Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-2169
06-28-2019
FRANK JAMES CAPOZZI, SR., Plaintiff v. WARDEN TIM BETTI, et al Defendants
(RAMBO, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se civil rights action, initiated upon the filing of the original complaint in this matter by Plaintiff Frank James Capozzi, Sr. on November 27, 2017. (Doc. 1). In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts his cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple Defendants. (Doc. 1). Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 27). For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends the motion be granted. I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Frank James Capozzi, Sr. ("Capozzi" or "Plaintiff") filed the complaint, along with a motion to proceed in forrma pauperis, on December 29, 2017. (Doc. 1); (Doc. 2). At the time he filed his complaint, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Lackawanna County Prison ("LCP"). (Doc. 1, at 1). Liberally construing this pro se complaint, Plaintiff seeks to invoke his right to access to the courts.
The Court granted Capozzi's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on July 3, 2018. (Doc. 16, at 1).
As Defendants, Plaintiff names 1) Tim Betti, Warden at LCP; 2) David Langan, Deputy Warden at LCP; 3) Mari Fanlon, Facility Coordinator at LCP; and 4) the Prison Committee Board of Scranton City Council ("Board") (collectively referred to as "Defendants"). (Doc. 1, at 2 ¶ III(1-4)). Plaintiff alleges the Board is responsible for management and oversight at LCP. (Doc. 1, at 2 ¶ III(4)). As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from each named Defendant. (Doc. 1, at 3 ¶ V(2)). Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief regarding improvements to LCP's law library and LCP's internal grievance system. (Doc. 1, at 3 ¶ V(1);(3)).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that, in May of 2017, he met with Jerry Dempsey ("Dempsey"), the Warden's administrative assistant regarding a lack of resources in LCP's law library. (Doc. 1, at 2 ¶ IV(1)). Specifically, Plaintiff detailed to Dempsey a networking issue and his difficulties with saving work. (Doc. 1, at 2 ¶ IV(1)). Plaintiff suggested that LCP consider purchasing thumb drives to increase the storage space for inmates to save their work. (Doc. 1, at 2 ¶ IV(1)). Dempsey indicated that LCP was looking into this possibility, but at the time Plaintiff filed this action the difficulties with saving work and networking persisted. (Doc. 1, at 1-2 ¶ IV(1)). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that thumb drives are available to inmates at another prison. (Doc. 1, at 5 ¶ IV(7)).
Plaintiff's complaint does not name Dempsey as a Defendant.
Plaintiff claims that, even after his conversation with Dempsey, the resources in LCP's law library continued to deteriorate. (Doc. 1, at 2 ¶ IV(2)). There were only four networked computers to be shared between twelve or sixteen inmates (Doc. 1, at 5 ¶ IV(5)). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges the law library's use of Lexis Nexis makes his research difficult, as that program is not user-friendly. (Doc. 1, at 6 ¶ IV(8)). Plaintiff would prefer West Law, which he suggests is easier to use. (Doc. 1, at 6 ¶ IV(8)).
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges there were no books, typewriters, or trained assistants to help prisoners research the law. (Doc. 1, at 3 ¶ IV(2)). On September 30, 2017, a computer monitor "fried out" and Plaintiff was unable to access his work. (Doc. 1, at 3 ¶ IV(3)). Plaintiff unplugged and re-plugged the monitor, but that did not rectify the problem. (Doc. 1, at 3 ¶ IV(3)). Therefore, he was unable to meet his pro se deadline of October 3, 2017, in an unspecified action. (Doc. 1, at 3 ¶ IV(3)).
Defendants submitted a motion to dismiss on September 4, 2018. (Doc. 27). Defendants docketed a brief in support of that motion on September 6, 2018. (Doc. 28). To date, Plaintiff has not submitted a brief in opposition to the pending motion to dismiss.
Local Rule 7.6 provides, in pertinent part:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.
Although the motion may be deemed unopposed, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted "without an analysis of the merits of the underlying complaint, notwithstanding local rules regarding the granting of unopposed motions." Ray v. Reed, 240 F. App'x 455, 456 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)).
The pending motion to dismiss is ripe for disposition. II. DISCUSSION
A. MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 12(B)(6)
A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 also requires a "showing that 'the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. If a complaint fails to comply with the threshold pleading requirements of Rule 8, a defendant may move for its dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Sally-Harriet v. Northern Children Svcs., No.CV 17-4695, 2019 WL 1384275, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2019) ("[a] motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Assoc'd. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Further, in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Indeed, "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Accordingly, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted, and should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In addition to the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, the Court may also consider "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, pro se plaintiffs are still subject to the base pleading requirements of Rule 8. Rhett v. NJ State Superior Court, 260 F. App'x 513 (3d Cir. 2008).
B. CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff's complaint asserts federal civil rights claim(s) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a private cause of action with respect to violations of federal constitutional rights. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995).
C. ACCESS TO THE COURTS CLAIM
1. Failure to state a claim
Defendants assert Plaintiff's allegations do not state an access to the courts claim. (Doc. 28, at 3). Specifically, Defendants argue the Supreme Court's case law "did not create a freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, so an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injuries simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense." (Doc. 28, at 3). According to Defendants, Plaintiff "does not explain how his many suggested changes resulted in an actual injury to him." (Doc. 28, at 4).
