Opinion
2012-01-31
CARI, LLC, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. 415 GREENWICH FEE OWNER, LLC, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Bryan Cave LLP, New York (Noah M. Weissman of counsel), for appellant. Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, New York (Ronald S. Greenberg and Scott Ruskay–Kidd of counsel), for respondents.
Bryan Cave LLP, New York (Noah M. Weissman of counsel), for appellant. Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, New York (Ronald S. Greenberg and Scott Ruskay–Kidd of counsel), for respondents.
TOM, J.P., SWEENY, DeGRASSE, ABDUS–SALAAM, MANZANET–DANIELS, JJ.
Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L. Schweitzer, J.), entered June 16, 2011, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the first amended complaint and denied plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
The contracts' termination provision provided that plaintiff could cancel the agreement for any reason and obtain the return of its deposit with interest, so long as it provided written notice to defendant sponsor no later than 10 days before closing. The court correctly determined that the termination provision rendered the contracts unenforceable for lack of mutual consideration ( see Dorman v. Cohen, 66 A.D.2d 411, 415, 418, 413 N.Y.S.2d 377 [1979] ).
The obligation to provide written notice of termination does not constitute consideration where, as here, termination occurs immediately upon notice, and not after some specified period of time ( see Allen v. WestPoint–Pepperell, Inc., 1996 WL 2004, *3 n. 5, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6, *8 n. 5 [S.D.N.Y.1996]; cf. Dorman, 66 A.D.2d at 419, 413 N.Y.S.2d 377, citing McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 App.Div. 62, 68, 117 N.Y.S. 775 [1909], affd. 198 N.Y. 143, 91 N.E. 516 [1910] ). The termination provision is enforceable and cannot be severed, even though it renders the contracts void ( see Ying–Qi Yang v. Shew–Foo Chin, 42 A.D.3d 320, 839 N.Y.S.2d 90 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 812, 846 N.Y.S.2d 602, 877 N.E.2d 652 [2007] ). Plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim fails because it does not allege “a duty independent of the [contracts]” ( Celle v. Barclays Bank P.L.C., 48 A.D.3d 301, 303, 851 N.Y.S.2d 500 [2008] ).
The court properly denied leave to file a second amended complaint, where the proposed amendment “suffers from the same fatal deficiency as the original claims”—namely, the lack of mutual consideration (“ J. Doe No. 1” v. CBS Broadcasting Inc., 24 A.D.3d 215, 216, 806 N.Y.S.2d 38 [2005] ).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.