Opinion
J-A27023-18 No. 25 EDA 2018
03-15-2019
FELIX CAPONE Appellant v. AMERICAN HERITAGE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered November 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No.: No. 2014-04724 BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE, and McLAUGHLIN, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:
Appellant Felix Capone appeals from the November 20, 2017 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County ("trial court"), which granted Appellee American Heritage Federal Credit Union's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Appellant's amended complaint. Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. As recounted by the trial court:
In May of 2008, Appellant's daughter, Jillian Moyer, opened an account with Appellee and began the process of applying for a loan. On May 28, 2008, Appellant transmitted a letter to Appellee verifying that Moyer worked for him and her weekly salary. The letter stated that Appellant was vice president and part owner of a company named "Casualty Restoration and Construction Management, Inc." that Moyer was employed by this company since April 2004, and that she was paid a gross weekly salary of $1,250. Based on this letter, Appellee approved Moyer for a
$5,000 loan that listed Appellant as a co-signer. Appellant later admitted in his disposition that the information contained in the letter Appellant sent to Appellee regarding Moyer's employment was entirely false.
Appellee subsequently increased the line of credit three times, through three separate agreements, to $11,000. The credit line increase agreements contain the signature of "Felix J. Capone".
Moyer eventually defaulted on the loan. Moyer accepted a "Request for Hardship Extension", which also contained the signature of "Felix J. Capone". As of January 2013, Moyer was still delinquent in repaying the amounts owed on the credit line. Appellant alleges that at this time, Appellee began misapplying payments Appellant had made on his car loan to Moyer's loan.
Appellant contends that he had no knowledge of the credit line increases, that he did not sign the increase, and that Moyer forged his signature on the documents authorizing the increases. On July 11, 2014, Appellant commenced this action, claiming a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL")[, 73 P.S. § 201-1, et seq.], fraud, and breach of contract. On July 21, 2014, Appellant filed an amended complaint.
On February 25, 2015, Appellant file[d] a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint to include claims of a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress, negligent infliction of mental and emotional distress, conversion, and intentional tort. On April 7, 2015, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. On [September 1], 2015, th[e trial c]ourt denied Appellant's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Also[,] on [September 1], 2015, [the trial court] denied Appellee's motion for summary judgment without prejudice, permitting Appellee to refile upon completion of discovery.
The parties continued to engage in discovery until June 5, 2017[,] when Appellee filed its second motion for summary judgment. Appellee argued that summary judgment is appropriate as to all three of Appellant's claims. First, Appellee contended that Appellant's UTPCPL claim failed because he lacked standing under the UTPCPL and that even if he had standing, Appellant failed to prove the elements of justifiable reliance or offer evidence of fraudulent or deceptive conduct. Second,
Appellee argued that Appellant's fraud claim failed because Appellant did not provide any evidence of fraud. Finally, Appellee contended that summary judgment was appropriate as to Appellant's breach of contract claim, because Appell[ant] lacked standing and failed to offer evidence to establish the required elements of the cause of action.Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/18, at 1-3 (record citations and unnecessary capitalizations omitted).
[The trial court] held oral argument on Appellee's motion for summary judgment on November 14, 2017. On November [20], 2017, [the trial court] granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment. On December 18, 2017, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Following receipt of the notice of appeal, [the trial court] directed Appellant [to file] a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on or before January 5, 2018. [Appellant complied. In response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.]
On appeal, Appellant raises four issues for our review.
[I.] Has the [trial] court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment in favor of a financial institution accused of forgery and fraud by declaring "forgery allegations ma[k]e proving the element of justifiable reliance [by the consumer plaintiff] . . . under the UTPCPL impossible"?
[II.] Has the court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment in favor of movant financial institution thus dismissing non-movant's common law fraud claims where the record unarguably shows movant's loan officers participated in the fraud and forgery on non-movant by bearing false witness to the forged signature of Appellant on numerous loan documents?
[III.] Is the [trial] court's finding that the non-movant's breach of contract claims "appears to be specific to [] subsequent agreements . . . rather than to the original loan contract" a deliberate disregard of record facts and therefore an abuse of discretion?
