While "the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended or instigated [his] confinement," King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original), "`[a] civilian complainant, by merely seeking police assistance or furnishing information to law enforcement authorities who are then free to exercise their own judgment as to whether an arrest should be made and criminal charges filed, will not be held liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution.'" Carmellino v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 5942 (PKC), 2006 WL 2583019, at *61 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (quoting Levy v. Grandone, 14 A.D.3d 660, 789 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (2d Dep't 2005)), aff'd in part sub nom. Mauskopf v. Dist. 20 of N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 299 Fed.Appx. 100 (2d Cir. 2008) and Papasmiris v. Dist. 20 of N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 299 Fed.Appx. 97 (2d Cir. 2008).

In sum, there is no allegation in the amended complaint that Defendant Noel or any other CAMBA employee arrested or detained Plaintiff. See generally Dkt. No. 27. Section 1983 false arrest liability attaches “to one who causes or directs an arrest or imprisonment in New York” only where “the defendant must have affirmatively induced the officer to act, such as taking an active part in the arrest and procuring it to be made or showing active, officious and undue zeal to the point where the officer is not acting of his own volition.” Carmellino v. Dist. 20 of New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 03-CV-5942 (PKC), 2006 WL 2583019, at *61 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (quoting Curley, 153 F.3d at 5, 13-14); TADCO Const. Corp., 700 F.Supp.2d at 253, 268-69. “To hold a defendant liable as one who affirmatively instigated or procured an arrest, a plaintiff must show that the defendant or its employees did more than merely provide information to the police.” King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1997);

Construing Nnebe's allegations liberally and to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest, see Williams v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 2018 WL 4735713, at *1, the Court finds that she has pled sufficient facts to plausibly suggest the 2019 Reassignment was materially adverse. See Carmellino v. Dist. 20 of N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ 5942 (PKC), 2006 WL 2583019, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (finding that a transfer requiring a teacher to teach “outside her license area . . . if true, would arguably constitute a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of her employment”). Similarly, Nnebe has plausibly alleged that the 3020-a Charges constituted an adverse employment action.

“In the absence of such evidence, other courts have routinely granted or affirmed grants of summary judgment in favor of defendants.” Carmellino v. Dist. 20 of New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 03-cv-5942(PKC), 2006 WL 2583019, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006).

The prospective ramifications and subjective concern regarding the consequences of being issued a counseling memorandum, without supporting evidence, is insufficient to raise an issue of fact on whether the memorandum amounted to an adverse employment action. See Carmellino v. District 20 of New York City Dept. of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 5942 PKC, 2006 WL 2583019, at *48 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that negative letters placed in her file constituted an adverse employment action since they created a permanent record that, according to her belief, would prevent another school from hiring her).

Dancause is consistent with a line of cases in which courts have held that failure to acquire a state-mandated teaching certification renders a plaintiff unqualified for purposes of an employment discrimination claim—a sensible principle, given that an educational institution legally has no discretion in the matter. See Carmellino v. Dist. 20 of New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 03-CV-5942, 2006 WL 2583019, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (collecting cases). But in the present case, the Court confronts the more nuanced inquiry of precisely when a teacher whose lack of a degree did not render her unqualified for at least the first year of her employment, by her employer's standards, ceased being able to perform the essential functions of the position.

Indeed, such allegations are entirely conclusory, and there are no facts from which the court can plausibly infer that Quinones suffered any adverse action after submitting his affidavit. See Carmellino v. Dist. 20 of N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ 5942, 2006 WL 2583019, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) ("To establish a causal relationship between protected activity and adverse employer conduct, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, introduce evidence that the protected activity in question occurred before the adverse employment action."). Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss Quinones' retaliation claim is granted, and the claim is dismissed.

In the context of Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, "'[a] civilian complainant, by merely seeking police assistance or furnishing information to law enforcement authorities who are then free to exercise their own judgment as to whether an arrest should be made and criminal charged filed, will not be held liable for false arrest or malicious prosecution.'" Gonzalez v. Delaware Cty., No. 17-CV-0373, 2017 WL 6001823, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2017) (quoting Carmellino v. District 20 of N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03-CV-5942, 2006 WL 2583019, at *61 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006)). "An officer's independent decision to arrest a suspect normally 'severs the causal connection' between the informant and the arrestee."

The Court further notes that another court in this District has reached the same conclusion as Bailey. See Carmellino v. District 20 of New York City Dept. of Ed., 03 Civ. 5942 (PKC), 2006 WL 2583019, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) ("an employee is not constructively discharged when he or she resigns rather than respond to disciplinary charges."). The reasoning of Bailey equally applies to individual charges contained in a Section 3020-a Notice as well.

As an initial matter, it is unlikely that the 2014 performance review constitutes an "adverse employment action." See e.g., Carmellino v. Dist. 20 of New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 03-cv-5942, 2006 WL 2583019, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) ("[A] negative performance evaluation—without more—does not ordinarily constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of a discrimination claim." (citations omitted)). "