Opinion
C. A. 5:21-03765-RMG-KDW
01-06-2023
Kevin W. Capell, a/k/a Kevin Capell #283227, Plaintiff, v. Director Patricia Ray; Major Lumpkin; and Capt. Willie Sweat, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 54. Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion on July 19, 2022. ECF No. 66. Defendants filed a Reply on July 26, 2022. ECF No. 67. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in prisoner petitions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court now issues the following Report and Recommendation (“R&R”).
I. Factual Background
On November 17, 2021, Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee, filed this action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging several Defendants violated his constitutional rights afforded by the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff then amended his claims to add facts related to the allegations he raised in his initial filing. ECF No. 37.
The named Defendants include Patricia Ray, Director of the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center (the “Detention Center”); Chanae Lumpkin, Deputy Major and Assistant Director at the Detention Center; and W. Sweat, Captain at the Detention Center. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, on March 10, 2021, Plaintiff was detained at the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center and placed in quarantine for fourteen days. ECF No. 37 at 2. After testing negative for COVID-19, he was placed in Bravo Pod (“B-Pod”). ECF No. 37 at 2. While in B-Pod, Plaintiff alleges he began having issues with Officer Gregg-Wright, to whom he admittedly responded “harshly” in interacting with this officer. Id. at 3. Thereafter, on July 9, 2021, Plaintiff alleges Officer Gregg-Wright directed a racial comment toward him, and Plaintiff initially notified Defendant Sweat. Id. at 4.According to Plaintiff, he used the kiosk system to make formal complaints to Defendant Lumpkin and Defendant Sweat regarding these issues, but he alleges nothing was done regarding Officer Gregg-Wright's behavior. Id. at 4. Plaintiff believes as a result of this notification, Officer Gregg-Wright informed him that he “would be handled.” ECF No. 37-1 at 7. A few days later Plaintiff was moved to Charlie Pod (“C-Pod”), which Plaintiff terms the “quarantine unit.” ECF No. 37 at 4. Plaintiff alleges he did not want to go to C-Pod for fear of getting sick; however, Defendant Sweat told Plaintiff that he was moved there by Defendant Ray because he was “making too big of a fuss” in B-Pod. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that on August 25, 2021, he contracted COVID-19. Id. at 5. This fact is not in dispute. Plaintiff alleges that Director Ray violated his rights by moving him to C-Pod knowing of the risk that Plaintiff could contract COVID-19, but nevertheless moved him to that pod. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges he suffered from physical pain, as well as mental anguish because he knew COVID-19 was killing many people, and in fact his grandmother had died of COVID-19. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also generally alleges he was denied pain medication and refused mental health treatment. Id.
Officer Gregg-Wright whose alleged actions Plaintiff claims resulted in him being unfairly moved from one pod to another, is not a named defendant in this lawsuit. Officer Gregg-Wright provided affidavit testimony, which is included in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, wherein she denies the claims that she used racial slurs toward Plaintiff or punished him for “no reason.” See Affidavit of Officer Gregg-Wright, attached to Defs.'s Br. at ECF No. 54-2.
Further, in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, he alleges additional facts regarding the treatment he claims came from Officer Gregg-Wright, including her yelling at him in front of other detainees, taking away recreational time to take a shower, and making the comment that she has never “met a white life that mattered,” apparently referencing Plaintiff's skin color. ECF No. 37. Plaintiff also added as relief a requested injunction to enjoin Defendants from housing detainees in “inhumane” conditions and to remove Defendants from their positions at the Detention Center. ECF No. 37 at 8.
Defendants provided their own affidavits, which set forth the following facts: Defendants assert that when Plaintiff arrived at the Detention Center, the only pods he could be housed in were B-Pod and C-Pod due to his status as a maximum-security inmate. Affidavit of Defendant Lumpkin, ¶ 6, attached to Defs.' Brief at ECF No. 54-3. Plaintiff does not refute that these are the only two available pods, nor does Plaintiff refute his security classification. According to the Defendants, these two pods have the same privileges and restrictions. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges C-Pod contains additional restrictions than the restrictions in B-Pod. Upon learning that Plaintiff was experiencing conflict with Officer Gregg-Wright, Defendant Ray indicates she investigated the claims by Plaintiff that Officer Gregg-Wright was making negative racial comments toward him. Ray Aff., ¶¶ 14-20, attached to Defs.' Brief at ECF No. 54-4.While Defendant Ray states that no other inmates or officers indicated they heard these alleged comments, she ultimately made the decision to move Plaintiff to avoid any additional conflict or confrontation. Ray Aff., ¶¶ 14-20. Due to Plaintiff's security classification, the only other option for Plaintiff was C-Pod, which Defendant Ray also asserts has the same privileges and restrictions as B-Pod. Id. While Plaintiff alleges he was at a higher risk of contracting COVID-19 in C-Pod, Defendants refute this claim. To that end, Defendants argue that B-Pod had more positive COVID-19 test results at that time, and inmates in every pod had tested positive for COVID-19. Lumpkin Aff., ¶¶ 16-20; Affidavit of Defendant Sweat, ¶¶ 7; 16-20; attached to Defs.' Brief at ECF No. 545. Defendants Sweat's involvement in the allegations complained of by Plaintiff include moving Plaintiff to C-Pod at the direction of Defendant Ray and responding to grievances related to Plaintiff's complaints against Officer Gregg-Wright. Sweat Aff., ¶¶ 15; 22-23. Defendant Lumpkin's involvement with Plaintiff's allegations includes responding to grievances related to Plaintiff's complaints against Officer Gregg-Wright. Lumpkin Aff., ¶¶ 11-14. Admittedly, Plaintiff acknowledges he argued back with this officer, and does not necessarily dispute that they should have been separated. Instead, Plaintiff believes the officer should have been removed from her position in B-Pod, rather than he be moved to a pod that he believes left him more susceptible to COVID-19.
Plaintiff provides several affidavits from inmates who state that they heard the same or same similar comment made by Officer Gregg-Wright. In their Reply, Defendants state that these statements were never produced during the initial investigation of these claims, even though inmates were asked whether they witnessed Officer Gregg-Wright make these statements. Defs.' Reply at 2; see also Supplemental Affidavit of Lumpkin, ¶¶ 3-4, attached to Defendants' Reply.
II. Standard of Review
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
Defendants argue several grounds exist for the court to grant summary judgment as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims: (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity; (2) supervisory liability is inapplicable as to Defendants Lumpkin and Sweat under § 1983; (3) Plaintiff has failed to prove a violation of either the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants also assert that this action should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E) and § 1915(A) and count as a strike.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants assert that they are immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacity. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2019). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
Here, Defendants argue that they are all state officials and therefore not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Defendants argue that a Sheriff and his deputies in South Carolina are considered state officials. See, e.g., Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a sheriff, in his capacity as a state official, is immune from suit under § 1983 for money damages); see also Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525, 308 S.C. 109 (S.C. 1992) (holding that sheriffs and deputies are state officials).Defendants argue that they were acting in their official capacity at the time the incident in question took place. In response, Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not allow for officers to conduct themselves in an unprofessional manner and does not condone abuse of authority. However, Plaintiff does not specifically assert which conduct on the part of these Defendants was an abuse of authority. Plaintiff also does not acknowledge that the law is clear that state officials, of which Defendants in this case are, are immune from suit in their official capacity. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants, to the extent these claims are brought against Defendants in their official capacity.
All three Defendants provided in their affidavits that they are employed by the Sumter County Sheriff's Office. See Defs.' Br. at 6; see also Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 1; Ray Aff., ¶ 1; Sweat Aff., ¶ 1.
2. Supervisory Liability under § 1983
Defendants argue that while Plaintiff names Defendants Lumpkin and Sweat in his Complaint, the allegations are simply vague assertions that these Defendants failed to properly respond to grievances. Defs.' Br. at 7. Defendants argue that because they are being named as supervisors without the requisite involvement needed to establish a § 1983 claim, these Defendants must be dismissed. Defs.' Br. at 7. Plaintiff responds that he brought “awareness” in the form of grievances to Defendants Lumpkin and Sweat, but nothing ever came of his grievances. Pl.'s Br. at 3.
Liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in these cases. Id.; see Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). However, supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances upon a “recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1984)). To establish supervisory liability under § 1983 one must show: (1) the “supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a ‘pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury”; (2) the “supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,'”; and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link between the supervisors inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal citation omitted).
Defendant Lumpkin explained in her affidavit that she usually handles front-office work, even though she did respond to one grievance from Plaintiff. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 2; ¶ 12. Defendant Lumpkin further explains that upon reviewing the grievance, wherein Plaintiff alleged that Officer Gregg-Wright wrongfully withheld his shower privileges, Defendant Lumpkin advised Plaintiff she would look into the matter. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 12. In so doing, she found that prior to the revocation of the shower for one day, Plaintiff had used profane language and ignored officer's commands; therefore, he lost his shower/recreation time for one day. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 12; see Exhibit A and B to Lumpkin Aff. In response, Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendants Sweat and Lumpkin did not properly respond to grievances related to the alleged mistreatment by Officer Gregg-Wright. To the extent Plaintiff argues that he believes his grievances were “ignored” or “nothing was done” in response to his complaints, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff does not allege a violation of the grievance procedure. Additionally, a prisoner does not have a constitutionally protected right to “grievance procedures or access to any grievance procedure voluntarily established by a state.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Second, Plaintiff also acknowledges that it was Defendant Ray who made the decision to move him to a different pod, not Defendants Sweat or Lumpkin. Finally, Plaintiff does not refute the fact that Defendant Lumpkin usually handles front-office work, and he does not specifically respond to her contention that she investigated his complaints regarding the loss of recreation time. Here, it is clear from the information provided in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that Defendant Lumpkin did respond to and investigate Plaintiff's grievance; however, he simply did not like the result of this investigation. Plaintiff does not otherwise alleged Defendant Lumpkin had any personal involvement in his claims. Plaintiff's vague assertions that Defendant Lumpkin “did nothing” to aide him in his conflict with Officer Gregg-Wright is not only unsupported by the record before the court, but it does not rise to the level of actionable conduct under § 1983.
As to Defendant Sweat, he alleges within his Affidavit that he is responsible for supervising staff. Sweat Aff., ¶ 2. Defendant Sweat states that he received a grievance filed by Plaintiff on July 13, 2021, alleging that Officer Gregg-Wright made racial comments toward him. Sweat Aff., ¶ 11. Defendant Sweat stated he investigated these issues and found that Officer Gregg-Wright denied making any such statements, and that Plaintiff had discussed having a confrontation with Officer Gregg-Wright. Sweat Aff., ¶ 12. After discussing with Defendant Ray, Defendant Sweat states that Defendant Ray made the decision to move Plaintiff to avoid any additional conflict. Sweat Aff., ¶¶ 14-15. Defendant Sweat avers that Plaintiff was treated the same in C-Pod as he had been in B-Pod and that the same precautions exist in both pods. Sweat Aff., ¶¶ 16. Again, Plaintiff does not refute these claims other than to allege that Defendant Sweat did not “do anything” about his issues with Officer Gregg-Wright. Still, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the response of Defendant Sweat was inadequate or otherwise showed deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff by moving him to a different pod. Nor does Plaintiff make any showing that there was a causal link between any alleged inaction and Plaintiff contracting COVID-19. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that any claims against Defendant Sweat and Lumpkin under the doctrine of supervisory liability be dismissed.
3. Constitutional Violations
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights by moving him to a pod in the Detention Center that Plaintiff alleges resulted in him having had a higher risk for contracting COVID-19 and where Plaintiff in fact contracted COVID-19. Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to establish that any of the Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. In Plaintiff's response, he contends that upon having issues with Officer Gregg-Wright, she punished Plaintiff by taking away recreation time. Pl.'s Br. at 2. Plaintiff further contends that after complaining to Defendants Sweat and Lumpkin, nothing was done. Pl.'s Br. at 3. Plaintiff contends that Officer Gregg-Wright then made racist comments toward him, and when he complained about this treatment, Defendant Ray moved him to C-Pod, where he contracted COVID-19, which he alleges to be a form of punishment. Pl.'s Br. at 3-4.
