Capes v. Morgan

7 Citing cases

  1. Krieger v. Walton County Board of Commissioners

    269 Ga. 678 (Ga. 1998)   Cited 9 times
    In Krieger, supra at (3), we acknowledged that a home rule ordinance was a proper manner for effecting a change in such supervision.

    Since the board has the express authority to hire these individuals, the necessary implication is that the board does not have the authority to hire other county employees. Instead, the general power to hire and fire rests with the chairperson in his position as the board's executive officer with power to superintend all of the county's work. Cf. Madden v. Bellew, 260 Ga. 530 ( 397 S.E.2d 687) (1990) (local act gave chairperson of the Madison County Board of Commissioners authority to employ all county personnel with the approval of a board majority); Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1 ( 218 S.E.2d 764) (1975) (local act gave chairperson of the Newton County Board of Commissioners the power to hire and fire all employees). 1929 Ga. Laws at 754.

  2. Newsome v. City of Union Point

    291 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 13 times

    As a result, this motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment under Code Ann. ยง 81A-156. See Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1, 4 ( 218 S.E.2d 764) (1975). Because this evidence and these arguments were presented without objection by the parties as to the 30 day time requirements of ยง 81A-156 (c), and because it is clear that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the question of this plaintiff's standing could be determined as a matter of law, summary judgment on the question of standing was proper.

  3. Burry v. DeKalb County

    299 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 6 times

    The motion to dismiss for lack of standing therefore when supported by evidence outside the pleadings became a summary judgment. Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1, 4 ( 218 S.E.2d 764). "Plaintiffs were entitled to notice of conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and 30 days to respond to such motion."

  4. Willis v. Rabun County Bank

    161 Ga. App. 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant on fraud claim because purported promise was "wholly without consideration"

    Appellant correctly points out that the trial court's consideration of matters outside the pleadings converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1 (I) ( 218 S.E.2d 764). The first enumeration of error asserted by appellant is that the trial court erred in considering a copy of the first deed to secure debt which was attached as an exhibit to appellee's brief filed in support of the motion to dismiss.

  5. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Tesler

    282 S.E.2d 703 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    Although the parties and the trial court have denoted appellee's motion one of dismissal, when matters were stipulated into evidence and considered by the court in deciding the motion, the motion was thereby converted into a motion for summary judgment. Code Ann. ยง 81A-112 (b) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 622 through 1972, pp. 689, 692, 693; Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1 (1) ( 218 S.E.2d 764)). In a motion for summary judgment, decision is made based upon the pleadings and evidence of record as to whether there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

  6. Coates v. Doss

    265 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    The court's consideration of outside evidence converted its judgment to the grant of a motion for summary judgment. See Daylight Ind., Inc. v. Allen, 123 Ga. App. 69 ( 179 S.E.2d 542); Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1 (I) ( 218 S.E.2d 764); Unigard Ins. Co. v. Kemp, 141 Ga. App. 698 (4) ( 234 S.E.2d 539). See also Newsrack Supply, Inc. v. Heinle, 127 Ga. App. 843 (1) ( 195 S.E.2d 193). Since plaintiff has not asserted on appeal (nor did she complain below) that she was not timely served with a motion for summary judgment (see in this regard Johnson v. Heifler, 141 Ga. App. 460 (1) ( 233 S.E.2d 853)), the court's grant of summary judgment was not improper on the grounds that it was inadvertently denominated a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

  7. Williams v. Columbus, Georgia

    259 S.E.2d 705 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 9 times

    Since the order in the case sub judice recites a consideration of evidence we treat such as tantamount to ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Newsrack Supply, Inc. v. Heinle, 127 Ga. App. 843 (1) ( 195 S.E.2d 193); Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1, 4 ( 218 S.E.2d 764). We are constrained to reverse because of a procedural ground.