Prisoners maintain a "fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts," embodied in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)); see also Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) ("[u]nder the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain a right of access to the courts"). This right includes the provision of resources that allow inmates to present valid claims to the judiciary. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-55. "Where prisoners assert that defendants' actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an 'actual injury'—that they lost a chance to pursue a 'nonfrivolous' or 'arguable' underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other 'remedy that may be awarded as recompense' for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit." Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205 (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)); see also Isom v. Donate, No. CIV 4:CV-07-0946, 2008 WL 4609994, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2008) (finding that, with respect to complaints of inadequate law libraries, a litigant's right of access to the courts is not violated unless he alleges an actual injury to his ability to litigate a claim). "An inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Rather, "[t]he complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is 'more than mere hope,' and it must describe the 'lost remedy.'" Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06 (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415-16). Ultimately, the constitutional right to access to the courts is "ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court... it follows that the underlying cause of action... is an element that must be described in the complaint." Christopher 536 U.S. at 415.
The basis of this right, under either the First or Fourteenth Amendment, does not alter the Court's foregoing constitutional analysis. See Rauso v. Zimmerman, No. CIV A 397-CV-1841, 2006 WL 3717785, at *4 n. 14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2006).
Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts. Aside from a single reference to a missed deadline, Plaintiff fails to identify a specific legal proceeding that has been frustrated by the allegedly deficient law library resources at LCP. See Isom, 2008 WL 4609994, at *3 ("the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation"). Instead, Plaintiff conveys his dissatisfaction with the library's subpar resources in a "theoretical sense," and does not demonstrate a nonfrivolous claim in relation to his past or current litigation efforts. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415; see also Riley v. Kuzar, No. 3:CV-17-0516, 2017 WL 4931691, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2017) (dismissing access to the court claim when plaintiff failed to plead a "lost chance to pursue a non-frivolous claim"). As he has not adequately alleged an actual injury from the purportedly inadequate law library at LCP, Plaintiff has failed to state a denial of his constitutional right of access to the courts, and the Court recommends granting Defendants' motion to dismiss on this basis.
2. Lack of Personal Involvement
In moving to dismiss, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to allege personal involvement with respect to his alleged constitutional deprivations. (Doc. 28, at 5). Specifically, Defendants submit that "Plaintiff does not allege the personal involvement of any of the Defendants in the fortuitous breakdown of the computer monitor, which allegedly led to the Plaintiff missing a filing deadline." (Doc. 28, at 5). "A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Moore v. Mann, No. 3:CV-13-2771, 2015 WL 3755045, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2015) (citing Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.2005); Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249-50 (3d Cir.2003)) ("[p]ersonal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing is necessary for the imposition of liability in a civil rights action").
Plaintiff does not attribute the computer monitor's malfunction, which caused the missed deadline, to any person; instead he simply states that the monitor he was using in LCP's law library "fried out." (Doc. 1, at 3 ¶ IV(3)). Moreover, Plaintiff only mentions a named Defendant in one sentence of his complaint, when he avers that Dempsey told Plaintiff that Deputy Warden Langan was investigating the possibility of acquiring thumb drives for use in LCP's law library. (Doc. 1, at 2 ¶ IV(1)).
Plaintiff does not elaborate on how Deputy Warden Langan's investigating the possibility of LCP acquiring thumb drives relates to his access to the courts claim. The inability to save work, attributable to a lack of resources available in LCP's law library, could plausibly inhibit a prisoner's ability to present claims to the judiciary, but even assuming Plaintiff alleged Deputy Warden Langan failed to provide adequate storage capacity for work done in LCP's law library, Plaintiff still has not alleged a non-frivolous underlying claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. Plaintiff fails to allege personal involvement on the part of any named Defendant with regard to his access to the courts claim. As such, the Court recommends granting the motion to dismiss on this additional basis.
D. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Third Circuit has also acknowledged that a district court has "substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend." Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000). It is recommended that Plaintiff be given the opportunity to file an amended complaint that is complete in all respects and cures the pleading deficiencies identified herein.
The amended complaint must be a unified pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original complaint. Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). The amended complaint should further specify the claims Plaintiff wishes to bring, who he wishes to allege each claim against, and the specific facts that show each Defendant's liability for each claim. Boyd v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 583 F. App'x 30, 32 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2374 (2015). Insofar as Plaintiff intends to brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the amended complaint must additionally establish the existence of actions taken by the Defendants which have resulted in constitutional deprivations, and specify which actions are alleged as to which Defendants. As a final matter, the amended complaint should be limited to those claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and that have questions of law or fact in common to all the named Defendants and claims. III. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that:
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) be GRANTED, as the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);
2. Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint, that clarifies the bases of his claims and cures the pleading deficiencies outlined herein, within thirty (30) days upon the disposition of this Report and Recommendation; and
3. The matter be referred to the undersigned for further proceedings.
Dated: June 28, 2019
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated June 28, 2019.
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Dated: June 28, 2019
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge