Opinion
14-P-225
12-11-2014
ANTHONY J. CARACCIOLO, JR. v. ARBELLA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff appeals from the summary judgment for the defendant. We review a motion for summary judgment de novo and determine "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Caron v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 218, 221 (2013) (citation omitted). "[A] party moving for summary judgment in a case in which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial is entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrates . . . that the party opposing the motion has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of that party's case." Lambert v. Fleet Natl. Bank, 449 Mass. 119, 123 (2007). The defendant argues that based upon the undisputed facts the plaintiff's claims are barred by a general release that was signed in May of 2005, or alternatively, by the statute of limitations. We agree.
"As is often the case, a [general] release may be prompted by the settlement of a specific dispute or resolution of a specific issue, but broad wording in the release operates to settle all other, unrelated matters, even if they were not specifically in the parties' minds at the time the [general] release was executed." Eck v. Godbout, 444 Mass. 724, 728 (2005). "A 'claim' arises at the time of the 'underlying incident' giving rise to the claim." Id. at 730, quoting from Sword & Shield Restaurant, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 832, 833 (1981). The plaintiff makes three claims in his complaint. The first two claims are premised on alleged actions or inactions by the defendant surrounding the settlement negotiations, which occurred before the release was signed. The third claim is based upon the injuries that the plaintiff sustained in the motor vehicle accident that was at issue in the settlement. All three claims are barred by the release.
To the extent that the plaintiff is now arguing that the release was induced by fraud, that argument is not supported by evidence in the summary judgment record.
Even if the claims were not barred by the general release, they are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for bringing an action "arising on account of violations of any law intended for the protection of consumers" is four years. G. L. c. 260, § 5A, inserted by St. 1975, c. 432, § 2. The settlement occurred in 2005. The plaintiff filed for bankruptcy in 2005. In 2006, the plaintiff began being insured by the defendant. At that point, the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the alleged injury by the defendant. See Lambert v. Fleet Natl. Bank, supra at 126. This action was filed in September of 2012.
To the extent that the plaintiff is making claims that sound in tort, the statute of limitations is shorter, three years, and as a result any such claims would also be barred. G. L. c. 260, § 2A.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Kafker, Trainor & Milkey, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
--------
Clerk Entered: December 11, 2014.