Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:00CV94-D-A
September 24, 2001
OPINION
Presently before the court is the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted.
A. Factual Background
The Plaintiff, Sherman Carouthers, began working at the Allsteel plant in Tupelo, Mississippi, in 1991. He began working there as a scheduler, which is a management position that oversees scheduling of two production lines and sets capacities for those work areas. Carouthers continued to work at Allsteel until he resigned in June of 1999.
Carouthers alleges that, during his employment with Allsteel, he was subject to certain remarks and conduct that constituted a hostile work environment, that he was denied promotions, pay increases and discriminated against because of race in violation of Title VII. Carouthers further claims that he was constructively discharged; that is, this alleged conduct forced him to resign as the conditions were intolerable.
Specifically, Carouthers claims that in a supervisor meeting in 1992, Jack Northrup, a co-worker, called him a "black son of a bitch" and referred to him as "you nigger." Carouthers also claims that at that meeting, another co-worker named Truett Powell essentially said that Carouthers was only hired as a "token." Carouthers stated that Northrop also made the comment "you old bonehead" and "you old nigger" to Carouthers approximately two months before Northrop was fired in February of 1996.
Carouthers also cited an instance that occurred "in the mid `90s" involving another co-worker, Sharon Rye, where Rye said to another employee "you saw me working hard like a nigger out in my yard." When Rye realized Carouthers overhead her, she said "Oh, Sherman, I'm so sorry" and she appeared embarrassed. Carouthers also cited an incident where Rye got her hands dirty and gestured to Carouthers while saying "did that black on you rub off on me?" Carouthers admitted that he did not report the last event to any higher management.
In January of 1998, Carouthers was transferred to the position of Scheduler for the Terrace Tile product line. In this position, he reported to Karen Olderog, Allsteel's plant manager. Although Carouthers and Olderog did not have a good working relationship, Carouthers does not claim that Olderog ever made any racial comments to him.
Eventually, Carouthers began seeking another position that would not require direct supervision by Olderog. Carouthers originally sought a position in the Terrace Tile Pack Out Department. Carouthers stated that he spoke with Beth Ray, a Human Resource Assistant, who told him that position would pay about a dollar less an hour than the $11.70 per hour he was making as a scheduler. Carouthers admits that the decision to seek the Terrace Tile Pack-Out position (which was not a management position) was initiated by him. Carouthers indicated in his deposition that his thinking was, at least in part, that the pack out position was "paying about as much . . . and it didn't sound like as hard a job." Mike Dilliard, the Focus Factory Manager, told Carouthers he would be placed in the position of Electrical Pack-Out around July 1998.
Carouthers admitted that he did not talk to Dilliard or Olderog about pay for the Electrical Pack-Out position prior to entering that position. Olderog decided that since Carouthers had no prior experience as a production team member, he would start making between the minimum and the maximum range allowed for the position, and he was paid $9.50 an hour. Carouthers was moved from Scheduler of Terrace Tile to the position of Electrical Pack-Out around July of 1998. Carouthers admitted that no one actually told him he would be paid $10.50 an hour (approximately a dollar less than what he had been making), the rate for Terrace Tile packer, in Electrical Pack-Out. When Carouthers received his first check in Electrical Pack-Out, he spoke to his supervisor, Steve Webb, and told him he thought something was wrong with his check. Webb stated that he would talk to Mike Dilliard about it. Carouthers claims he talked to Mike Dilliard about his compensation, and asked when he was going to be paid the amount Beth Ray told him. Dilliard responded by essentially saying "let's see how you do the first couple of weeks, and we'll discuss it further when it is time for your review." Carouthers stated he never got a review while in the Electrical Pack-Out position.
Carouthers also claims that he applied for three different positions and was never promoted. These positions are Focus Factory Manager (which Carouthers applied for twice), Human Resources Assistant, and Timekeeper. Carouthers also claims that approximately four other non-minority workers who were similarly situated were paid more. Carouthers resigned from Allsteel on July 11, 1999.
Carouthers filed this suit on March 13, 2000, asserting claims for racial harassment and race discrimination in violation of Title VII. On July 13, 2001, Defendant moved for summary judgment.
B. Summary Judgment Standard
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).
C. Discussion
1. Carouthers' Hostile Work Environment claim
First, Carouthers claims that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Specifically, Carouthers asserted that Jack Northrop, who was terminated in 1996, "constantly" made racial comments to him. Carouthers, however, only cited two actual instances, in addition to a couple of other instances of other co-workers making racial comments. When asked when these comments were made, Carouthers could not provide any specific dates, and instead stated only that it was "in the mid `90s." Carouthers has not mentioned a single offensive racial comment that occurred after June 16, 1999.
