Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Reasbeck

10 Citing cases

  1. Singer v. Jones

    173 Wis. 2d 191 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 27 times
    Applying two-tiered standard of review to grant of constructive trust on summary judgment: de novo as to summary judgment and "abuse of discretion standard as to the trial court's ultimate decision to grant the equitable relief of a constructive trust"

    Duhame, 154 Wis.2d at 263, 453 N.W.2d at 151; Parge, 159 Wis.2d at 178-79, 464 N.W.2d at 218-19. We acknowledge that in Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis.2d 332, 479 N.W.2d 247 (Ct.App. 1991), the court of appeals reviewed a summary judgment ruling in a constructive trust case under the de novo standard. Id. at 336, 479 N.W.2d at 249.

  2. U.S. v. Tracts 10 11 of Lakeview Heights, TX

    51 F.3d 117 (8th Cir. 1995)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that, in the forfeiture context, "personal property . . . is generally susceptible of a broader definition of 'ownership' than is real property."

    However, the Johnsons have not proven the two elements of a constructive trust under Wisconsin law: (1) unjust enrichment (2) obtained or retained by unconscionable conduct. Wilharms v. Wilharms, 93 Wis.2d 671, 287 N.W.2d 779, 783 (1980); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis.2d 332, 479 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Ct.App. 1991). The Johnsons argue that a constructive trust should be imposed in their favor against the government because of Bruce's mistake in not transferring title to them when he bought the property.

  3. Dahl v. Keller

    Case No. 18-CV-1526 (E.D. Wis. May. 20, 2019)

    "To state a claim on the theory of constructive trust the complaint must state facts sufficient to show (1) unjust enrichment and (2) abuse of a confidential relationship or some other form of unconscionable conduct." Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 533-34, 405 N.W.2d at 315; see also Ross v. Specialty Risk Consultants, 2000 WI App 258, 240 Wis. 2d 23, 34, 621 N.W.2d 669, 676 (citing Wilharms v. Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d 671, 678-79, 287 N.W.2d 779 (1980)); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis. 2d 332, 339, 479 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Ct. App. 1991).

  4. Foley v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co.

    Appeal No. 2017AP545 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2018)

    A. Standard of Review and Summary Judgment Methodology.¶41 The circuit court granted summary judgment to Wisconsin Mutual. Whether summary judgment should be granted is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis. 2d 332, 336, 479 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1991). ¶42 Summary judgment methodology is well established in Wisconsin.

  5. Estate of Traxler v. Traxler

    2016 WI App. 16 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015)

    We review summary judgment de novo, using the same standards and methodology applied by the circuit court. See Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis.2d 332, 336, 479 N.W.2d 247 (Ct.App.1991). As we have set forth the methodology for reviewing a summary judgment many times, see Green Springs Farm v. Kersten, 136 Wis.2d 304, 315–16, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987), we need not repeat it here.

  6. Eilola v. Hattlestad

    Case No. 99-0682-FT (Wis. Ct. App. Sep. 21, 1999)

    We review questions of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, giving deference to the trial court's weight and credibility determinations. Section 805.17(2), Stats. Whether the facts satisfy a legal standard presents a question of law that we review de novo. SeeCapitol Indem. Corp.v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis.2d 332, 338, 479 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Ct.App. 1991). Weix argues that in equity she is entitled to the retirement funds instead of Janice. Weix combines several factual and legal issues under this heading.

  7. Stanisz v. Hastings

    Case No. 95-2714 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1996)

    96 award representing the interest-rate differential was, therefore, premature. SeeCapitolIndem. Corp. v.Reasbeck, 166 Wis.2d 332, 338, 479 N.W.2d 247, 249 (1991) (an award of damages that has not been or may never be incurred is premature). We reverse that portion of the judgment awarding damages based on the interest-rate differential, and remand this matter to the trial court to retain jurisdiction over this case for a reasonable amount of time to permit the property to be conveyed.

  8. American States Ins. Co. v. Skrobis

    182 Wis. 2d 445 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 26 times
    Affirming the grant of summary judgment to an insurance company based upon an Absolute Pollution Exclusion and stating that, "as a matter of law, an insured cannot have a reasonable expectation of coverage when an unambiguous policy excludes coverage."

    We review summary judgment de novo, using the same standards and methodology applied by the trial court. See Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis.2d 737, 748, 470 N.W.2d 625, 629 (1991); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis.2d 332, 336, 479 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Ct.App. 1991). The court must first examine the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for relief. Voss, 162 Wis.2d at 747, 470 N.W.2d at 628. If it has, the court then shifts its inquiry to whether any factual issues exist.

  9. Park Bancorporation v. Sletteland

    182 Wis. 2d 131 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 37 times

    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a summary judgment de novo. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis.2d 332, 336, 479 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Ct.App. 1991). This review entails the same methodology applied by the circuit court. Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis.2d 737, 748, 470 N.W.2d 625, 629 (1991).

  10. Cook v. Continental Cas. Co.

    180 Wis. 2d 237 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 25 times
    In Cook v. Continental Casualty Co., 180 Wis.2d 237, 249, 509 N.W.2d 100 (Ct.App. 1993), we said: "Upon remand, Cook must prove not only that Hupy was negligent, but that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury...."

    SUMMARY JUDGMENT Our review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Capitol Indem. v. Reasbeck, 166 Wis.2d 332, 336, 479 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Ct.App. 1991). We apply the standards set forth in sec. 802.08 (2), Stats., in the same manner as the trial court.