Capitol Hill Hospital v. District of Columbia

9 Citing cases

  1. Walden v. District of Columbia Dept. Emp

    759 A.2d 186 (D.C. 2000)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that claimant met the threshold test when she offered a medical report from her doctor "clearly identif[ying] at least one new symptom attributable to ... previous injury" and a "significant change in the degree of her disability"

    Id. (citing section 36-324). Thus Short establishes that section 36-324 creates an exception to the doctrine of res judicata in cases that fall within its purview. See Capitol Hill Hospital v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 726 A.2d 682, 685 (D.C. 1999) ("ยง 36-324 is designed for the review of a specific compensation award covering an issue `previously decided' by that order"). From the case law we conclude that there are two exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata which may be applicable to this case.

  2. Fred F. Blanken Co. v. D.O.E.S

    825 A.2d 894 (D.C. 2003)   Cited 1 times
    Remanding for Director of DOES to address "important" issue in first instance

    Although Employer challenges the decisions of both the Examiner and the Director, "it is the Director's final decision, not the examiner's, which may be reviewed in this court." See Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 726 A.2d 682, 685 n. 2 (D.C. 1999). We review the Director's decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence, which is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

  3. Hughes-Turner v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs.

    277 A.3d 1282 (D.C. 2022)

    A disability becomes permanent rather than temporary once the claimant's condition reaches "maximum medical improvement." Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp. Servs. , 726 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claimant suffers from total disability if [the claimant's] injuries prevent [the claimant] from engaging in the only type of gainful employment for which [the claimant] is qualified."

  4. Frazier v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs.

    229 A.3d 131 (D.C. 2020)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining that the CMPA "specifically assigns" the responsibility of "reviewing decisions made after evidentiary hearings on ... initial claims for disability benefits" to the Director of DOES, who has delegated that responsibility to the CRB

    The CRB has taken that view in the private-sector setting. See Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 726 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. 1999) (deferring to CRB's conclusion that claimant can bring claim for permanent partial disability award under compensation schedule despite having previously obtained temporary benefits; court states that it would "make[ ] no sense" to interpret statutory time limits to make claimant ineligible to obtain permanent disability benefits before claimant became eligible for them). I realize that the private-sector workers' compensation provisions vary in some respects from the public-sector provisions, so that a holding from one context does not necessarily carry over to the other.

  5. Brown v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.

    83 A.3d 739 (D.C. 2014)   Cited 14 times
    Addressing issues arising from award of both "non-schedule" and "schedule" permanent partial benefits

    We conclude that the CRB's interpretation of D.C.Code ยง 32โ€“1507(d) is entitled to deference..726 A.2d 682 (D.C.1999).Id. at 685 (quoting Short v. D.C Dep't of Emp't Servs., 723 A.2d 845, 849 (D.C.1998)).

  6. Combs v. Dept. of Empl. Serv

    983 A.2d 1004 (D.C. 2009)   Cited 4 times

    Because Combs had made a claim for TTD within a year of the 1991 accident, he was not precluded from requesting compensation for TPD in 2003, for the one-year limitation period does not apply in this situation. See, e.g., Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 726 A.2d 682, 684-86 (D.C. 1999) (construing earlier version of statute and holding that an initial claim for TTD or TPD preserves a subsequent claim for PPD). It was therefore potentially, to Combs' substantial advantage, after May 18, 2005, to attribute his injury to the 1991 accident rather than to one that occurred in 1996.Affirmed.

  7. Wmata v. Dist. of Columbia Does

    981 A.2d 1216 (D.C. 2009)   Cited 1 times

    WMATA did not reach the different question presented in this case, whether a request for modification is the sole avenue for relief available to a claimant who develops new or aggravated injuries caused by a covered work accident with respect to which a claim for compensation has already been adjudicated, but for a different injury. The only other case to consider a subsequent claim following the same accident at work, and the one we find most instructive, is Capitol Hill Hosp. v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 726 A.2d 682 (D.C. 1999). There, after the claimant had suffered an injury and been awarded temporary total disability benefits, it was determined that the injury resulted in a permanent ten percent physical impairment, and the claimant sought compensation for the resulting loss.

  8. Office of the People's Counsel v. Public Service Commission

    889 A.2d 1003 (D.C. 2006)   Cited 1 times

    Finally, an agency's interpretation of a statute is controlling "`unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the statute.'" Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Servs., 726 A.2d 682, 684 (D.C. 1999) (quoting District of Columbia v. Davis, 685 A.2d 389, 393 (D.C. 1996)). This court will "defer to an agency's construction of the statute it is charged with administering as long as that construction enhances the general purposes and policies underlying the statute."

  9. Gross v. District of Columbia Does

    826 A.2d 393 (D.C. 2003)   Cited 6 times

    "[I]t is the Director's final decision, not the [ALJ]'s, which may be reviewed in this court." See Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 726 A.2d 682, 685 n. 2 (D.C. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). D.C. Code ยง 32-1501(9) (2001) defines an employee as "every person, including a minor, in the service of another under any contract for hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, in the District of Columbia . . . ."