Title VII requires that plaintiffs file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the allegedly discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Vadie v. Mississippi State University, 218 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 2000). "The period begins to run from the time the complainant knows or reasonably should have known that the challenged act has occurred." Vadie, 218 F.3d at 371. Carouthers filed his charge of discrimination on December 13, 1999. Based on the 180-day time limit, Carouthers concedes that he is barred from bringing a claim of discrimination based on any act which occurred prior to June 16, 1999, which he knew or reasonably should have known constituted alleged racial discrimination unless either the continuing violation theory applies or Carouthers can prove that he was constructively discharged during the requisite time frame. The continuing violation doctrine allows liability to attach for acts outside the statutory 180-day time limit provided that at least one incident occurred within the 180 day time frame. Diggs v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 1:00CV1, 2001 WL 588856, at 2 (N.D.Miss. Jan. 23, 2001). In order to invoke the continuing violation doctrine, the plaintiff must show more than a series of discriminatory acts. He must show "an organized scheme leading to and including a present violation, such that it is the cumulative effect of the discriminatory practice, rather than any discrete occurrence, that gives rise to the cause of action." Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
The court finds that Carouthers' claim for hostile work environment is time barred because he has not alleged a single act of discrimination within the 180-day time period as is required to invoke the continuing violation doctrine. Huckabay, 142 F.3d at 239. As such, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to this claim, and the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Carouthers' Compensation claim
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination with respect to compensation, Carouthers must show that he was paid less than a member of a different race for work requiring substantially the same responsibility. Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981).
In the present case, Carouthers claims, in conclusory fashion, that several similarly situated employees were paid more than Carouthers. However, Carouthers does not indicate how these employees were similarly situated and there is no evidence as to how much they were paid. While this failure alone is sufficient to grant the Defendant's motion for summary judgment, it is also axiomatic that "the mere perpetuation of the effects of time-barred discrimination does not constitute a violation of Title VII in the absence of independent actionable conduct occurring within the statutory period." Huckabay, 142 F.3d at 239. In addition to Carouthers' lack of evidence as to this claim, the court finds that no actionable conduct occurred within the statutory period; the Defendant's motion for summary judgment, therefore, shall be granted as to this claim.
3. Carouthers' Failure to Promote claim
Carouthers also claims that he applied for the following three positions : Focus Factory Manager (which Carouthers applied for twice), Human Resources Assistant, and Timekeeper. Carouthers first applied for Focus Factory Manager in December of 1997, when he was still a scheduler. Around November 29, 1998, Carouthers applied for the Human Resources Assistant job. Dana Looney Grubs, who came from a temp. service, ultimately filled the position. Carouthers again applied for Focus Factory Manager in early March of 1999. Lastly, Carouthers applied for the position of Timekeeper on March 26, 1999. A temporary employee filled that position as well. Even assuming, arguendo, that Carouthers was not promoted to these positions because of his race, it appears that his claim is now time-barred as none of this conduct took place within the 180-day period as required by Title VII. Vadie, 218 F.3d at 371. Therefore, Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted as to this claim.
4. Carouthers' Constructive Discharge claim
In order to establish a claim for constructive discharge, a "plaintiff must establish that working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign." Brown v. Kenney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001). Discrimination alone, without aggravating factors, is not sufficient to establish a claim of constructive discharge. Brown, 237 F.3d at 566. While unlawful discrimination in the form of unequal pay is relevant to determine whether a constructive discharge has occurred, a difference in pay alone cannot constitute such an aggravated situation that a reasonable employee would be forced to resign. Pittman, 644 F.2d at 1077.
In the present case, Carouthers initially sought another job with less responsibility and to get away from the perhaps abrasive management style of Karen Olderog. It appears that Carouthers was willing to be on the production line making approximately $10.50 an hour (which is what Beth Ray told him), but that management thought it would not be a good idea to place Carouthers on the line he previously had responsibility over. Management instead placed him in the Electrical Pack-Out Department, where he began at roughly $9.50 an hour. Carouthers admitted that he did not talk to Dilliard or Olderog about pay for the Electrical Pack-Out position prior to his entering that position and that no one told him how much that particular position paid.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Carouthers has failed to establish that his "working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign." Brown, 237 F.3d at 566. Therefore, the court finds that Carouthers' argument for constructive discharge must fail, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted as to this claim.
D. Conclusion
In sum, Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted. While all legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Based on the fact that Carouthers filed his EEOC charge on December 13, 1999, he is barred from bringing a claim of discrimination based on any act which occurred prior to June 16, 1999, which he knew or reasonably should have known constituted alleged racial discrimination. While the acts Carouthers complains of are certainly not acceptable in a modern society, the court finds that they are more in the nature of isolated employment decisions or work assignments and, if true, the alleged acts had the degree of permanence that should have triggered an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his rights. Furthermore, there is no proof that the hostility between Olderog and Carouthers was because of Carouthers' race, and the court finds that no reasonable juror could find that the present circumstances amounted to such intolerable and aggravated conditions that a reasonable employee would be forced to resign. As such, the court finds that neither the continuing violation doctrine applies nor can a claim for constructive discharge be established. Therefore, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted, and Carouthers' claims shall be dismissed.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
(1) the Defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket entry 18) is GRANTED;
(2) the Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
(3) this case is CLOSED.
All memoranda, depositions, declarations, and other materials considered by the court in ruling on this motion are hereby incorporated into and made a part of the record in this action.
SO ORDERED.