Opinion
1740 MDA 2022 J-A27036-23
01-12-2024
GREGG CARIGNAN Appellant v. ROSE WELLER LIDDINGTON, THOMAS WELLER, SHANA MARIE MINIUM, LEON M. MINIUM AND OTHER UNKNOWN ACCOMPLICES
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered November 28, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County Civil Division at No(s): CV-494-2021
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM
STEVENS, P.J.E.
Gregg Carignan appeals pro se from the order entered on November 23, 2022, in the Snyder County Court of Common Pleas. Upon review, we quash Appellant's appeal for the reasons set forth below.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On December 18, 2019, Appellant filed a complaint pro se against Rose Weller Liddington. He alleged that he and Liddington had an agreement in which Appellant assisted Liddington in setting up flea markets. The relationship between Appellant and Liddington deteriorated, but items of Appellant's personal property, including equipment and vehicles, were stored on Liddington's property. Appellant sought the return of that property. By order dated December 23, 2019, the court prohibited the destruction of Appellant's property. The parties reached an agreement regarding the return of property, and by order dated March 24, 2020, the court provided Appellant the opportunity to enter Liddington's property and remove specific items. The court entered a final order on June 24, 2020, which specifically states, "The Plaintiff having not identified any further property that he seeks to retrieve from the Defendant's property, this matter is closed." No appeal was taken from that final order.
On December 15, 2022, Appellant filed a complaint pro se against Rose Weller Liddington, her son Thomas Weller, two other named defendants, and "unknow [sic] accumplisses [sic] the defendants have refused to divolage [sic]." He alleged again that he and Liddington had an agreement, but the relationship deteriorated, and he now seeks damages for property he alleges was removed and not available to be returned. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on January 10, 2022, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 on the basis of the parties' prior action. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, agreeing that the action by Appellant against defendant Rose Liddington regarding his personal property left at her residence has been litigated and cannot proceed. We agree.
We review the claim that the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint under the following standard:
To the extent that the question presented involves interpretation of rules of civil procedure, our standard of review is de novo. To the extent that this question involves an exercise of the trial
court's discretion in granting [a] "motion to dismiss," our standard of review is abuse of discretion.
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow legal procedure.Sigall v. Serrano, 17 A.3d 946, 949 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Rule 233.1. Frivolous Litigation. Pro Se Plaintiff. Motion to Dismiss
(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that
(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related defendants, and
(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.
* * *
(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se litigation against the same or related defendants raising the same or related claims without leave of court.Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a), (c) (bold title in original).
As previously stated, in the prior action docketed at CV 629-2019, as well as herein, Appellant acted pro se. In both cases, Appellant raised similar causes of action against the same or related defendants. Appellant now essentially alleges additional instances arising out of the same set of circumstances that led to the previous litigation where the defendants failed to preserve and return his property, alleging they "stole and sold [it] off." Amend. Comp. ¶ 21. We further observe that the claims in the previous case were resolved pursuant to an agreement or court proceeding, i.e., a settlement agreement during the court proceedings and a final order closing the case.
Thus, the parties and claims in the previous court action and the present case were sufficiently related to inform the trial court that Appellant's current claim has been considered and resolved. Appellant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1.
We note that even if Appellant's claims were not barred by Pa.R.C.P. 223.1, Appellant's brief would be dismissed for failure to adhere to the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although this Court will "liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, [an] appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because he lacks legal training." Elliot-Greenleaf, P.C. v. Rothstein, 255 A.3d 539, 542 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Here, Appellant noted an apology in his brief stating, "Carignan apologizes as to the format, computer to printer interface print problems the overall brief construction and lack of more case law. Carignan injuries and the time constraints for this filing was too much to overcome." See Appellant's Br. The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure mandate that a brief submitted by a party - whether counseled or pro se - "shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of [the] rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit[.]" Pa.R.A.P. 2101. If the defects in the brief are substantial, "the appeal…may be quashed or dismissed." Id. "The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority." Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305, 319 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
Here, Appellant raised sixteen issues, some with multiple subparts. While Appellant attempted to structure his brief to comply with the Rules, he has provided this Court with no developed, coherent argument. He cites minimal caselaw and pastes entire rules of procedure with committee comments included, spanning multiple pages of his brief. He includes an incomplete table of contents, no table of authorities, and no numbered pages. He provides what he titled "List prejudicial conduct" of reasons he was prejudiced which includes no complete sentences, let alone a developed argument. He repeatedly cites to a transcript that is not included in the certified record because it is of testimony from the 2020 case, not because the Court of Common Pleas or prothonotary did not fulfil its obligations, as Appellant claims. See Appellant's Response Br. He complains of issues arising from the previous litigation which resulted in a final order from which Appellant failed to appeal. "This Court's appellate function is to correct legal errors made by the trial court. It is not our duty or our prerogative to give pro se litigants a 'do over,' based upon their ignorance of the judicial system or our Rules of Appellate Procedure." Commonwealth v. Hoffman, No. 1288 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 1743018, at *2 (Pa. Super. 5/3/21) (unpublished memorandum). Indeed, we have observed, "any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing." Elliott-Greenleaf, P.C., 255 A.2d at 542 (citation omitted).
Appeal quashed.
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.