Summary
granting motion to dismiss breach of contract and negligence claims as preempted under Carmack Amendment
Summary of this case from Acuity v. YRC Inc.Opinion
Case No. 1:06CV00679.
June 6, 2006
ORDER OF DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). ORDER
Before this Court is Olympian Moving Storage (hereinafter "Olympian") and Bekins Van Lines, Inc.'s (hereinafter "Bekins") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Cathleen Carr's (hereinafter "Carr") Complaint (Doc. # 3). Having reviewed the motion, response, reply, and applicable law, the Court concludes that the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 17 February 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, alleging state common law claims of breach of contract, Compl. ¶ 13, and negligence, Compl. ¶ 17. Defendants removed the case to this Court on 24 March 2006 and subsequently filed their Motion to Dismiss on 31 March 2006.
This case is based upon claims for breach of contract and negligence stemming from an agreement between Defendants and Carr to move her household belongings from Shaker Heights, Ohio to Wilmington, North Carolina. Compl. ¶ 2. Upon delivery of her household belongings to Wilmington on 14 August 2004, Carr claims Defendants demanded an amount of money in excess of the estimate that was provided to her by the Defendant on 4 August 2004. Compl. ¶ 8. Carr alleges that, upon her refusal to pay the increased amount, Defendants returned her belongings to Ohio and placed them in storage. Comp. ¶ 9 and ¶ 10. Eventually, on 19 August 2004, Carr paid the excess amount plus an additional $18,344.77 for storage and transportation. Comp. ¶ 11 and ¶ 12. Carr alleges that upon re-delivery of her household belongings on or about 23 August 2004, many items were missing or damaged. Comp. ¶ 16. She claims loss and damages in an amount of nearly $50,000.00. Id. On 17 January 2006, Carr, through counsel, sought reimbursement for her loss and damages. Compl. ¶ 19. At some time, Defendants denied this reimbursement claim — the date and whether the denial was written or oral is not set forth. Compl. ¶ 20.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss asserts that Carr's state law claims are subject to complete preemption by 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (hereinafter the "Carmack Amendment"). Carr's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss acknowledges the Carmack Amendment but asserts that although it was not specifically pled, the Complaint somehow put Defendants on notice of a claim under the Carmack Amendment, and therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be denied. For the reasons set forth below, this Court disagrees.
LAW
A motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), questions the sufficiency of the pleadings. No complaint shall be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Pfennig v. Household Credit Servs., 295 F.3d 522, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2002). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court limits its inquiry to the content of the complaint. See Yanacos v. Lake County, 953 F.Supp. 187, 191 (N.D.Ohio 1996). However, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record, and attached exhibits also may be taken into account. Id. The Court may also consider documents referred to in the complaint without thereby converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999). The Court's task is to determine not whether the complaining party will prevail on its claims, but whether it is entitled to offer evidence in support of those claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Court must accept all the allegations stated in the complaint as true and view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); see also Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683. The Court, however, is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).THE CARMACK AMENDMENT
The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, established a uniform national liability policy for interstate carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 14706. This uniform policy allows a shipper anywhere in the United States to recover for loss or damage caused by an interstate carrier. See Id. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Carmack Amendment created uniformity because "the national law is paramount and supersedes all state laws" and as evidence of Congress' intent to "take possession of the subject, and supersede all state regulation with reference to it." Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06, 33 S. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314 (1913). The Sixth Circuit, as well as the Fifth Circuit, has followed Adams Express by holding the Carmack Amendment preempts all state law claims. See Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Carmack Amendment preempts . . . state law claims including breach of contract and negligence); W.D. Lawson Co. v. Penn Cent., 456 F.2d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding the Carmack Amendment preempts common law suits relating to the shipment of goods by interstate carriers); see also Toledo Ticket Co. v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 133 F.3d 439, 441 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating "[Plaintiff's] claim for damages is governed by the [Carmack Amendment], . . . preempting state and common law actions relating to the shipment of goods by interstate carriers.") (citing W.D. Lawson Co., 456 F.2d at 421).
Plaintiff's claims are based on state common law causes of action, not the Carmack Amendment. Plaintiff now argues the Complaint contains "sufficient facts to put Defendants on `fair notice'" creating the specter of a claim under the Carmack Amendment sufficient to withstand Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. This eleventh hour sleight of hand fails. As the court stated inJackson v. Brook Ledge, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 640, 644 (E.D. Ky. 1997), precedent "dictates that the statutory federal remedy provided in the Carmack Amendment . . . precludes a plaintiff from pursuing [his state] common law claims." Brook Ledge, Inc., 991 F. Supp. at 644 (relying on New York, New Haven Hartford R.R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 131, 73 S. Ct. 986, 97 L. Ed. 1500 (1953); Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1413 (7th Cir. 1987).
The Carmack Amendment is the sole remedy available to a shipper seeking damages from a carrier resulting from the interstate shipment of goods. The Amendment is written clearly and has nearly a century of precedent defining its scope. The state common law causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff do not translate magically to a federal claim under the Carmack Amendment; instead, the underlying complaint must explicitly plead claims pursuant to the Carmack Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this matter is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
IT IS SO ORDERED.