter, and the City agrees that such a statement was made by a TML claims specialist. Although the City points out appellants' failure to cite the record, it nevertheless addresses this argument on the merits, as do we.
A governmental unit waives immunity from suit only through its express consent. Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003). Such consent may be found in the language of a statute if such language is clear and unambiguous. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (Vernon 2005). Alternatively, when a municipality institutes litigation asserting claims for monetary relief, it waives immunity from suit regarding claims "germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to" its own claims. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 376B77 (Tex. 2006). Neither of these circumstances is present here.
Appellants' argument instead assumes, inter alia, that the City is amenable to suit for the acts for which it is "responsible." But governmental immunity protects cities from both liability and suit without regard to whether the entity is, in some broader sense, "responsible." A municipality's lack of responsibility for harm is not a prerequisite to governmental immunity; it is the result of governmental immunity. Consequently, we disagree that the mere implication that the City could be "responsible" under some theory is the equivalent of express consent to suit.
We overrule appellants' first issue.
C. Statutory Waiver of Immunity
Appellants' second issue turns on the distinction between a municipality's governmental and proprietary functions. "[G]enerally speaking, a municipality's proprietary functions are those conducted 'in its private capacity, for the benefit only of those within its corporate limits, and not as an arm of the government.'" Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Dilley v. City of Houston, 148 Tex. 191, 193, 222 S.W.2d 992, 993 (1949), superseded by statute on other grounds). In contrast, "governmental functions are 'in the performance of purely governmental matters solely for the public benefit.'" Id. (quoting Dilley, 148 Tex. at 193, 222 S.W.2d at 993).
This distinction has important implications for the municipality's governmental immunity. When a municipality commits a tort while engaged in a governmental function, its liability is determined by the provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a) (Vernon 2005); Martinez v. City of San Antonio, No. 04-05-00775-CV, 2006 WL 3497250, at *3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Dec. 6, 2006, no pet. h.). On the other hand a municipality is not immune from suit for torts committed in the performance of its proprietary functions. Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343.
Appellants do not contend that the Tort Claims Act applies.
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.0215(a) classifies a municipality's actions concerning building codes, building inspections, plat approval, and engineering as governmental functions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)(28)B(30) (Vernon 2005). By statute, the proprietary functions of a municipality do not include governmental activities. Id. ' 101.02158.
Relying on Texas Local Government Code section 214.2128, appellants argue that building inspections and code compliance activities nevertheless are proprietary in nature. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 214.2128 (Vernon Supp. 2006). Pursuant to this statute, A[a] municipality may establish procedures: (1) to adopt local amendments to the International Residential Code; and (2) for the administration and enforcement of the International Residential Code" (the AIRC"). Id. Appellants argue, without supporting authority, that a municipality's actions in administering and enforcing the IRC are proprietary because this provision uses the word "may" and therefore is permissive. Although appellants acknowledge that this contention is directly contradicted by the classifications of these actions as governmental functions in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.0215(a), they nevertheless assert that, because Texas Local Government Code section 214.2128 is the later-enacted statute, it effectively abrogates the earlier-enacted provision.
Appellants do not contend that the City's actions should be considered proprietary under the common law. Cf. City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 500B02 (Tex. 1997) (reversing in part a summary judgment granted to a city on its assertion of sovereign immunity regarding allegedly negligent acts that occurred before the State legislature recharacterized as governmental functions acts that had been characterized as proprietary under common law).
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, appellants cite no authority for the proposition that when a statute permits but does not require a municipality to take certain actions in connection with a governmental function, that function ceases to be governmental and becomes proprietary. This argument is therefore waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h).