[IV.] As a final order, now that the [trial] court order granting summary judgment dismissed all claims in the action, was the
interlocutory order of September 1, 2015 denying [Appellant's] motion for leave to file a second amended complaint for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, intentional and negligent infliction of mental and emotional distress an error of law and an abuse of discretion?Appellant's Brief at 7-10 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted).,
Appellee argues Appellant failed to preserve his issues for our review because he did not raise them before the trial court. Although Appellee is correct that Appellant's issues do not mirror the issues raised in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, we nonetheless decline to find them waived. Appellant's issues appear to be subsumed by the issues raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement, as quoted in the trial court's Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/18, at 3-4.
Appellee aptly points out that Appellant's brief includes and relies upon documents, specifically the "Supplemental Record of Slaboda Deposition," that are outside of the certified record. Appellee's Brief at 18. We agree. In Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109 A.3d 682 (Pa. Super. 2014), we explained:
[t]he law of Pennsylvania is well settled that matters which are not of record cannot be considered on appeal. Thus, an appellate court is limited to considering only the materials in the certified record when resolving an issue. In this regard, our law is the same in both the civil and criminal context because, under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, any document which is not part of the officially certified record is deemed non-existent—a deficiency which cannot be remedied merely by including copies of the missing documents in a brief or in the reproduced record.Parr , 109 A.3d at 695 (internal citations omitted). As such, we may not consider the Slaboda deposition Appellant relies upon on appeal.
We review a challenge to the entry of summary judgment as follows:
[We] may disturb the order of the trial court only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.
In evaluating the trial court's decision to enter summary judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the summary judgment rule. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2. The rule [provides] that where there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Lastly, we will review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.E.R. Linde Const. Corp. v. Goodwin , 68 A.3d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted; brackets in original) (emphasis added).
After careful review of the record and the relevant case law, we conclude that the trial court accurately and thoroughly addressed the merits of Appellant's claims. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/18, at 5-11. Appellant's UTPCPL claim fails because he did not offer any evidence to establish justifiable reliance. See Kern v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 108 A.3d 1282, 1289-90 (Pa. Super. 2015) ("[J]ustifiable reliance is an element of private actions under Section 201-9.2 of the UTPCPL. As such, [the a]ppellant had to demonstrate that he . . . justifiably relied on [the a]ppellee's alleged violations of the UTPCPL and, as a result of those alleged violations, suffered an ascertainable loss."). Appellant admitted that he had no knowledge of the credit line increases, that he did not sign the increases, and that his signatures on those increases were forgeries. Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/18, at 7. Similarly, Appellant's fraud claim lacks merit. Appellant failed to establish any evidence that Appellee committed fraud sub judice. See id . at 7-8 (On the contrary, Appellant has "admitted that his daughter had herself forged his signature on the documents in question."). Moreover, Appellant cannot establish a breach of contract because he emphatically denied signing the documents relating to the credit line increases. Id. at 9 ("As Appellant acknowledged that he did not sign these additional agreements, he could not assert a breach of contract claim based on these increases[.]"). Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint because the additional causes of action Appellant sought to raise were time-barred. Id. at 9-11; see Shiflett v. Lehigh Valley Health Network , Inc., 174 A.3d 1066, 1083 (Pa. Super. 2017) ("[i]t is axiomatic that a party may not plead a new cause of action in an amended complaint when the new cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations at the time the amended complaint is filed"), appeal granted in part , 191 A.3d 745 (Pa. 2018). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's November 20, 2017 order granting Appellee's summary judgment motion. We further direct that a copy of the trial court's January 24, 2018 opinion be attached to any future filings in this case.
Although we decline to find waiver, we note with disapproval that Appellant failed to develop his third issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; see also Umbelina v. Adams , 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating "where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived[]") (citation omitted), appeal denied , 47 A.3d 848 (Pa. 2012).
TCPF Ltd. P'ship v. Skatell , 976 A.2d 571, 574 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting that we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to cases challenging a trial court's denial a motion to amend).
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/15/19
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