Opinion
No. 3:02-CV-2701-H
February 4, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Texas Tech University's Amended Motion to Transfer Venue, filed January 10, 2003; Plaintiffs Jaime Cardenas-Garcia and Jahan Rasty's Response to Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue, filed January 24, 2003; and Defendant's Reply thereto, filed January 31, 2003. Upon review of the pleadings, Parties' briefs, and relevant authorities, the Court is of the opinion for the reasons stated below that Defendant's Motion should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Defendant Texas Tech University on December 17, 2002 in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas, alleging employment discrimination. Plaintiffs' causes of action include: national origin discrimination and harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), retaliation, and violations of Plaintiffs' rights of due process. (Pls.' Original Compl. at 14-17). Defendant filed a Motion to Transfer Venue to the Lubbock Division of the U.S. Court for the Northern District of Texas on January 9, 2003, and filed the Amended Motion to Transfer Venue on January 10, 2003.
II. ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit has recently addressed the importance of the special venue provisions adopted by Congress for Title VII cases in In Re: Horseshoe Entertainment, 305 F.3d 354 (2002). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(3). In that case, the Circuit held that in an analysis of venue in a Title VII cause of action, a district court must determine whether or not the judicial district for which transfer is sought qualifies for venue under Title VII as a "judicial district where the civil action `might have been brought.'" In Re: Horseshoe Entertainment, 305 F.3d at 357. Following 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) the Circuit found that venue is proper in any judicial district in the state where: (1) "the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed"; (2) "the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered"; (3) "the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice"; and (4) "the respondent has his principal office." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)).
In that case the Circuit also held that the special provisions for venue in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) do not exclude general statutory venue provisions from being applicable in Title
VII causes of action. Therefore, if the above Title VII special provisions test is met for a district in question, a district court then may consider whether the "`convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice' requires a district court to transfer [the case]." In Re: Horseshoe Entertainment, 305 F.3d at 357 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
In the instant case Texas Tech is requesting a transfer of venue from the Dallas Division to the Lubbock Division of the Northern District of Texas. The Plaintiff has rightly pointed out that In Re: Horseshoe Entertainment is directly applicable to transfers of venue between judicial districts, not divisions. The Court finds that because the Fifth Circuit made clear that a district court is to pay close attention to the special factors set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) for Title VII causes of action, the principles for Title VII causes of action articulated in that case are instructive for motions to transfer venue within districts also. In Re: Horseshoe Entertainment, 305 F.3d at 359. The Court first looks to whether the Lubbock Division meets the criteria set forth under the special venue provisions of Title VII articulated in In Re: Horseshoe Entertainment, and then decides whether in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses the case should be transferred to the Lubbock Division. See Crumrine v. Neg Micon USA, Inc., 104 F. Supp.2d 1123, 1126 (N.D. Iowa, 2000) (noting that factors identified for determining transfer from one district to another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for the convenience of the parties may be used in deciding intra-district venue questions).
A. Title VII Special Venue Provisions
Defendant argues that the Lubbock Division of the Northern District of Texas is the proper venue under the Title VII provisions because: (1) all of the decisions which the Plaintiffs allege to be discriminatory occurred in Lubbock, (2) all records relevant to the case are maintained and administered in Lubbock, (3) Plaintiffs worked in Lubbock at all relevant times, and (4) Texas Tech maintains its principle office in Lubbock. (Defs Am. Mot. to Trans. Venue at 1-2). Further, it argues that Plaintiff Rasty's teaching in Dallas is only "occasional" and not a "significant part of his position at Texas Tech" — not "impacting his annual reviews, raises, [or] promotions." ( Id. at 4-5).
Plaintiffs argue that not all of the alleged unlawful employment practices took place in Lubbock. (Pls.' Resp. to Def's Mot. at 5). According to Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Rasty's classes in Dallas constituted twenty to thirty-three percent of his teaching activities. (Pls.' Letter to the Court, filed January 31, 2003).
The Plaintiffs do not deny Defendant's contention that the Lubbock Division is appropriate for venue under the Title VII provisions, except to say that Plaintiff Rasty taught part-time in Dallas. Specifically, they do not argue that any of the allegedly unlawful actions took place in Dallas.
The Court finds that the Lubbock Division clearly is appropriate for venue under the Title VII provisions as a division where the civil action "might have been brought," and that it clearly surpasses the Dallas Division in that regard. In Re: Horseshoe Entertainment, 305 F.3d at 357.
B. The Convenience/Justice Test
Next the Court determines whether the case must be transferred to the Lubbock Division for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Fifth Circuit has held that the special venue factors included in Title VII indicate that Congress thought employment discrimination controversies should be litigated within venues that had "direct and immediate connection with the parties, the events and the evidence bearing on their controversy." In Re: Horseshoe Entertainment, 305 F.3d at 359.
Defendant argues that the action should be transferred to the Lubbock Division for the sake of the convenience of the parties. (Def.'s Am. Mot. at 3-5). Specifically, it argues that each of the persons alleged to have engaged in the allegedly unlawful acts resides in Lubbock; none of the alleged discriminatory actions took place in Dallas; none of the employment records at issue are located in Dallas; Plaintiff Rasty resides in Lubbock; all key witnesses reside in Lubbock; and Texas Tech is located in Lubbock. ( Id.).
Plaintiffs point to the facts that not all parties or witnesses currently reside in Lubbock: Plaintiff Cardenas-Garcia now resides in Maryland, and "President Schmidly has sought another position at Oklahoma State University." (Pls.' Resp. at 5-6).
The Court finds that although the Plaintiffs have alleged some facts which show that Dallas has a direct and immediate connection with the parties, the overwhelming weight of the undisputed facts point to the Lubbock Division as the proper venue for this case for the convenience of the parties and the witnesses, and in the interest of justice.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the Lubbock Division of the Northern District of Texas is appropriate for venue under the Title VII special provisions, and in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses this case should be heard in the Lubbock Division.
The Court therefore GRANTS the Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue.
Accordingly, by the authority of 28 § 1404(a) this cause in TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Lubbock Division.
SO ORDERED.