Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-4787 (DMC).
May 21, 2004
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Dennis H. Carmichael's motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7.1(g), of this Court's January 27, 2004 Opinion and Order. This motion was decided without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 7.1(g). After careful review of the parties' submissions and based upon the following, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.
BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2004, this Court denied Plaintiff Dennis H. Carmichael's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering respondents to provide him with a Collection Due Process Hearing with witnesses and the opportunity to record the hearing. On February 3, 2004, Carmichael filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 27, 2004, Order and Opinion pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(g), and filed a second motion for reconsideration on February 19, 2004. The facts in this matter are described in detail in this Court's January 27, 2004, Opinion. Dennis H. Carmichael v. Mark W. Everson, Commissioner Internal Revenue Service, et al., Civil Action No. 03-4787 (D.N.J. January 27, 2004).ANALYSIS
Local Rule 7.1(g) requires the moving party to "set forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the [court] has overlooked." L. Civ. R. 7.1(g). A motion under Rule 7.1(g) may be granted if: (1) "an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) evidence not previously available has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice."Database America, Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising Pub. Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.N.J. 1993); North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir 1995). Relief by way of a motion for reargument is "an extraordinary remedy" that is to be granted "very sparingly." See NL Indus. Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996);Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986). Local Rule 7.1(g) governing reconsideration does not contemplate a recapitulation of arguments considered by the court before rendering its decision. See Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of Am., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 856 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994); Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989). Rather, the rule permits a reconsideration only when "dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law" were presented to the court but were overlooked. See Resorts Int'l v. Great Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992); Khair v. Campbell Soup Co., 893 F. Supp. 316, 337 (D.N.J. 1995). In sum, it is improper on a motion for reconsideration to "ask the Court to rethink what it had already thought through — rightly or wrongly." Oritani Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990).
Here, Petitioner Carmichael has failed to meet the burden imposed upon him by Local Rule 7.1(g). In his two motions for reconsideration, Carmichael does not suggest that an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred. Furthermore, while Carmichael contests the date upon which he received his Notice of Intent to Levy from the Internal Revenue Service, he fails to present any evidence not previously available — he simply reiterates his arguments made in his initial petition. Finally, Carmichael does not point to any clear error of law or manifest injustice to compel this Court to reconsider its prior ruling.
Indeed, Carmichael's motions for reconsideration basically reiterate the arguments that Mr. Carmichael has made in his initial Petition and in his Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. Carmichael also complains of ths Court granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss "with no orals or appearances," but Fed.R.Civ.P. 78 clearly provides the Court with the power to determine "motions without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition." These briefs were provided by both Petitioner and Respondents. It was upon those briefs that this Court made is decision as reflected in the January 27, 2004, Opinion and Order. It appears here that Petitioner Carmichael, apparently dissatisfied with this Court's decisions, wishes to once again posit his arguments. Petitioner has failed, however to indicate any intervening change in the controlling law, new evidence, or clear error of law or manifest injustice. Without more, Petitioner's motion for reconsideration cannot be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Dennis M. Carmichael's motions for reconsideration of this Court's Opinion and Order of January 27, 2004, is denied.