Plaintiff also implies in his Amended Complaint that due to a “more than professional relationship” between Defendant Ray and Officer Gregg-Wright, he was being punished; however, he provides no evidence or other factual support for this claim. ECF No. 37 at 5.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relief may be sought when a plaintiff alleges the violation of a right secured by the Constitution by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Askins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). However, because Plaintiff is or was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged violation, Plaintiff's claim is properly brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Coney v. Davis, 809 Fed App'x 158, 159 (4th Cir. 2020).
At its core, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that he was moved from B-Pod to C-Pod as “punishment” for raising concerns about his interactions with an officer at the Detention Center. Pretrial detainees possess the right to be “free from punishment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt. Bell, 411 U.S. at 535. Therefore, conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees are to be evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). However, not every disability imposed upon pretrial detainees amounts to “punishment” violating one's constitutional rights. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. A court must decide whether the imposed disability is to punish or whether it is incidental to a legitimate government purpose. Id. at 528. To prevail on such a claim, a pretrial detainee must show either (1) an expressed intent to punish or (2) a lack of a reasonable relationship to a “legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred.” Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990-91 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Martin v. Gentle, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff has failed to establish either an expressed intent to punish or a lack of a reasonable relationship between the complained of action and a legitimate governmental objective in this case.
Plaintiff argues that the move to C-Pod was punitive in nature, and that because of the move from B-Pod to C-Pod, he not only lost privileges but was at a higher risk for contracting COVID-19. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that he directed grievances beforehand to Defendants; however, he alleges Defendants did not do anything about his complaints. In response, Defendants provide affidavit testimony and provide exhibits to explain that Plaintiff's move to C-Pod does not amount to a constitutional violation. First, Defendants explain that due to Plaintiff's classification as a maximum-security inmate, the only housing options available were B-Pod and C-Pod. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 6; Ray Aff., ¶ 5; Sweat Aff., ¶ 5. Inmates in these pods are treated the same, and both of these pods have been used as a quarantine unit for COVID-19 positive inmates. Lumpkin Aff., ¶¶ 6-7; Ray Aff., ¶¶ 5, 8; Sweat Aff., ¶¶ 5; 7. Defendant Lumpkin further testified in her affidavit that the contact with inmates in both of these pods are the same, and that there were more inmates who have tested positive for COVID-19 in B-Pod than in C-Pod at that point in time. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 17. Indeed, Defendant Lumpkin points out that not only are the same precautions followed in both pods, but that Plaintiff initially did not have a cellmate when he was moved to C-Pod. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 18. While Plaintiff alleges this is not accurate, he does not raise a genuine dispute as to whether the testimony of the three Defendants is true. Plaintiff simply contends that C-Pod does not receive outside recreation or haircuts, along with unspecified “other unfair treatment.” Pl.'s Br. at 4. For example, Plaintiff argues that inmates in C-Pod were not allowed to get haircuts, and he attached a grievance wherein he asks about shaving. Pl.'s Br. at 5. However, the grievance he attached to his Response does not establish that the pods have different privileges; instead, the grievance reflects that the response he received was that barbers were provided for the facility, and he would be notified when they are available. ECF No. 66-1 at 4. Moreover, even if C-Pod had less privileges, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this alone amounts to a constitutional violation given that he agreed he and the officer should be separated, and he does not refute the fact that C-Pod was the only other available pod for his security classification. While Plaintiff may disagree with the handling or administration of the jail, he has not shown that the move from B-Pod to C-Pod was done as a punishment, rather than a safety measure.
