Summary
In Carlisle v. Warren Cty. Budget Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 478, 588 N.E.2d 859, we held that a subdivision was not entitled to mandatory minimum inside millage under R.C. 5705.31(D) if it did not exist during the period from 1929 through 1933.
Summary of this case from Wash. Local Sch. v. Budget CommOpinion
No. 91-148
Submitted November 14, 1991 —
Decided ___, 1992.
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 89-E-282.
The issue in this appeal is the proper allocation of unvoted property tax millage (inside millage) among the four taxing authorities which levied inside millage upon real property located within the village of Carlisle for fiscal year 1990. The Warren County Budget Commission apportioned the available millage as follows:
Warren County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 mills Franklin Township . . . . . . . . . . . 7 mills Carlisle Local School District . . . . 5.8 mills Village of Carlisle . . . . . . . . . . 9 mills
Of the participating entities, only the village of Carlisle was not in existence during the period 1929 through 1933; it was incorporated on January 13, 1971. Prior to its 1989-1990 fiscal year budget request, the Carlisle school district had requested and had been allocated 4.9 mills of the inside millage. The village, during such time, had applied for and had been allocated 1.8 mills. In its 1989-1990 fiscal year budget the school district requested 5.8 mills, which reduced the amount available to the village to .9 mills.
The village appealed to the BTA and entered into stipulations of fact. The BTA identified the legal issue as: "* * * Whether the school district is entitled to levy an unvoted property tax at a rate of 5.8 mills." The BTA found that the school district was so entitled and affirmed the decision of the budget commission.
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Ruppert, Bronson, Chicarelli Smith Co., L.P.A., and David A. Chicarelli, for appellant.
Timothy A. Oliver, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael E. Powell, for appellee.
Section 2, Article XII of the Ohio Constitution established a constitutional limitation on the taxation of property in excess of one percent of its true value without approval of a majority of the electors of a taxing district. The statutory "ten-mill limitation" likewise appears in R.C. 5705.02. Under the mandate of R.C. 5705.31, the budget commission is obligated to approve without modification:
"(D) A minimum levy within the ten-mill limitation for the current expense and debt service of each subdivision or taxing unit, which shall equal two-thirds of the average levy for current expenses and debt service allotted within the fifteen-mill limitation to such subdivision or taxing unit during the last five years the fifteen-mill limitation was in effect unless such subdivision or taxing unit requests an amount requiring a lower rate. * * *"
In Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Lorain Cty. Budget Comm. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 50, 51, 526 N.E.2d 297, 299, we stated:
"Since the fifteen-mill limitation was in effect only from 1929 through 1933, the formula to determine a subdivision's minimum guaranteed millage is the average of all the levies for current expenses and debt service allotted for those five years multiplied by two-thirds. R.C. 5705.31(D). Unless the subdivision requests an amount requiring a lower rate, this is the millage that a subdivision in existence in those years should receive." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, we interpreted the statute as guaranteeing a minimum levy inside the millage. See, also, Cambridge City School Dist. v. Guernsey Cty. Budget Comm. (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 77, 42 O.O.2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 512, paragraph two of the syllabus, as adopted from the appellate decision below, 11 Ohio App.2d 77, 40 O.O.2d 239, 228 N.E.2d 874.
In response to appellant's contention regarding the inequity or lack of fairness with respect to subdivisions not in existence during the period 1929-1933, the BTA observed that the "newly incorporated entities" were "on prior notice of the millage which remains available within the constitutional limitation." The BTA then pointed out that the newly incorporated entities had recourse available in that they could request the voters to approve a levy outside the ten-mill limitation or they could petition the General Assembly for legislative change in the statutory formula. The BTA refused to make changes of a legislative nature.
We agree with the BTA's conclusion. Its finding was neither unreasonable nor unlawful and it is affirmed.
Decision affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.