Opinion
C.A. No. 99A-05-006-CG.
Date Submitted: May 26, 2000.
Date Decided: June 12, 2000.
On Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Affirmed.
Scott A. Capaldi, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se, Appellant.
Sentry Homes, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware, Unrepresented, Appellee.
James J. Hanley, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Appellee, Unemployment Insurance Board.
ORDER
This 12th day of June, 2000, upon consideration of the record in the case and the papers filed by the Appellant and Appellee, Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Appellant, Scott Capaldi, filed an application for unemployment benefits with the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance for a period of time effective January 11, 1998. After conducting a fact finding interview, a Claims Deputy referred the matter to an Appeals Referee for determination, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3318 (a), due to the complexity of the facts involved.
(2) On June 25, 1998, the Appeals Referee held a hearing to consider Capaldi's application for benefits. On June 30, 1998, the Appeals Referee issued a written decision determining that Capaldi served as a sub-contractor to Sentry Homes, Inc., rather than as an employee. As a result, the Appeals Referee concluded that Capaldi was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The Referee's Decision stated that the last day to file an appeal of the determination was July 10, 1998. Capaldi did not file an appeal of the Appeals Referee's decision with the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board until March 1, 1999.
(3) On April 14, 1999, the Board held a hearing to consider the sole issue of the timeliness of Capaldi's appeal. At the hearing, Capaldi testified, ". . . the reason why we were so late, I was so late in filing an appeal was when his decision was rendered originally in reading the document I misinterpreted it." Capaldi explained that he did not understand that the Board was reviewing benefits Capaldi had already received as well as future benefits. The Board, in its written decision, determined that the Capaldi's appeal was filed late and that there was no evidence to suggest that the appeal was late due to Department of Labor error. Therefore, the Board declined to assume jurisdiction over the late appeal.
(4) Capaldi has now appealed the Board's decision to this Court pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3323(a). Although Capaldi also argues the merits of his claim for unemployment benefits in his opening brief, the Court notes that the sole issue properly before the Court is the correctness of the Board's decision to dismiss the late appeal. Capaldi argues, as he did before the Board, that he did not understand the scope of the Appeals Referee's decision.
(5) This Court's review of the Board's decision is two-fold. First, the Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Capaldi filed an untimely appeal and whether the Board's proceedings are free from legal error. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Duncan, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 308 (1975). Next, the Court must determine whether the Board abused its discretion by not exercising, sua sponte, its power to hear the case on the merits despite the fact that the appeal was untimely. Thornton v. Caldwell Flexible, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95A-10-001, Barron, J. (Apr. 19, 1996), Order at 2.
(6) Pursuant to 19 Del, C. § 3320, the Board may, on its own motion, hear cases filed beyond the ten-day appeal deadline set forth in 19 Del. C. § 3318(c). However, this power is limited to cases "where there has been some administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor which deprived the claimant of some opportunity to file a timely appeal, or in those cases where the interest of justice would not be served by the inaction." Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Supr., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (1991).
(7) Capaldi does not dispute that he filed his appeal with the Board well past the ten-day deadline. Nor does Capaldi claim that the lateness of his appeal was due to Department of Labor error. Rather, Capaldi states that he misunderstood the Appeals Referee's decision.
(8) Given these facts, the Court must determine whether the Board abused its discretion by failing to exercise its power to hear the case sua sponte because it was required to do so in the interest of justice. In order to make that determination, the Court must measure the severity of the facts of this case to those considered in Funk, 591 A.2d 222. In Funk, the Board refused to consider a late appeal where the claimant stated that the postal service delivered the notice of determination to his parents' house by mistake. Funk held that, while the Board may act sua sponte to consider the merits of a late appeal, the circumstances must be "much more severe" than the facts presented by the claimant. Id. at 225.
(9) The Court finds that the facts surrounding Capaldi's untimely appeal cannot be considered "much more severe" than those presented by Funk. Capaldi admits that he received the determination and that the lateness of his appeal was due only to his own misunderstanding. The Court also notes that the appeal was filed nearly eight months after the appeals period lapsed. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Board did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept jurisdiction over the late appeal.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Board's decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.