Defendant Ray explains in her affidavit that she became aware that Plaintiff had filed several grievances concerning problems with Officer Gregg-Wright, and that Plaintiff indicated he was going to confront this officer. Ray Aff., ¶ 14. Defendant Ray knew that Plaintiff wanted the officer to be removed from B-Pod; however, Defendant Ray explained in her affidavit that the Detention Center does not have a practice of moving officers from a pod upon request of an inmate. Ray Aff., ¶ 17. Instead, Defendant Ray states that after consulting with several officers, she made the decision to move Plaintiff to C-Pod. Ray Aff., ¶ 18. Defendant Ray states that the decision was not an unusual one, that it was made to keep both inmates and staff safe, and that it was not meant to punish Plaintiff, as his privileges in both B-Pod and C-Pod would be the same. Ray Aff., ¶ 19. Defendant Ray also explains that when he was moved, Plaintiff was initially in a cell by himself and when he was given a cellmate, the cellmate was not positive for COVID-19. Ray Aff., ¶ 22. Defendant Sweat also explained that he moved Plaintiff at Defendant Ray's direction, that he believed it was a good decision, and that it is not unusual to move an inmate who is experiencing conflict with an officer. Sweat Aff., ¶ 15. In other words, Plaintiff transferred pods as a safety measure to separate him from the allegedly offending officer, and indeed Plaintiff initially was placed in a cell by himself.
Plaintiff does not refute the fact that he and Officer Gregg-Wright had conflict, and in fact implicitly acknowledges that he responded harshly back to this officer on at least one occasion. ECF No. 34-1 at 3. Nor does Plaintiff raise a genuine issue of material fact in response to Defendant Ray's explanation that the decision to transfer him to the only other available pod due to his security classification was to avoid continued conflict with Officer Gregg-Wright. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a prisoner does not have a constitution right to be housed at a particular institution or receive a particular security classification). Indeed, Plaintiff was in favor of being separated from the officer, but he objected to being transferred to a different pod rather than her being removed from her position in B-Pod. Additionally, the rationale given behind Defendants' reasons for placing Plaintiff in C-Pod do not indicate an expressed intent to punish, nor has Plaintiff raised a genuine issue as to whether any facts support his contentions to the contrary. Further, Defendants have established a reasonable relationship between moving Plaintiff to C-Pod and a legitimate safety objective. Generally, courts will not interfere with administrative matters within a prison. See generally Sweet v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 859 (4th Cir. 1975) (describing federal court's deference to prison administrators and all administrative matters unless the condition arises to the level of a constitutional violation). Finally, while Plaintiff claims Defendants ignored his grievances, the evidence provided does not support this claim. Defendants attached a grievance from Plaintiff, answered by Defendant Lumpkin, who indicated he was going to discuss the issue of Officer Gregg-Wright not allowing Plaintiff to shower. See Exhibit A to Lumpkin Aff.; ECF No. 54-3 at 6. Similarly, Defendant Sweat responded to a grievance stating that he would forward Plaintiff's request for help with Officer Gregg-Wright to administration. Exhibit A to Sweat Aff. While Plaintiff feels these were “irrelevant” responses, he has not established that this behavior amounts to a constitutional violation. Further, while Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 subsequent to the move, there is also no evidence put forth by Plaintiff that the changing of pods equated to a higher risk of contracting COVID-19. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to establish that there are any material facts to support his claims that Defendants moved him to a different pod in order to punish him.
To the extent Plaintiff is making an Eighth Amendment claim that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to him testing positive for COVID-19, the undersigned notes that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a pretrial detainee violates the due process clause. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001). A pretrial detainee's claims related to inadequate medical care are governed by the standard of care under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). While the scope of the obligation to provide medical care to a pretrial detainee is unclear, the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are as great as the protections afforded under the Eighth Amendment to convicted prisoners. Id. at 991.