Additionally, the record before us does not show that section 214.2128 applies in this case. For the purposes of this section, the term "residential" is defined in relevant part as "having the character of a detached one-family or two-family dwelling or a multiple single-family dwelling that is not more than three stories high with separate means of egress. . . ." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN." 214.211(3) (Vernon Supp. 2006). In contrast, "commercial" is statutorily defined as Aa building for the use or occupation of people for a public purpose or economic gain." Id. ' 214.211(5)(A). Appellants have consistently asserted that the building at issue is a "joint residential and commercial structure" in which the first floor was constructed for commercial use while the second floor was intended to serve as appellants' residence. The second floor of the building is neither detached from the commercial portion of the building nor a "multiple single-family dwelling"; thus, on the record before us, the building does not appear to fall within the statute's definition of a "residential" structure. See id. ' 214.211(3). On the other hand, the structure is "a building for the use or occupation of people for . . . economic gain," and therefore falls within the statute's definition of "commercial." See id. ' 214.211(5)(A). Section 214.212 applies only to residential structures. See id. "214.212(a), (b); Act of April 24, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 120, ' 3, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 238, 240. In the absence of any citation to the City's building code, the IRC, or evidence regarding the procedures the City used in administering and enforcing the provisions of the IRC as applied to this building, there is no basis on which to conclude that section 214.212 has any application to the facts of this case.
For each of the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellants' second issue.
D. Police Power
Appellants contend that the City "failed to comply with its duty under the [p]olice [p]ower of the State of Texas" by failing to follow its own guidelines in issuing permits and ensuring compliance with building codes. They assert that "the [p]olice [p]ower creates an agreement where State agencies will seek to protect the safety and welfare of its [sic] citizens in exchange for the grant of continued power to do so." Appellants reason that their safety and welfare have been compromised by the City's omissions, and conclude, "These matters are within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the [c]ourt, because the [p]olice [p]ower is not included addressed [sic] in the Texas Tort Claims Act."
In support of this argument, appellants cite only to Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 11, 73 S.W.2d 475, 479 (1934) (upholding the constitutionality of state and municipal zoning ordinances). We are unable to determine how this authority supports appellants' contentions. See Haynes v. City of Beaumont, 35 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (holding that appellants waived an issue on appeal by failing to offer supporting argument demonstrating how the three cases they cited should govern the reviewing court's decision).
Appellants assert that, after a diligent search, they have found "no case or statute granting municipalities immunity when they fail to meet their obligations under its [sic] [p]olice [p]ower." Because cities are immune from suit except to the extent that such immunity has been waived, the appropriate query is not whether immunity exists, but whether immunity has been waived. See, e.g., Reata Constr. Corp., 197 S.W.3d at 374; Wichita Falls State Hosp., 106 S.W.3d at 694 n. 3; Hosner v. De Young, 1 Tex. 764, 769B70 (1847). Both at trial and on appeal, appellants have failed to demonstrate that the City waived immunity from this suit. Accordingly, we overrule appellants' third issue.
As the Texas Supreme Court recently stated:
In this Court's second Term, we acknowledged the common-law rule that "no state can be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent." We gave no basis for this principle of sovereign immunity, perhaps because a rule then more than six centuries old which the United States Supreme Court would describe as "an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations" required no justification, or perhaps because the reasons given for the rule had evolved over the centuries, from "the king can do no wrong", to preserving the dignity of the state, to protecting state resources. The rule remains firmly established, and as it has come to be applied to the various governmental entities in this State, an important purpose is pragmatic: to shield the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their governments.
Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 331B32 (citations omitted).
E. Estoppel
Again relying on their assertion "that the [p]olice [p]ower creates an agreement where State agencies will seek to protect the safety and welfare of its [sic] citizens in exchange for the grant of continued power to do so," appellants reason that the City is "estopped from asserting the defense of immunity because it has promised to seek protection of [appellants'] safety and welfare." Appellants have cited neither facts nor law in support of this argument, and there is precedent to the contrary. See Saudi v. Brieven, 176 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) ("Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel at any stage of a proceeding."); Tourneau Houston, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 24 S.W.3d 907, 910 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) ("No one is ever estopped from asserting lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.").
The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that briefs "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h). Conclusory arguments citing no authority present nothing for our review. Jensen v. State, 66 S.W.3d 528, 534 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). Because appellants have failed to support their argument or provide substantive analysis, we conclude they have waived their fourth issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of appellants' issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.