To establish that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of adequate medical care, Plaintiff must establish first that he suffered a serious medical condition; that is, one that is either “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or is “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)). Second, Plaintiff must establish that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety,” which requires that the official have “had actual subjective knowledge of both the inmate's serious medical condition and the excessive risk posed by the official's action or inaction.” Mays, 992 F.3d at 300 (citations omitted). Stated another way, deliberate indifference is met by showing a defendant actually knew of and ignored a detainee's serious need for medical care. Parrish ex. Rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied pain medication to treat the physical pain associated with COVID-19 and refused mental health treatment. ECF No. 37-1 at 9. Plaintiff also alleges that he was only given vitamins for treatment, and that he suffered mentally knowing COVID-19 had killed many people. ECF No. 37-1 at 8. The undersigned notes that none of the Defendants are medical providers. Plaintiff does not indicate which Defendants, if any, were allegedly not providing him treatment, or otherwise had knowledge that he was in physical pain related to COVID-19 and failed to act accordingly. Nor does Plaintiff allege that he informed anyone specifically that he was worried about dying from COVID-19. In fact, Plaintiff provides his medical records showing that he tested positive for COVID-19, and that he was put on the nurse's list for follow up. Exhibit E to Plaintiff's Br.; ECF No. 66-1 at 14. Further, the medical records show that mental health was notified after Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19. See id.
It appears that the core issue complained of by Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint relates to the conflict he experienced with Officer Gregg-Wright. However, Plaintiff did not name this officer as a Defendant. His evidence to support his allegations are affidavits of several inmates who allege that they heard Officer Gregg-Wright make what the undersigned will assume for purposes of this R&R was a racially-motivated comment toward Plaintiff.However, even assuming the officer made this comment, Plaintiff does not refute the fact that Defendants investigated these claims and decided to move Plaintiff so that he would not have any additional interaction with this officer. While it is unfortunate that he contracted COVID-19, Plaintiff has also failed to establish that Defendants transferred him to this pod knowing he would likely contract COVID-19. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that any of the policies or procedures of the Detention Center caused him to be at a heightened risk of catching COVID-19 in C-Pod as opposed to B-Pod. Having considered Plaintiff's arguments, the undersigned recommends finding that Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation on the part of these Defendants. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to Defendants.
Plaintiff's affidavit testimony includes the affidavits of Diontre Brown, Jason Geddings, Esteban Delgado, and Freddie Curtis, all of whom indicate they heard Officer Gregg-Wright make the comment that she “never seen a white life that mattered.” Exhibit D to Plaintiff's Br.; ECF No. 66-1 at 9-12. However, these individuals also state that the comment was made incident to an argument between Plaintiff and Officer Gregg-Wright. For her part, Officer Gregg-Wright denies ever making such a statement. Gregg-Wright Aff., ¶ 4. Additionally, in Defendants' Reply, they attach the supplemental affidavit of Defendant Lumpkin, who advises that these inmates did not produce these affidavits during the initial investigation conducted after Plaintiff grieved this issue over a year ago. Lumpkin Aff. ¶¶ 3-4.
4. Qualified Immunity
Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In evaluating whether qualified immunity applies, the court must determine: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff show that Defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the complained of misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The Fourth Circuit has stated that the purpose of qualified immunity is to ensure that government officials can perform their job free from the specter of endless and debilitating lawsuits. Torchinksy v. Siwinksi, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff did not respond to this argument.
The undersigned recommends finding that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. As previously analyzed, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right. While Plaintiff argues that he should never have been placed in C-Pod, he does not show that the decision to move him to a different pod amounted to a constitutional violation, nor did he show that any Defendants were aware of a heightened risk to Plaintiff catching COVID-19 in C-Pod as opposed to B-Pod. Plaintiff does not make any showing that Defendants had any knowledge that C-Pod was more contagious, and in fact Defendants refute that claim. Plaintiff has not otherwise explained how Defendants' conduct violates a clearly established right. Therefore, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
5. Request for Strike under § 1915(E) and § 1915(A)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are frivolous in that they lacked legal merit, that Plaintiff knew they were false, and that he has no evidence to support them. Defs.' Br. at 22. Specifically, Defendants argue Plaintiff named Defendants who had limited or no contact with Plaintiff and that Plaintiff lacked evidence to support any allegation of a constitutional violation. Defs.' Br. at 22. The undersigned does not find Plaintiff's Complaint or Amended Complaint to have been filed frivolously. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the request to consider this action as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 54, be granted and the claims against Defendants be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).